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This thesis discusses the local self-government of Wanxi from two perspectives. 
One is from the central-local relationship, and the other is from the local state building. 
In the 1930s, some local elites in Wanxi organized mintuan - or the People’s Militia - to 
suppress the rampant banditry in this remote and hilly region. On the base of powerful 
local armed force, these elite drove the Guomindang’s administration out of this region 
and established a local self-government. In the following ten years, they successfully 
resisted the Guomindang provincial government’s effort of resuming its rule in Wanxi. 
The local self-government of Wanxi seriously challenged the authority of the state. As 
such, the history of the local self-government of Wanxi was regarded as a vivid case of 
Guomindang’s failure in extending the state power. 
Although it impeded the process of power centralization, the local 
self-government of Wanxi was one significant rural reconstruction experiment in the 
1930s. The elite that ran the local self-government, contributed to the stabilization of 
the social order, improved the local economy, and developed the rural education in this 
region. In this thesis, their activities were known as the “local state building”. This term 
refers that when the central or provincial government was incapable of stabilizing and 
developing the rural society, the locality, and especially the bandit-and-poverty-ridden 
counties such as Wanxi, could find itself a feasible way of social development. In the 
long run, this kind of local effort would prove to be helpful for the national 
modernization.  
In the Rural Reconstruction Movement of the 1930s, Wanxi had a distinctive 
 iv
feature, which came from its political dimension. When compared with other rural 
reconstruction experiments, Wanxi did enjoy full autonomy. The autonomy of Wanxi 
was generated from the local self-government, and the self-government was based on 
the powerful local armed force. Therefore, we can argue that the local self-government 
of Wanxi was a blend of local militarization and rural reconstruction. To add, the 
experiment of Wanxi was led by local elites. They were much less utopian in their 
vision as compared to the intellectuals in the Rural Reconstruction Movement. The 
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Wanxi is located in the southwestern part of Nanyang City of Henan Province, 
China. It consists of several counties, such as Zhenping, Neixiang, Xichuan, Deng, 
and Xixia. Because Nanyang was known as “Wan” in the ancient time, the local 
residents call these counties “Wanxi”—“the west of Nanyang”. 
Wanxi is a place where three provinces—Henan, Hubei, and Shaanxi—meet. It 
is surrounded by mountains such as the Mountain Range Qinling and Dabie. In this 
region, although the number of cultivated land is very small, hills can be seen 
everywhere. Therefore, the local people call Wanxi “Seven mountains, one river, and 
minute land (qi shan yi shui liang fen tian七山一水两分田)”. The traffic in this 
region is extremely poor. In the 1920s, Wanxi was about four hundred kilometers 
from Kaifeng, the capital city of Henan Province. It was far from the Beijing-Hankou 
and Lanzhou-Xuzhou trunk railways. Due to its closeness and lack of cultivated land, 
Wanxi was one of the most backward regions in Henan.  
In those days, Wanxi was suffering from the persistent instability and abject 
poverty. Under such circumstances, bandits became extremely rampant and their 
frequent and brutal looting, kidnapping, and killing put the society of Wanxi into 
chaos. Unfortunately, the local governments of Wanxi were incapable and indifferent. 
Hence, they could not stop the disturbance caused by bandit gangs. To make things 
worse, some senior officials of the county governments even colluded with bandit 
chieftains. The worsening situation and the discontent with the local governments 
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motivated local elites of Wanxi, especially those who were educated and intelligent, to 
take the initiative to prevent the society from falling into the abyss of disorder. 
The local elite painstakingly reorganized and trained traditional militias, and did 
their best to upgrade them into a well-organized, strictly disciplined, and 
combat-worthy local armed force, which was called mintuan, or commonly known as 
the people’s militia. Among them, Peng Yuting, Bie Tingfang, Chen Shunde, and 
Ning Xigu made many contributions to build up mintuan. Peng was born in the 
Zhenping County and had served in General Feng Yuxiang’s army for a long period of 
time. Subsequently, he was promoted to a senior military position1. Ning came from 
Deng County and was educated in the Whampoa Military Academy. He participated 
in the two Northern Expeditions in the 1920s and was a veteran soldier. Bie was a 
famous military strongman in Neixiang County and he had a powerful private army 
even before the local self-government of Wanxi. Chen was born in a noble family2 in 
the Xichuan County and was an active political figure in Nanyang. The four men 
created the new mintuan and began suppressing bandits. In 1930, Peng Yuting 
persuaded the other three leaders to incorporate their troops and establish a unified 
local self-government in Wanxi. 
Peng Yuting was a “regionalist”3 and had one distinctive political idea, which 
                                                 
1 General Feng had very good impression of Peng’s performance in his Northwest Army. Peng left 
the Army in 1927. Subsequently, he began his self-government work in Zhenping. Feng did not know 
much about Peng’s work. After 1930, Feng was defeated by Jiang Jieshi, and became a less 
significant figure in Chinese politics. It was impossible for Feng to give much more concrete 
assistance to the local self-government of Wanxi. 
2 One of Chen’s forefathers did great work in suppressing Nian Rebellion—a collaboration army of 
Taiping Rebellion—and was awarded an honor banner from the imperial court. 
3 In this thesis, the term of regionalist has two types. One is separatist, who advocates that the locality 
should be totally independent from the state. The other is not separatist, who just argues that the locality 
should enjoy more autonomous rights to develop the local society. Speaking generally, the second type 
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he called reshaped sanminzhuyi (the Three Principles of the People). In his mind, 
when the countryside was in chaos, and the central or provincial government was too 
weak to give help, the countryside should take its own action to solve serious 
problems that it was facing. In other words, in the chaotic time of the 1920s and 1930s, 
the locality should have full-fledged autonomy and became the vital player of 
stabilizing and developing the rural society. Meanwhile, the central government 
would ideally approve and support the full autonomy. If the central government would 
not like to grant autonomy to the locality, the latter could, as Peng advocated, seize 
power from the state. To him, this radical way of seizing power should not be viewed 
as “separatism”, because its goal was not to build a separatist regime, but to help the 
countryside to resume the social order in a critical time. The countryside had to do it 
on its own because there was no available official effort in improving the rural society. 
More interestingly, Peng defended himself painstakingly that his political solution 
was inspired by Sun Zhongshan’s idea, and declared that Sun’s ideal of promoting the 
full-fledged county-level self-government laid the solid foundation for his 
“regionalism”. Peng said that his regionalism and Sun’s sanminzhuyi shared the same 
spirit and the difference was just in the scope that they could be applied to. In his 
words, while sanminzhuyi was suitable for the whole China, his regionalism met 
needs of the locality at the county level.  
Peng’s idea was regarded as the guiding principle of the local self-government 
of Wanxi. The leaders of the counties of Wanxi agreed with him unanimously. In the 
                                                                                                                                            
of regionalist does not deny the authority of the central government. The leaders of the local 
self-government of Wanxi, Peng Yuting, Bie Tingfang, and Chen Shunde, belong to the second group.  
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region of Wanxi, gaining and maintaining the full autonomy was the prerequisite for 
promoting the local self-government and rural reconstruction work. In fact, from 1930, 
the Guomindang’s provincial government of Henan did not have any idea how to 
resume the official administration in Wanxi. The Guomindang’s county governments 
in Zhenping, Neixiang, and Xichuan were mere figureheads and all administrative 
affairs were controlled and manipulated by leaders of the local self-government. The 
situation was not changed until the Sino-Japanese war broke out, and especially after 
Bie Tingfang’s death in 1940. In the ten years between 1930 and 1940, the local 
self-government of Wanxi not only suppressed successfully the banditry, but also 
resisted the penetration of the Guomindang’s provincial government, relying on the 
powerful mintuan. In the meantime, the self-government of the counties of Wanxi 
contributed to developing the rural economy, improving the elementary education, 
and changing the general mood of society. As a result, in the 1930s, the local 
self-government of Wanxi was regarded as an important experiment in the Rural 
Reconstruction Movement (RRM). 
 
“Why Wanxi?”: The Significance of Wanxi to Republican Chinese History 
In the process of research, this study discovers that there are three attractive and 
significant features in the history of the local self-government in Wanxi: First, the 
relationship between Wanxi and the Guomindang’s provincial government of Henan; 
Second, the theory of local self-government proposed by Peng Yuting, which Peng 
called “a reshaped sanminzhuyi”; and finally, Wanxi’s rural reconstruction work. 
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First and foremost, the local self-government of Wanxi was a spontaneous 
response to chaos and poverty. Since the late Qing, Henan was greatly disturbed by 
banditry. Wanxi was one of the centers of banditry in the province. Local elites lost 
their confidence in the official administration and acted on their own to suppress the 
bandits. Their solution was to establish a local armed force (mintuan). In addition to 
organizing mintuan, these elites, encouraged by Peng Yuting, decided to promote 
local self-government in Wanxi and try to find a feasible way of improving local 
politics and developing local agriculture, industry, and education. In 1930, Peng 
initiated the Joint Defense Conference of Wanxi, in which local leaders suggested that 
they could integrate the mintuan into one group and launch the local self-government 
of Wanxi. Bie Tingfang was selected as the chief commander of mintuan, and Peng 
became the spiritual leader of Wanxi.  
The local self-government of Wanxi can roughly be divided into two periods. 
The first period was from 1930 to 1933. Zhenping was the center of self-government 
and Peng was the leader. Peng was a man of thought. In the process of suppressing 
bandits, he found that banditry was just one of reasons that caused chaos in the 
countryside. If anyone wanted to change fundamentally the rural area, there must be a 
systematic plan of social development. To put the plan into practice, the countryside 
must have enough political power to promote a full-fledged self-government. Peng 
never believed that the central government or the provincial government would have 
any interest in developing a remote and poor region such as Wanxi. Furthermore, the 
county governments of Wanxi had neither the capability nor willingness to stabilize 
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and develop this region. The official administration in Wanxi was inefficient. If there 
was no official help at all, Wanxi must act on its own to solve the problem of 
instability and poverty. After the establishment of self-government of Zhenping, Peng 
resolutely cut the connection with Guomindang’s county government and even 
executed the county magistrate of Zhenping in public. Consequently, Zhenping and 
the provincial government were in open conflict.  
In that time, General Liu Zhi was the chairman of Henan government. He was 
loyal to the central government and identified with the centralization of power. When 
he was appointed as the chairman of Henan, he swore to fulfill the state’s tight control 
over the grass-root society in this province. The radical action of Peng Yuting in 
Zhenping enraged Liu. In 1933, with the approval of the provincial government, one 
of local gentries of Zhenping, who was unhappy with Peng’s self-government policy, 
bribed Peng’s bodyguards and assassinated Peng. Consequently, the local 
self-government of Zhenping was stopped and the provincial government resumed its 
control over this county. After that, the center of self-government of Wanxi shifted to 
Neixiang County, and Bie Tingfang became the leader. 
Peng’s tragic end taught Bie a valuable lesson. He changed the strategy and did 
his best to avoid direct conflict with the provincial government. First of all, Bie 
strengthen his control over the mintuan. Because of the mintuan, it was not easy for 
Liu Zhi to launch a military attack on Wanxi. Additionally, Bie employed all his social 
relations to move ingeniously in the provincial government. In Chapter 2, this thesis 
discusses in detail what Bie and his friends did. In just one decade, from 1930 to 1940, 
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Wanxi successfully resisted the provincial government’s effort of resuming the state 
power in this region. However, when Bie passed away in 1940, the local 
self-government of Wanxi came to an end. 
This thesis tries to discuss the local self-government of Wanxi from the 
perspective of state-society relations. Generally speaking, in modern China, the 
relations between state and society are antagonistic. State always does its utmost to 
extend its power top-down, while the local society tries its best to avoid state control. 
The local self-government of Wanxi vividly illustrates this scenario. From the 
viewpoint of statist and centralist, what Peng and Bie did, without any doubt, was 
“reactionary” because they operated in contrary to the ruling party’s effort in creating 
a powerful and centralized modern state. The fact that Wanxi kept its 
semi-independent status for ten years was not good for the central government 
because it demonstrated Guomindang’s failure in modern state building. 
Through detailed discussion, this thesis also hopes that we can objectively 
evaluate the local self-government of Wanxi. What this thesis argues is that the local 
self-government of Wanxi was not separatist in nature. The purpose of Peng and Bie 
was to, by the way of self-government, free Wanxi from chaos and poverty. Facing the 
persistent banditry and the incapability of the official administration, these local elite 
had no choice but to act on their own initiative to solve the serious social problems as 
soon as possible. The only way of suppressing bandits was to create a powerful local 
armed force. Hence, these elite promoted local self-government in Wanxi, and 
implemented a systematic plan of improving the rural society and putting it into actual 
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practice. They believed that their work could bring stability and prosperity to Wanxi, 
and in the long run, would be helpful for the state building. 
Inspired by Elizabeth Remick’s book entitled Building Local States: China 
during the Republican and Post-Mao Eras, this thesis argues that we can understand 
the significance of Wanxi from the perspective of “local state building”. It suggests 
that there are two parallel processes in China’s modernization. One is guided by state, 
or the central government, which is known as the urban-centered modernization. The 
other is initiated by the local society. The defect of the state-led modernization is that 
the countryside plays a less important role in this process. To a large extent, the 
countryside was marginalized and thus many plans of rehabilitating the countryside 
failed in the republican period. Such failures made the local elites extremely 
disappointed. Motivated by regional sentiment and nationalism, they mobilized the 
resources in their hands and promoted a regional modernization in the region that they 
lived in. To achieve their goal, they needed to gain more autonomous power. At the 
first look, it seemed that they were building a local state. In fact, they were 
implementing those tasks that should be done by the official administration which had 
failed to do so. In this thesis, the term “local state building” emphasizes not on 
building a local state, but on the local’s effort in the implementation of the state’s task. 
Therefore, the term “state building” here, underscores the effort of how to improve the 
rural society. 
Nevertheless, there is a problem: did the state endorse such action? In China, a 
country that has a long tradition of centralism, promoting full-fledged local 
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self-government is a “hot potato”. The state was highly suspicious of the local’s effort 
in promoting self-government, and the local society had no confidence in the state’s 
promise of granting more autonomous rights. This was exactly what happened in 
Wanxi. The provincial government of Henan always had a hostile attitude towards the 
local self-government of Wanxi. The chairman of the provincial government 
denounced that the local self-governments in Zhenping, Neixiang and Xichuan were 
“in name” and were just “separatist regimes”. In the meanwhile, the elites of Wanxi 
never thought that the Guomindang government would like to give a hand to Wanxi. 
In an atmosphere of hostility and mistrust, there was no mutual action between the 
provincial government and Wanxi. The local self-government of Wanxi was doomed 
to fail simply because the state power was much more powerful than the local society. 
Leaders of Wanxi knew exactly that the local self-government faced a problem 
of legality. Peng, the theory-builder of Wanxi, did his best to justify his idea of 
regionalism at the local self-government of Wanxi. His regionalism was called “a 
reshaped sanminzhuyi”. 
Secondly, the detailed discussion on Peng’s regionalism can be found in Chapter 
3. The purpose of his “reshaped sanminzhuyi” was to bridge the official 
nationalism—Sun Zhongshan’s sanminzhuyi—and regionalism. Peng hoped that by 
doing so, the local self-government of Wanxi could avoid being accused of being a 
“separatist”. To some extent, Peng’s idea was convincing. For example, he argued 
that sanminzhuyi should be regionalized to meet the reality of the rural area. Also, the 
Chinese revolution was conducted at two levels. One was national, which needed 
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Sun’s sanminzhuyi as the guide. The other was regional or local. To promote a 
regional/local revolution, the leader should “reshape” sanminzhuyi. This “reshaped” 
sanminzhuyi kept the fundamental spirit of sanminzhuyi, which was to create a 
powerful and modernized China; meanwhile, it gave consideration to the local 
society’s interest and handled local affairs by pragmatic means. 
This thesis argues that we can discuss Peng’s regionalism from the perspective 
of stratified nationalism. That is to say that the discourse of nationalism in modern 
China is not onefold but multifold. The discourse of nationalism can be understood 
nationally and regionally. In the national discourse, it stresses that modernization 
should be led by a powerful central government, and the local society should be 
integrated into national goals. When it comes to the state-society relations, the state 
must be dominant. In such context, the local society can enjoy autonomous right, but 
it must be given and supervised by the central government. Any discourse and activity 
that violates the principle will be denounced illegal or separatist. When nationalism is 
discoursed regionally, it emphasizes that the local society recognizes the authority of 
state and never claims independence. At the same time, the state should grant more 
autonomous rights to the local society and allow the local society to play a pivotal role 
in social development. In other words, state should promote full-fledged local 
self-government and stop interfering excessively in local affairs. Hence, we can say 
that Peng Yuting’s idea of local self-government was indeed an example of 
regionalized nationalism. 
This thesis coins Peng’s way of illuminating his regionalism a “reshaping” of 
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sanminzhuyi. Peng claimed that his idea inherited the true spirit of Sun Zhongshan’s 
sanminzhuyi and could be applied to county-level society. The scope of sanminzhuyi 
was reshaped. The goal of Peng’s explanation was to defend that the local 
self-government of Wanxi was not anti-government and anti-nation. However, in 
realpolitik, Peng’s idea was not that powerful. The spontaneity of Wanxi 
self-government and the existence of mintuan decided that, no matter how attractive 
Peng’s idea appeared, it could not eliminate the provincial government’s hostility and 
suspicion. 
The situation was embarrassing. Both the state and the local society alleged that 
they had legality. From the state perspective, we understand that nobody can ensure 
that the local self-government initiated by local elites, especially by those who have 
local armed forces, will not become separatist. The armed local self-government was 
a genuine threat to the state because it violates the basic law of modern state that the 
armed force should be monopolized by the state. From the perspective of the rural 
society, under the circumstance that the state cannot give enough support, promoting a 
full-fledged self-government to facilitate rural reconstruction work is not an evil thing. 
Nevertheless, in the context of modern China in which the state discourse of 
nationalism is hegemonic, the ideas of regionalist, or the adapted discourse from the 
state nationalism, are not welcomed. The appeal for political rights by the local 
society is therefore neglected. 
Thirdly, the local self-government of Wanxi was not only a political event, but it 
was also an important rural reconstruction experiment. In 1929, Peng Yuting 
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established a Rural Self-government Institute in a small town of Henan. He invited 
some influential figures in RRM, including Liang Shuming, the most important 
theory-builder of RRM, to teach and study rural problems in this Institute. After 
several months, the provincial government shut down the Institute. Peng returned to 
Zhenping and began his rural reconstruction work, which included the reshuffling of 
the grass-root administrative organ, developing the local economy, universalizing the 
primary education, and so on. The details of these works can be found in Chapter 4. 
Among thousands of RRM experiments in the 1930s, the Wanxi experiment had 
two distinct features that could be regarded as “military” and “pragmatic”. We can 
therefore argue that without the mintuan, there was no genuine rural reconstruction 
experiment of Wanxi. On one hand, to promote rural reconstruction in Wanxi, there 
must be social stability. To achieve this, the self-government must depend on mintuan, 
which could rapidly eliminate the bandits and maintain social order. On the other hand, 
to promote rural reconstruction, there must be local self-government in Wanxi. 
Whether the local self-government could exist and develop depended very much on 
the local armed force. For this reason, the mintuan was a good administrative tool in 
mobilizing the rural residents because it was both a military organization and a civil 
administrative organ. 
Rural reconstruction work of Wanxi was more pragmatic when it was compared 
with other experiments, especially those led by the intellectuals. Experiment such as 
Liang Shuming’s Zouping project came from an abstract cultural theory, and its goal 
was to create a utopia in the countryside. Contrastingly, Wanxi had no profound 
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theory and its purpose was very simple—to give the peasants a peaceful and 
prosperous life. Motivated by the passion of saving the nation and countryside, 
intellectuals such as Liang join the RRM. However, in the eyes of the peasants, they 
were just kind-hearted outsiders. Peasants had no enthusiasm in their plans. In fact, 
Liang Shuming was very annoyed at this. Nevertheless, the situation was totally 
different in Wanxi. The leaders of Wanxi were born and grew up in this region. They 
were very familiar with the reality of the countryside and worked out many feasible 
programs that won the support of the rural residents. 
The rural reconstruction work of Wanxi was multi-dimensional. Militarily, the 
local armed force played a pivotal role in its work. Politically, the local 
self-government was its premises. Socially, it had an overall plan of improving rural 
society. Therefore, this thesis coins Wanxi’s rural reconstruction as “developmental 
regionalism”. That is to say that the practice of Wanxi provided an answer to how to 
systematically improve the countryside. It also implied that anyone who wants to 
solve rural problems in China should, first of all, arouse the countryside’s enthusiasm 
and increase its participation in the politics. In other words, giving the countryside 
financial and educational help is insufficient and the most important thing is that the 
state should appropriately retreat from the countryside and make available more 
political spaces. This would then allow the countryside to find the solution to rural 
problems on its own. 
Lastly, this thesis attempts to contribute to the present scholarship in the 
following ways: First, this thesis is the so far the most detailed, complete, and 
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systematic study on the local self-government of Wanxi in Western-language 
scholarship. Previously, only a small handful of scholars very briefly studied about 
Wanxi; Second, the paradigm of “local state building” may be helpful for us to 
understand the spontaneous local self-government in modern China; Third, the 
discussion on Peng Yuting’s regionalism reveals that the discourse of nationalism was 
different in the state and the rural society perspective; and finally, to make the military 
and political dimension of Wanxi distinct in RRM, this thesis sheds some light on why 
most of the RRM experiments in 1930s did not achieve much satisfying results. 
 
Literature Review 
Because it happened in a remote region and its leaders were not celebrities of 
that time, only a handful of Chinese and Western scholars have discussed the local 
self-government of Wanxi. In his prize-winning book devoted to Liang Shuming - the 
most influential thinker of RRM - Guy Alitto examines Peng Yuting and the Academy 
of Village Self-government of Henan set up by him. He argues that the reason behind 
Peng’s promotion of the rural reconstruction work in Wanxi was that some bandits 
disrupted his mother’s funeral. After the incident, he made a resolution to suppress the 
banditry and restore the social order in his hometown4. In the process of suppressing 
bandits, Peng realized that the banditry was just one of the serious rural problems. If 
he wanted to settle these problems once and for all, he needed a more systematic plan. 
With the help of Feng Yuxiang and Han Fuqu, the Governor of Henan, Peng set up the 
                                                 
4  Guy S. Alitto, The Last Confucian: Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p.172. 
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Academy, in which the rural reconstruction activists could conduct some research 
work5. Alitto also notices that the self-government led by Peng had powerful militias 
and refused to pay exorbitant taxes and levies imposed by the provincial government. 
Finally, the conflicts between the self-government and provincial government led to 
Peng’s assassination in 19336. 
In one of the chapters in The Cambridge History of China, Philip Kuhn made 
very brief discussion of Wanxi. He categorizes Wanxi as one of cases of the 
military-type rural reconstruction experiment. Kuhn argues that the local 
self-government of Wanxi evolved from the militia organization—mintuan. He points 
out that the movement led by Peng Yuting “was, by force of circumstance, 
anti-government.”7 Kuhn also explains that if Peng wanted to promote his rural 
reconstruction experiment in Wanxi, he had no alternative but to prevent the official 
army and local officials from undermining his plan. But Peng’s way was in 
diametrical opposition to the ruling party’s efforts of tightening the control over the 
local society. Consequently, it was impossible for the rural self-government proposed 
by Peng Yuting to last long8. 
Zhang Xin’s book, Social Transformation in Modern China: The State and 
Local Elites in Henan, 1900-1937, focuses on the relationship between the state and 
the local elite. Zhang chooses the northern and southwestern Henan as the two cases 
                                                 
5 Ibid, pp. 173-4. 
6 Ibid, p. 235. 
7  Philip A. Kuhn, “The development of local government”, in John K. Fairbank and Albert 
Feuerwerker (eds.), The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 
vol. 13, p. 358. 
8 Ibid, p. 359. 
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in his discussion - the southwestern Henan refers to Wanxi in this book. Zhang 
contends that unlike the West, the modernization of China commenced from the 
individuals9. That is to say, the changes of local elites brought about deep changes in 
the state-societal relation, and such the change initiated the Chinese modernization. In 
this process, each different region took on a different look. When it comes to Henan, 
the northern part was one of cores of the province and the changes of local elites led 
up to a closer cooperation of the state and the society. One the contrary, the 
southwestern Henan was an outer zone, where one of the results of the changes of 
local elite was the antithesis between the state and the society. Besides Peng Yuting, 
Bie Tingfang, Chen Shunde, and Ning Xigu, are also mentioned in this book. Thus, 
when compared with Alitto and Kuhn’s writings, Zhang’s work is relatively more 
thorough in his discussion on Wanxi.  
Shen Songqiao, a Taiwanese scholar, produces a lengthy thesis on the local 
self-government of Wanxi. He points out that, from the mid 19th century, the local 
elites in Henan took organizing the local armed force as the method in gaining and 
maintaining power in the countryside. Peng Yuting, Bie Tingfang, and Chen Shunde 
were some of such typical cases. Depending on the powerful local militias, they 
toppled down the Guomindang’s rule in Wanxi. In the 1930s, the Central Government 
in Nanjing tried its best to build an effective top-down social control. As a result, the 
conflict of Wanxi and the Guomindang’s provincial government of Henan could not 
be avoided. Shen argues that, the local elites of Wanxi illegally seized the political 
                                                 
9  Xin Zhang, Social Transformation in Modern China: The State and Local Elites in Henan, 
1900-1937 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 269. 
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power from the state. As such, the local self-government that they established 
paralyzed the Guomindang’s official administration. The power of social control, 
which should be monopolized by the state, was transferred violently into the hands of 
these local military leaders. From this point of view, Shen’s work draws a conclusion 
that the local self-government of Wanxi was just a case of “the mode of monopolizing 
the local political power by the ‘local bullies and evil gentry’ in the Republican 
period”10. 
There is a common feature in these studies: all of them discuss the local 
self-government of Wanxi from the angle of the state-societal relation. Scholars argue 
that Peng Yuting, Bie Tingfang and Chen Shunde stood on the opposite side of the 
state, and what they did was a reaction to the central government’s effort in extending 
state power. To conceptualize Wanxi using the state-societal paradigm is very helpful 
in understanding the political dimension of the local self-government. 
Correspondingly, the study of Wanxi will also illustrate the complexity of the state 
building in the Republican period11. Based on the history of Wanxi, Zhang Xin 
concludes that, in the period, the state building had both the vertical complexity—it 
manifested in the top-down power extension of the central government and the 
bottom-up penetration from the locality—and the horizontal complexity, which could 
be seen in an individual province. For example, in Henan alone, the outer and center 
                                                 
10  Shen Songqiao 沈松侨 , “Difang jingying yu guojia quanli: Minuuo shiqi de Wanxi zizhi, 
1930-1943 地方自治与国家权力：民国时期的宛西自治  (Local Elite and State Power: The 
Self-government of Wanxi in the Republican Period, 1930-1943)”, in Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi 
yanjiusuo jikan 中央研究院近代史研究所集刊 (Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History of 
Academia Sinica) (Taipei: 1992), no. 21, p. 371. 
11 “State building” in the thesis has two meanings. When it is in the context of central-local relation, it 
refers to how to build a powerful central government. When it is the context of rural construction, it is 
about how to develop the local society. 
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zone exerted totally different influence on the state-building efforts of the 
Guomindang’s provincial government12. 
Nevertheless, these studies neglected the significance of Wanxi in relations to 
the RRM. Although Alitto briefly mentioned Peng Yuting in his book, we cannot find 
details of the rural reconstruction that Peng initiated in Wanxi. Similarly, it is 
impossible for us to obtain more information of Wanxi’s rural reconstruction work in 
Kuhn’s rough sketch of the local self-government of Wanxi. Zhang Xin points out that 
the local self-government of Wanxi had a close relationship with the Academy of the 
Village Self-government of Henan, and argues that it was one of the outcomes of the 
RRM13. However, there is no further discussion on the topic in his book. In Shen 
Songqiao’s thesis, the author did not attempt to take Wanxi as a rural reconstruction 
experiment at all. 
Currently, there is only one book that concentrates on the rural reconstruction 
work of Wanxi. Xu Youli argues that the nature of the local self-government of Wanxi 
was a spontaneous rural reconstruction experiment led by the local elites. The 
experiment had two distinctive characteristics. One was that the self-defense work, or 
the existence of mintuan, was the premise of the self-government. The other was the 
“inwardness”14 of the experiment. Xu asserts that the two characteristics could not be 
found in the rural reconstruction experiments conducted by the intellectuals. 
Therefore, the practice of Wanxi was a “unique” style of rural reconstruction 
                                                 
12 Xin Zhang, Social Transformation in Modern China, p. 275. 
13 Ibid, p. 137. 
14 Xu Youli 徐有礼, Sanshi niandai Wanxi xiangcun jianshe moshi yanjiu 三十年代宛西乡村建设模
式研究 (A Study on the Rrual Reconstruction Mode of Wanxi in the 1930s) (Zhenzhou: Zhongzhou 
guji chubanshe 中州古籍出版社, 1999), p.206. 
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experiment in the 1930s15.  
 
Theoretical Paradigms: “Local state building”, “Developmental regionalism”, 
and Nationalism 
1) Modern state building was the most important content of the political history 
of modern China. Nevertheless, by examining the history of modern China, we find 
that the ideal power-centralized state, in which the central government firmly 
controlled the locality and the state power penetrated top-down without hindrance, 
was not established in the Republican period. In fact, the state building in this period 
was only partly successful. The central government controlled some provinces, but its 
penetration into the rural society was not satisfying, while at the same time, some 
regions were controlled by regionalists and maintained a semi-independent status. 
Usually, regions, such as Wanxi, got out of the state’s control were blamed and 
despised as separatist regimes. However, this thesis hopes to present a more objective 
discussion on it, and tries to show that this dissociated region did do some good works 
on developing the local society and what they did should be regarded as one part of 
the modern state building. Here, this thesis employs the idea of “local state building”. 
This idea is inspired by Elizabeth Remick16. In her book, Building Local States: 
China during the Republican and Post-Mao Eras, state can be divided into many parts. 
From a functional viewpoint, a state has different departments, such as ministries, 
bureaus, committees, and so on. Territorially, there are different localities, like 
                                                 
15 Ibid, p. 205. 
16 Elizabeth J. Remick, Building Local States: China During the Republican and Post-Mao Eras 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
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provinces, municipalities, and counties, in a state. To the central government, all these 
parts—departments and localities—have specific independence, and they are “more 
or less controlled by the center, depending on the circumstances.”17 In the ideal 
top-down power structure, localities are the weak “outer”, and are put under the firm 
control of the center and molded by the central policies and ideology. However, the 
situation in the Republican period was startlingly contrary to it. Because of the 
weakness and inefficiency of the central government, the locality became very active. 
The activeness of the locality brought about two kinds of local state building. 
The first was the “local state” building, which had the goal of building a “local state”, 
which was independent from the central government. It was a separatist movement. 
The second was the local “state building”, which meant that when the central 
government was too weak to develop the local (rural) society, the locality could take 
action to renovate itself. The goal of local “state building” was not to build a separatist 
regime, but to finish the work that could not be done by the state. To let the locality 
take the initiative to stabilize and develop the countryside would be very helpful for 
national modernization. The best circumstance would be that the central government 
was open and liberal enough to give the locality the power and freedom to perform the 
local state building. Conversely, if the state did not want to do it, the locality could try 
its best to gain autonomy. The local state building has the legitimacy. The locality, 
especially county, was closer to the people than the central or provincial government 
was. To develop the rural society, the county should be the vital player. What it did 
                                                 
17 Ibid, p. 5. 
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would be much better than the more bureaucratic program proposed by the central and 
provincial government, because the latter often did not know much about the reality in 
the countryside. That is why Elizabeth Remick argues “in the short run, local state 
building reduced central capacity, but it also created the potential basis for a stronger 
central state in the longer term.”18 
In modern China, the pursuing of modernity and the development of nationalism 
gave an impetus to the local state building. In the Republican period, modernism—or 
the ideal of achieving modernity/modernization—replaced Confucianism as the 
guiding ideology19. The modern Chinese nationalism came into being in this trend. 
Not only the national elite but also the local elite welcomed political ideas of 
modernity/modernization and nationalism. The discourse of the local elite was that 
the national modernization was predicated on the regional modernization; nationalism 
should be regionalized and answer the question that how to save and develop the local 
(rural) society. Elizabeth Remick argues that such the discourse was a “borrowed” 
nationalism20. In this thesis, the “reshaped sanminzhuyi”, or the political idea of Peng 
Yuting, was one case of the “borrowed” nationalism. 
In the Republican period, the reformulating of nation-state, nationalism, and 
modernization was very common. Nevertheless, if we discuss them from the 
viewpoint of local state building, what the “borrowers”—enlightened local leaders 
like Li Zongren and Yan Xishan, or capable local elite like Peng Yuting—did was not 
a bad thing for the state. Yan established a powerful rule in Shanxi and created a 
                                                 
18 Ibid, p. 257. 
19 Ibid, pp. 35-6. 
20 Ibid, p. 18. 
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relatively stable social environment for the economic development. Thomas Rawski 
asserts that the rapid economic development of Shanxi in the 1950s should be partly 
attributed to Yan’s work in the 1920s and 1930s21. One study on Chen Jitang, one of 
powerful militarists in Guangdong, shows that he did good works on improving 
infrastructure and maintaining the social order in this province22. 
In a smaller local society, like a county, there was also the local state building. 
In the Republican period, because of its limited capability, the state could not 
perform well in developing the countryside. The solution was that the work of 
developing the rural society should be turned over to the locality (county). The goal 
of this thesis is to show that in Wanxi, when the Guomindang’s provincial 
government could not give enough and effective help to these poor and chaotic 
counties, local elites could, by the way of local self-government, accomplished in 
suppressing bandits, developing local economy, improving rural education, and so 
forth. 
2) This thesis argues that the local self-government of Wanxi was a practice of 
“developmental regionalism”. “Developmental regionalism” is originally an 
economic term. It means that in the case of China, the locality should play the pivotal 
role in the economic development23. According to this theory, both central and local 
governments take economic development as the prime goal. When it comes to 
economic development, it is the local government, not the central government that is 
                                                 
21 See: Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth in Prewar China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1989). 
22 Alfred H. Y. Lin, “Building and Funding a Warlord Regime”, p. 179. 
23 Zheng Yongnian 郑永年, Zhongguo minzuzhuyi de fuxing: minzu guojia wang hechu qu 中国民族主义的复
兴：民族国家向何处去？ (The Revival of Chinese Nationalism: Where is the Nation-state Heading Forward?) 
(Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 1998), pp. 186-7. 
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the main player in developing local economy. When there is a dispute over the 
important political or economic matter between the central and local government, 
they should settle it through discussion and cooperation and try their best to ensure 
that economic development will not be affected. This thesis extends the idea of 
“developmental regionalism” into a comprehensive program of how to develop the 
local society. 
The word “developmental” has special meaning in this thesis. It emphasizes on 
“response”. At the local level, the meaning of “developmental” means that within 
China, the local elite responds to the instability and poverty in the region they live in. 
Their response is to promote the regional modernization. In this thesis, it refers in 
particular to the program of developing the rural society, which was worked out by 
local elite under the circumstance that the central or provincial government was 
incapable to stabilize and develop the countryside. Because the goal of such program 
was not to build a separatist local regime but to provide a solution to rural problems, 
this thesis calls it “local state building”. 
The developmental regionalism involves the power configuration between the 
center and the locality. It implies that the central government should give more 
political rights to the locality and allow the locality to select its own way of 
development. However, in the Nanjing decade, it was difficult for the central 
authorities to do that because the main work of Guomindang was to strengthen the 
central government’s power. Therefore, the ruling party was extremely cautious in 
their promotion of the local self-government. Meanwhile, the countryside was in 
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crisis. The central government’s attempt to improve the rural society was poor. Many 
intellectuals and local elites were disappointment with the Guomindang24. To the local 
population, they felt resentful towards the central government in their effort to extend 
the state power by the way of bureaucratizing the grass-root administration, which did 
nothing to improve the countryside, but rather increased greatly the peasant’s burden. 
The tension between the center and the locality was not alleviated but intensified. 
Under such circumstances, some radical local elites, such as Peng Yuting and Bie 
Tingfang in Wanxi, advocated that the locality should strive positively for the 
autonomy without which the rural reconstruction work could not be done. By 
organizing the powerful local armed force and political tactics, the local elite of 
Wanxi successfully drove the Guomindang out of the region and maintained a long 
period of semi-independence. To some extent, this could be easily despised as 
“separatist”. Thus, to legitimize its action, Peng Yuting claimed that what was done 
was based on the mainstream nationalism: Sun Zhongshan’s sanminzhuyi. 
3) In this thesis, “nationalism” has twofold meanings. Firstly, it refers to a 
political idea or an ideology. In the modern time, when China fell into the state of 
political crisis, some national elite, such as Sun Zhongshan, presented ideas of how to 
handle the crisis and build a powerful modern state. Subsequently, these ideas were 
systematized and turned into an official nationalism, such as Sun’s Three People’s 
Principles. Secondly, as one scholar argues, nationalism is one of responses of a 
                                                 
24 See: Luo Zhitian, Luanshi qianliu: minzu zhuyi yu minguo zhengzhi 乱世潜流：民族主义与民国政治 
(Underflow in the Chaotic Time: Nationalism and Politics in the Republican China) (Shanghai: Shanghai guji 
chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 2001), p. 156. 
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nation to the political and economic situation in a specific time25. In the context of 
modern China, the response was the question of how to create a powerful and 
modernized nation-state. Sun Zhongshan’s sanminzhuyi was one of representations to 
such response and was recognized nationwide. The local elite responded also to the 
crisis. They argued that the local society was seriously affected by the political, 
economic and cultural change, and the locality, with the premise of identifying the 
national unification and the authority of the central government, should act on its own 
initiative to develop. In this thesis, the local response refers in particular to the local 
elite’s response to the rural crisis. The theorized representation of such kind of 
response, such as Peng Yuting’s regionalism, is known as the regional nationalism. 
We can regard the regional nationalism as the “reshaping” of the official 
nationalism. In the case of Wanxi, Peng declared that his regionalism had the same 
spirit as sanminzhuyi. Sanminzhuyi - the official nationalism - was the prime principle 
for how to build a powerful nation-state. Peng’s regionalism, as one type of regional 
nationalism, was a feasible solution to the problems in a small rural society, like the 
counties of Wanxi. By the regionalized nationalism, Peng attempted to justify the 
local self-government of Wanxi.  
 
Methodology 
The primary sources of this thesis are obtained from the reports and documents 
edited by the self-government of Zhenping, Neixiang, and Xichuan in the 1930s. 
                                                 
25 Louis L. Snyder (ed.), The Dynamics of Nationalism, Readings in Its Meaning and Development (Princeton: D. 
Van Nostrand, 1964), p. 23. 
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Besides these sources, it also utilized the Wenshiziliao (the cultural and historical 
accounts) edited by the CPPCC of Henan and its branches in the counties of Wanxi. 
Also, this thesis depended on some memoirs written by people who experienced the 
local self-government of Wanxi.  
In 2005, I conducted three months of fieldwork in Wanxi. During this period, I 
visited the archives and county records office of the counties of Wanxi, and discussed 
the history of Wanxi with some local scholars. By utilizing the primary sources and 
the data from the fieldwork conducted, this thesis attempts to present an accurate 
narrative and analysis of the local self-government of Wanxi. 
 
Chapter Overview 
This thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 draws the historical 
background and sets the context for this study. Chapter 2 discusses how the local elite 
of Wanxi built the powerful local armed force—mintuan, and illustrates how they 
resisted the penetration of the Guomindang’s provincial government. Mintuan played 
the decisive role in the establishment and development of the local self-government of 
Wanxi. Therefore, this thesis calls Wanxi junxian, or the militarized county. Chapter 3 
introduces Peng Yuting’s political idea—the “reshaped sanminzhuyi”. Finally, 
Chapter 4 presents a panoramic view of Wanxi’s rural reconstruction work. 
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Chapter 1 – Setting the Context 
 
This thesis attempts to incorporate contributions of past scholarship and present 
a panoramic study of the local self-government of Wanxi. Its history will be put into 
the context of the state-societal relations and the rural reconstruction. Before 
embarking on the discussion of Wanxi, it is helpful for us to have a look at the 
historical background. From the late Qing to the Nanjing decade, there was a 
conspicuous trend: while the state was weakening and the local society became 
increasingly active. 
1) Weakening State, Active Locality 
Max Weber has argued that the modern state has two distinguishing features – 
territoriality and violence. A modern state should have the “capability of 
monopolizing the legitimate use of violence within a given territory.”26 That is to say, 
the monopoly of military force is the most important guarantee for the existence of a 
state, and it is also the foundation of the state’s authority. A powerful central 
government is bound to control all the military resources in the society and employ it 
as the foundation of its rule. On the contrary, if one central government cannot 
maintain the monopoly of the military resources, the political order will be in danger 
and the authority of the state will be likely to face serious challenges. This happened 
in the mid 19th century in China. Hence, the weakening of the central government of 
China could be traced back to this period. 
                                                 
26 David Held (et al.), States and Societies (New York: New York University Press, 1983), p. 35. 
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Philip Kuhn argues that the turning point of Chinese history was the Taiping 
Rebellion. This is because, in this rebellion, the Qing central government lost its 
control of military power. Before the Taiping Rebellion, the political accommodation 
of the court and the local elite generated the stability and continuity of Chinese 
politics, and the state-societal conflicts could be settled at the lowest price. The local 
elite played an important role in reestablishing the traditional state power. However, 
this was fundamentally changed in the late Qing period. In the process of putting 
down the Taiping Rebellion, it was the local elite, but not the state, that became the 
vital player. With the help of the local elite, the court survived the crisis. During and 
after the Rebellion, the power of the local elite was expanded at the expense of the 
central government. The official grass-root administrative organ was replaced 
gradually by the local militia organizations, like “tuan-lian”, which had 
multiple—military, political and economic—functions. The local armed force 
established by those influential local elites was much more powerful than the official 
army controlled by the imperial government. The military resources that should be 
monopolized by the state had been usurped by the locality. Consequently, the political 
and administrative power was gradually dominated by the local elites. These changes 
became the basic characteristic of the rural society from the late Qing to the early 
1920s. Kuhn asserts that what happened in the period of Taiping demonstrates the 
traditional Chinese society would never again “be reestablished on the old pattern.”27 
Subsequently, a new period of Chinese history—“the modern history”—commenced. 
                                                 
27 Philip Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 
1796-1864 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 3. 
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The new history was a history of power struggle between the state and the 
locality. Any central government of China, even as weak as the declining court of the 
late Qing, did its best to obtain and monopolize all kinds of power resources and put 
the locality under its firm control. The local elite, at the same time, spared no effort to 
extract power resources and demand more autonomy. Their actions embodied two 
fundamentally different ways of social development. The antithesis, conflicts, and 
accommodations of the two ways generated the changes and instabilities of modern 
China. The basic changes that caused by the Taiping Rebellion signified that the 
traditional political model of “dayitong” (the Grand Unification) had not been 
adaptable to the changing situation. Under such circumstances, there were two 
possible paths. One was the possibility of China to retain its authoritarian tradition 
and form a modernized and highly power-centralized national government. Under the 
leadership of the central government, China struggled for the accomplishment of 
modernization. The other path was that China would give up the model of 
centralization of state power and entrust more autonomy to the locality. It would be a 
bottom-up way of modernization. 
The two models each had its own supporters. From the late Qing, the central 
government in every historical period, which was the prime representative of the state, 
stressed the centralization of state power and the central government’s overwhelming 
superiority to the locality. In the centralist’s eyes, the most urgent task for China was 
to establish a powerful and centralized government and take it as the vital player in the 
social development. The locality could enjoy autonomy, but the autonomy must be 
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given by the central government and its practice must be supervised and regulated by 
the state. On the contrary, people who advocated for the decentralization of state 
power demanded a true and full autonomy for the locality. In their arguments, the best 
way of decentralization in China was to promote the full-fledged local 
self-government. 
By the mid 19th century, especially after the Taiping Rebellion, China was 
undergoing a period of deep changes and the traditional politics was coming to end. 
The imperial court’s capability of controlling and administering the local society fell 
short of its wishes. As a response to the political weaknesses, some influential gentry 
advocated that the court should release the energy of the local society through the 
“institutional” change. Feng Guifen was one of such advocators of change. He 
maintained that either hezhi (the power-centralized model) or fenzhi (the 
power-decentralized model) could be applied to China. If the model of fenzhi was 
employed, the traditional institution of xiangguan (head of village or villages) could 
be reformed and applied to the grass-root social administration. In his plan, xiangguan 
would be elected by the local residents and be approved by the court. The court would 
grant the xiangguan an official title and salary. The function of the new xiangguan 
system was to cooperate with the official grass-root administrative organs28. 
When China had more contacts with the West, some eminent intellectuals 
believed that the Western parliamentary politics could be adopted in China. Chen Qiu, 
Chen Chi, He Qi, and Hu Liheng argued that a top-down (province to county) 
                                                 
28 Feng Guifen 冯桂芬, “Fu xiangzhi yi 复乡职议 (On the Restoration of Village-level Officials)”, 
Jiaobanlu kangyi 校邠庐抗议 (Petitions from Jiaobin lu) (Taipei: Xuehai chubanshe学海出版社, 
1967). 
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parliament system would be helpful for China to improve its local politics29. Zhen 
Guanying suggested that the court should set up yishenzhiju (the legislative bureau 
formed by local gentry), which would become the administrative center in the 
grass-root society30. In 1895, Huang Zunxian, the Counselor of the Embassy of China 
in Japan, published the Ribenguo zhi (The State of Japan), in which he introduced in 
detail the local assembly system of Japan established after the Meiji Reformation31. 
The book exerted a great amount of influence over the Chinese intellectuals. 
After the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, the crushing defeat of China greatly 
shocked both the Chinese intellectuals and politicians. Reformists, such as Kang 
Youwei, Liang Qichao, and Yan Fu, appealed loudly to the public that if the country 
could not completely reform its politics, China would face the danger of destruction. 
Judging from the foreign experiences, they argued that the division of power created 
powerful states in the West and Japan. For China, it had no other choices but to follow 
the same way. The reformists raised the flag of local self-government and firmly 
believed that the local assemblies could improve the efficiency of the local 
administration. Tan Sitong, a famous reform activist in Hunan Province, argued that 
the Western style assembly should be replaced by xuehui (the Learning Society), 
which had more Chinese characteristics and was more easily for the local people to 
                                                 
29 See: Chen Qiu 陈虬, “Kai yiyuan 开议院 (Open the Parliament)”, Zhipin tongyi 治平通议 (A 
General Discussion on the State Affairs) (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe上海古籍出版社, 1995); 
Chen Chi 陈炽, Yong shu 庸书 (The Mediocre Book) (Jinan: Qilu shushe齐鲁书社, 1997); He Qi and 
Hu Liheng 何启、胡礼恒, Xinzhen zhenquan 新政真诠 (Notes to the New Policy) (Shenyang: 
Liaoning renmin chubanshe 辽宁人民出版社, 1994). 
30 Zheng Guanying ji 郑观应集 (The Collections of Zhen Guanying) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin 
chubanshe上海人民出版社, 1982), vol. 1, pp. 370-3. 
31 Huang Zunxian 黄遵宪, Ribenguo zhi 日本国志 (The State of Japan) (Shanghai: Shanghai guji 
chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 2001). 
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accustom32. Yan Fu, the leading disseminator of the Western knowledge of social 
science, profoundly pointed out that whether the people had the spirit and capability 
of self-government would determine the strength and weakness of a country33. In 
1898, the reformists led bairiweixin (the Hundred Days’ Reform) in Beijing and tried 
to put their political ideas into practice. Unfortunately, the conservatives in the 
imperial courts ruined the reform very quickly. 
The tragic end of the Hundred Days’ Reform enraged the Chinese population 
who were concerned with the country’s future, and felt more discontent with the 
dictatorial imperial system. The idea of local self-government developed into a 
political trend and became the most popular political slogan of the period34. In the 
early days of the twentieth century, books, magazines, and people that propagated the 
local self-government were emerging in large numbers. Facing these challenges, the 
Manchu dynasty, though it had stepped into the last days, had to respond. The court 
admitted that it was incapable to administer effectively the local society, and intended 
to adopt the Western style of local self-government that advocated by the reformists to 
strengthen the control over the grass-root society. At the same time, the court hoped 
that such the kind of local self-government would be placed under the supervision of 
the imperial court. The solution of the court, which could be described as a controlled 
local self-government, was an answer to the most difficult question that China was 
                                                 
32 Tan Sitong quanji 谭嗣同全集 (The Complete Works of Tan Sitong) (Beijing: Zhonghuashuju 中
华书局, 1981), vol. 2, p. 438. 
33 Yan Fu shiwen xuan 严复诗文选  (Essays and Poems of Yan Fu) (Beijing: Renmin wenxue 
chubanshe 人民文学出版社, 1959), p. 78. 
34 Ding Xuguang 丁旭光, Jindai zhongguo difangzizhi yanjiu 近代中国地方自治研究 (The Study 
on the Local Self-government in Modern China) (Guangzhou: Guangzhou chubanshe 广州出版社, 
1993), p.24-8. 
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facing in the modern period. The question as what Mary Rankin has pointed out was: 
“How could unity and local self-government be combined?”35 
The Qing central government began promoting xinzheng (the New Policy), in 
which the court hoped through the reform of central and local administration, not only 
the power of the state could be increased, but also the local politics would be 
improved. Based on the model of Japanese system of local self-government36, the 
Emperor issued the imperial edict of establishing Ziyiju (the provincial council) in 
1907, the regulations of the self-government of city, town, and sub-county in 1908, 
and the regulations of the self-government of prefecture and county in 1909. As one 
scholar says, the nucleus of the imperial plan was “the incorporation of guanzhi 
(official-government) and zizhi (self-government)” 37 . For example, in the 
self-government of prefecture and county, the head of the prefecture and county was 
the top official of the grass-root government as well as the leader of the local council. 
As the governmental official, he was appointed by the central government and his 
duty was to communicate and implement the instructions of the state. As the local 
leader, he was “elected” by the local people and had the duty of dealing with the local 
affairs. 
It was a model of power configuration, which emphasized that the official 
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government and self-government should be incorporated, and the official government 
would play the leading role. It was approved by not only the Manchu court but also 
the central governments after the collapse of Qing. The plan was aimed at the way of 
the controlled local self-government, the energy of the locality could be released and 
the locality would serve the national goal. The goal of mobilizing the locality by the 
local self-government was not to give it full autonomy, but to more effectively 
incorporate the locality into the state political system. However, any central 
government would find that it having to face a dilemma: if only the central 
government began promoting the local self-government, the locality would ask for 
even more autonomy38. It was very difficult for the state to satisfy the locality’s desire 
for autonomy. From the late Qing to the Nanjing decade, which is commonly known 
as the period of the modern state building in China, how to achieve the controlled 
local self-government—in which the central authorities could simultaneously 
mobilize and control the locality—became the key problem of Chinese politics. 
Although the efforts of the Manchu court were wrecked by the Revolution of 
1911, the policies that it adopted influenced greatly the state-societal relation in the 
following decades. Some scholars argue that these new policies changed the 
traditional situation of “strong state, weak society”. Such change resulted in the power 
of social control to erode from the center, and it implied that the locality could obtain 
more autonomy 39 . In other words, the central government was continuously 
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weakening and the power of the locality was constantly increasing. The Revolution of 
1911 accelerated this trend. Thus, in China, the modern state building which was 
characterized by the centralization of power became more and more difficult. Mary 
Rankin even calls the heritage of the revolution of 1911 one barrier of the modern 
state building of China40. 
Since the collapse of Qing, China faced more serious political and economic 
penetration from the foreign powers. The country was still too weak to change the 
situation. To add, the illusions aroused by the Revolution were crushed by the 
miserable reality. How could the country survive? Many people believed that the only 
feasible way of saving China was to create a powerful, centralized, and efficient 
central government. The startling discrepancy of the ideal and the reality forced 
people to admit that maintaining the unification and establishing a powerful central 
government were much more important for China. This vision was shared among the 
majority of Chinese people and became a powerful public opinion41. In that time, 
politicians that had the capability to form and control the central government believed 
firmly that, in the era of uncertainty, what China needed was a highly centralized 
government, which could perform top-down administration and control effectively 
regional political organizations. Only by the powerful central government, the 
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national modernization could be promoted and fulfilled. If China failed in creating 
such a central government, the uncontrolled increase of the power of the locality 
would break up the country. However, the reality was embarrassing. From the late 
Qing, the locality began gaining more and more autonomy. The demise of the 
monarchy gave the locality more opportunities to seize power. After the Revolution of 
1911, the expansion of the locality’s power was undoubtedly conspicuous. In different 
regions and by different ways, the ambitious local elite did their best to strengthen 
their own political dominance, and what they did totally changed the traditional 
central-local power configuration. 
Yuan Shikai was the most influential politician in the post-revolution period. 
According to Ernest Young’s study 42 , Yuan well understood what the China’s 
problems were and what it needed most in the age of imperialism: to resist the 
pressures from the foreign powers and to promote the national modernization. Yuan 
believed that China must establish a powerful and centralized government. However, 
his practice was not successful. Ernest Young criticizes Yuan Shikai’s idea of 
centralization for being too narrow—he only paid attention to the extension of the 
central bureaucratic administration, but neglected the strong regionalism that the 
powerful local elite cherished. To make things worse, the military way of suppressing 
the locality threatened the interests of the local elite and provoked their resistance43. 
In Shandong, Yuan promoted his plan of local self-government which was similar to 
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the Manchu’s reform. Yuan hoped that by bureaucratizing the county and sub-county 
administration, the grass-root society could be incorporated into the central 
government. Meanwhile, Yuan, by the way of coercion, tried to prevent the local elite 
of Shandong from seizing the state power. Nevertheless, because of many reasons 
especially the lack of funds, his plan ended up as a failure44. 
The basic reason for Yuan’s failure was that he emphasized on only the 
top-down control over the locality but had no plan of how to mobilize the locality. 
Yuan was suspicious and hostile towards the mobilization of the locality, and was 
afraid that the mobilization would threaten the authority of the central government. In 
the early 1910s, there were numerous city and town councils in China. In 1914, Yuan 
issued an order and dismissed all the provincial and sub-provincial councils45. The 
action infuriated the local elite. Yuan’s way of building the modern state by resuming 
the monarchy was incompatible with the public opinions. In the days that the Emperor 
was just thrown out of the Forbidden City, the resurrected monarchy could do nothing 
helpful for Yuan’s career, but bring about a shameful failure. In 1916, Yuan Shikai 
was dethroned and passed away very soon. The death of Yuan marked the beginning 
of a more disastrous and chaotic time for China. 
In the Republican period, the most dangerous challenge before China was the 
development of the local militarization. In 1912, excluding some frontier provinces, 
there were twelve dudu—the military provincial governor, who was also in charge of 
the civil administration—in the seventeenth provinces. The existence and 
                                                 
44 Mary Backus Rankin, “State and Society in Early Republican Politics, 1912-18”, ibid, p. 11. 
45 Ibid, p.17. 
 38
development of the local armed force helped these local military strongmen to resist 
Yuan’s effort of creating a powerful central government. In fact, even in the peak days 
of Yuan, he could only appoint directly the senior officials in a few provinces46, such 
as Zhili (Hebei), Henan, and Shandong. After Yuan’s regime collapsed, the local 
militarism developed into the military separatism. 
In his classic study, Philip Kuhn demonstrates that the local militarization 
commenced in the period of the Taiping Rebellion. When the rebellion broke out, the 
official army of the Qing government could not meet the challenge of the peasant 
army. The imperial court had to request the locality to organize and train the local 
troop to fight against the rebels. The central government sent back some senior civil 
officials their hometown to recruit troop, and required that they should do theirs best 
to keep these new armies to be loyal to the Emperor. The xiangjun (the Army of 
Hunan Province) organized by Zeng Guofan, an eminent gentry-official of the court, 
was the paragon of these local troops. In the army, there was a high level of loyalty 
among the officers and his inferiorities. The soldier was loyal to the commander, who 
was from the same hometown, but not to the Manchu emperor in the faraway capital 
city. Because the central government could not finance these armies, it consented 
tacitly to allow the military leader to tax the locality. Therefore, besides the armed 
force, these local leaders also controlled the local finance. Depending on the military 
and economic resources, these strongmen gradually dominated the local civil 
administration. The force that could check the trend came from a powerful central 
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government or a powerful state head. However, in China, the Manchu government 
was too weak to stop the development of the local militarism, and lost it political 
power in the Revolution of 1911. Although Yuan Shikai was became the most 
powerful and authoritarian leader of China, he also missed the opportunity of nipping 
the potential separatist military strongmen in the bud as a result of his wrong strategy. 
After Yuan passed away, China’s politics entered period of a vast power vacuum, in 
which any one, which controlled a powerful private army could show ostentatiously 
in the political stage47.  
The change of local elite was indispensable for the development of the local 
militarization. They promoted each other and accelerated the separation of the locality 
and the central government. The local elite—in the rural area, the name of gentry was 
more appropriate—played an important role in the social development of China. 
During the Qing period, the central government could exercise its power at the 
county-level administration. If it wanted to go down further, the central government 
must rely on the local elite. Since the mid 19th century, the imperial court became 
weaker and the local elite became increasingly active. In the early studies, the gentry 
were defined as people in the countryside, who had passed a certain level of the civil 
examination and was entitled48. They were recognized by both the government and 
the public, and went round between the official grass-root administration and the local 
                                                 
47  See: Wu Guoguang and Zheng Yongnian 吴国光、郑永年 , Lun zhongyang difang guanxi: 
zhongguo zhidu zhuanxing zhong de yige zhouxin wenti论中央—地方关系：中国制度转型中的一
个轴心问题 (On the Central-local Relation: A Key Problem of the Institutional Transformation of 
China) (Hong Kong: The Oxford University Press, 1995), p120-3. 
48 See: Chang Chung-li, The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese 
Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955). 
 40
residents49.  
It was too narrow to define the elite in the late Qing and Republican period. At 
that time, the way of becoming elite had been diversified. When the civil examination 
system was abolished, the scholar honor or the official rank was not the prerequisite of 
being elite and some scholars employed a broader definition. The so-called “elite” 
refers to any person or family that had the dominant influence in a given territory50. If 
one person wanted to be elite, he must extract and maintain the following resources: 
the “material”, such as land, commercial wealth, and military power; the “personal”, 
like the leadership in a region; and the “symbolic”, such as honor and social status51. 
Among them, extracting the military resource was the most effective way of 
becoming elite. In view of this, the so-called local militarization was tantamount to 
the militarization of local elite. When the militarized local elite incorporated with the 
separatist regionalism, the politics of China was seriously changed. 
The “regionalism” is not a new word in Chinese politics. In China, there are 
distinctions among provinces and territories inside one province. People of different 
regions have their particular personality and way of thinking. Generally speaking, 
politicians and the local elite from a specific region have strong regional sentiments52. 
The regional sentiment can develop naturally into regionalism. In this thesis, the 
regionalism is a neutral political term. It refers to the politicians and the local elite 
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who have the concerns— it is based on the regional sentiments—on the interest of the 
locality. This thesis argues there are two kinds of regionalism. The first One is “the 
regionalism with political ideal”. 
In the Republican period, the regionalism with political ideal argued that 
because a powerful, fair-minded, and efficient central government could not be 
created very soon, the national and local modernization was affected seriously. Under 
such circumstances, the locality could, under the lead of the capable local elite, carry 
out the works that the state was unable to perform, such as stabilizing the rural society, 
developing the rural economy and improving the rural education. What the locality 
did would be helpful for the national modernization. To help the locality to promote 
these works, the central authorities should approve of the locality’s role in the social 
development and give the locality the full autonomy. 
In the 1920s and 1930s, there was a “radical” regionalism with a political ideal. 
It referred to the political idea that if the central government was neither capable to 
solve the serious social problems in the local society nor it wanted to give the locality 
the full autonomy, the locality had the right to create the local self-government by its 
own way. The goal of seizing power from the central or provincial government was 
not to gain independence from the state, but to create a better circumstance for social 
works. When these social works were finished, the locality would return to the central 
government. 
The second type of regionalism was the separatist regionalism. It intended to be 
independent from the central government, and change the locality into an independent 
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regime. People, who had the idea, took the chaos of China in that time as one perfect 
opportunity to fulfill their personal ambition. By monopolizing the military resources 
in one or some regions, they became local “kings”. These ambitious guys acted 
willfully and regarded the personal interest far superior to the national interest. 
The emergence and development of regionalism was a long process. From the 
second half of the nineteenth century, some people had realized that it might be better 
for China to follow the decentralization of power and allow the locality to play a more 
active role in the social development. The regionalism began raising its head in this 
period. The Revolution of 1911 stimulated the steep rise of regionalism. One of the 
reasons for the Revolution’s success could be attributed to the individual province. At 
the critical moment of the Revolution, the province declared the independence and 
launched the coup de grâce to the ailing imperial court. After the Revolution, the 
provincial establishments hoped that the status quo could be maintained. They 
intended to perform a full-fledged local self-government, so that the local interest 
would not be undermined by the new central government. In the 1910s and 1920s, 
there was a heated debate on which political model China should 
follow—centralization or decentralization53. It was difficult for China to determine 
which way was appropriate. On one hand, the serious foreign and domestic situation 
required that China establish a powerful and centralized national government as soon 
as possible. On the other hand, the rise of the locality was an undeniable reality, and 
the excessive centralization would definitely intensify the central-local tension. Yuan 
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Shikai’s radical way of centralizing power provoked the locality’s fierce resistance, 
and was forced to leave the center of power. 
From Yuan’s demise to the establishment of Nanjing central government 
(1916-1927), military strongmen controlled China’s politics. The Chinese society 
became extremely chaotic. This period was the time in which the separatist 
regionalism was most rampant and the central government was the weakest. In those 
days, the central government was just a toy played by military strongmen. In the chaos, 
there were seven Presidents or state heads in other name, twenty-four cabinets, five 
national assemblies, and at least four constitutions or basic laws54. 
This period grew out of the trinity of the local militarism, the militarization of 
the local elite, and the separatist regionalism. The Revolution of 1911 and the 
anti-Yuan Shikai movement were the catalyst. In Edward McCord’s book55, he 
examined the emergence of the militarist politics in three stages. In the first stage, the 
Revolution of 1911 implemented the “politicization of the military”. It had two 
meanings: firstly, the intervention of the provincial New Armies guaranteed the 
Revolution’s success; and secondly, the Revolution justified the use of military means 
to achieve political goals. In the second stage, the “militarization of Chinese politics” 
was done in the Second Revolution. Both Yuan and his opponents fulfilled their 
political aims by employing military methods. The last but the most crucial stage was 
the Anti-Monarchical War. The war had two serious outcomes. One was that both the 
                                                 
54  James E. Sheridan, “The warlord era: politics and militarism under the Peking government, 
1916-28”, in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 12, p. 308. 
55 Edward A. McCord, The Power the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: California University Press, 1993) 
 44
sides greatly increased the number of their troops in the name of the War. The other 
was that, on the base of military power, these military strongmen tried to build up their 
political influence. The war justified both the military and political expansion of these 
military strongmen. 
The impact of militarist politics on China was rather negative. Military 
strongmen believed in the logic of power56 and the militarism57, and took control over 
territory or territories as the supreme rule of politics. In many cases, what they did 
drove the Chinese population into hardship and suffering58. However, we must be 
cautious not to apply this criticism to all military strongmen. In Odoric Y. K. Wou’s 
study on Wu Peifu, one of the leading militarists in the north China, the author 
concludes that Wu was a man of “rudimentary modern nationalism”59. He added that 
the influence of the traditional Confucianism was so great that Wu had a strong 
identity of the national unification and, he had some basic ideas of building a modern 
state. 
Another misperception of military strongmen was that they were just rude 
bellicose men surrounded by the simple-minded and greedy soldiers. In the territory 
that they controlled, they administered the society using violent means. However, in 
Gavan McCormack’s book, we noticed that Zhang Zuolin, the sinister, ruthless, 
lecherous, and opium-addicted bandit chieftain of the Manchuria, had employed some 
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civilian officials in his regime. These officials worked out some policies and plans of 
social development, in which we could even find elements of nationalism and 
anti-imperialism60. In his book on Long Yun, one of the Yunan military strongmen, J. 
C. S. Hall argues that the civil bureaucratic system had played an important role in 
Long’s kingdom. Therefore, Hall criticizes that the traditional understanding of 
“warlord” was overly biased because it emphasized only on the negative military 
aspect61. 
We cannot simply assert that all the territories controlled by military strongmen 
were “dark” in China. In his inspiring book, Donald Gillin shows that Yan Xishan, 
one of the most famous military strongmen of modern China who controlled Shanxi 
Province, worked out a systematic political, economic, and educational plan, and, 
even to a certain extent, succeed in developing the local industry62. Gillin even argues 
that under the circumstance of partial separation, it was still possible for a specific 
region such as Shanxi to create a better social environment for the economic 
development63. In Diana Lary’s book of the local leaders of Guangxi, the author 
points out that the regionalism could possibly bring about stability to the locality. Lary 
even argues that the iron-blood rule of some military strongmen, who had the 
long-term plan of social development, could increase the survival opportunity of the 
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locality in the chaotic time. In another more comprehensive book on Guangxi64, Zhu 
Hongyuan presents to us the vital role that Li Zongrong and Bai Chongxi - the two 
most eminent militarists of Guangxi - played in the social development of the remote 
southern province. Zhu contends that it was Li and Bai’s efforts that helped the 
province to take on a new political and economic look. In short, the two military 
strongmen’s work contributed greatly to the early modernization of Guangxi. 
When regional military strongmen became the “protagonist” of Chinese politics, 
it marked that the locality was the dominant role in the central-local power 
configuration. Perhaps, we can regard the period of militarist politics as an era that the 
regionalism was the most vivid. In this period, the tension between the state and the 
locality reached the peak. After that, China would either fall into parts, or reestablish a 
new, powerful, and centralized national government. Ch’i Hsi-sheng asserts that the 
deep-rooted consciousness of unification put all kinds of separatist military 
strongmen into the crisis of legitimacy, and the national crisis in the modern period 
strengthened the idea65. If the scholar’s words are right, we can induce that there was 
an establishment of a powerful central government after this period. The universal and 
unflagging national feeling would justify any effort of creating a centralized 
government and Jiang Jieshi was quick to grasp the opportunity. 
Arthur Waldron points out that the one-year between 1924 and 1925 was the 
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turning point of Chinese history 66 . It was in the second war between zhi and 
feng-clique “warlords” that the power of the northern group represented by Wu Peifu 
and Zhang Zuolin were greatly weakened. After the war, there was no single 
“warlord” who could be powerful enough to control the whole country. As those 
military strongmen were more concerned with the regional interest, China was thrown 
into the abyss of anarchism. This provided opportunity to the southern militarists. 
Jiang Jieshi, backed by the powerful tycoons of the prosperous provinces of the lower 
Yangtze River, became the final winner in the cruel competition. In the spring of 1927, 
he established the Nanjing central government and declared the formal unification of 
China. After the Great War of the Central Plains (1930), in which the military power 
of his opponents, Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan were destroyed and Jiang became the 
leader of China. Jiang checked the separatist tide. 
Akin to his predecessors, Jiang faced similar problems: how to create a powerful, 
stable, and efficient central government? What would he draw on the map of the 
central-local power configuration? In the new configuration, could the energy of the 
locality be released, while the interest of the centralized government not was being 
undermined? The solution of Jiang was, on one hand, to strengthen the control over 
the locality; on the other hand, to promote a limited or controlled, local 
self-government to mobilize the locality. Of course, such kind of mobilization 
should—principally must—be done by the central government. 
First of all, Jiang did his best to improve the capability of the central government. 
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Hence, improving the central government’s capability is tantamount to improve the 
state capability. According to John Migdal’s definition, the so-called state capabilities 
refers to the state head’s capability of mobilizing the people to fulfill the national 
goals, which include penetrating society, regulating social relationships, extracting 
resources, and appropriating or using resource in determined ways67. Therefore, Jiang 
expected the new central government he created able to monopolize all military, 
political, and cultural resources and put the locality under firm control. The state 
power would penetrate top-down into most of the grass-root society. Unsurprisingly, 
it was an authoritarian way of state building, which gave the first priority to the highly 
centralized power and the tight control over the locality. On the premise of the rigid 
top-down control, the locality could be granted a limited autonomy. One scholar calls 
this “the Whampoa-style controlled mobilization”68. Jiang hoped that by this model, 
Guomindang could maintain the authority of the central government and increase the 
efficiency of local politics. 
Nevertheless, this was not an ideal plan. Scholars in the field of elite study argue 
that there are two ways of integrating the present central political system and the new 
social force. The first is that the present central authorities could absorb the new social 
force by reforming the present political system. The second is violent, in which the 
new social force topples down the present central political system, and creates a new 
social space69. The paradigm can be used in discussing the central-local relations in 
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the Nanjing decade. In the ten-year, the active regionalists never stopped their appeal 
for autonomy, to which the central government must respond. Nanjing had two 
choices. First, it could reform the politics and grant the full autonomy to the locality. 
As a result, the locality would be mobilized and cooperate with the national 
government to fulfill the national modernization. Second, the ruling party could 
increase the degree of centralization and tighten its control over the local society. 
Correspondingly, the autonomy of the locality would be greatly reduced and Nanjing 
chose the latter. The similar viewpoint can be found in Lloyd Eastman’s study70. He 
argues that in the Nanjing decade, to the new forces that were from the society, the 
Guomindang government could either dispel them by political suppression, or 
incorporate them by expanding the political participation. Jiang Jieshi preferred the 
suppression. One of the results for his choice was that the spontaneous local 
self-governments in the rural area were oppressed. It was dangerous for Guomindang 
to do so because the locality became increasingly discontent with the central 
authorities. If the Guomindang’s opponent manipulated the discontent, the society 
would be as Lloyd Eastman calls, a “powder keg”. 
In the 1920s and 1930s, although Nanjing declared that it had “unified” China, 
its capability of controlling the local society was very limited. Tien Hung-mao points 
out that Nanjing had a “firm control” over Jiangsu and Zhejiang; by the middle of 
1930s, the number of provinces that controlled effectively by the party amounted to 
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ten71. But there were twenty-eight provinces in that time. In other words, by this time, 
the central government controlled only less than forty-percent territories of China. 
Even in the “effectively controlled” provinces, the Guomindang’s control may be 
incomplete. For instance, in Henan, a docile agricultural province in the eyes of the 
central authorities, we found that at least in the southwestern part of certain counties 
got out of the control of the Guomindang’s provincial government. James Sheridan’s 
study argues that in the Nanjing decade, many provinces such as Shanxi, Guangxi, 
Guangdong, Fujian, and Sichuan, were under the control of powerful regional 
militarists72. The large-or-small-scale wars against the central government broke out 
time and time again. 
Prasenjit Duara’s “state power involution” explains why Guomindang failed in 
extending its power. He argues that, in the Republican period, the bureaucratic 
organizations of the state and their power scope were expanding. In the north China 
plain, these expansions depended on “brokerage”. That is to say that although the state 
tried its best to extend power, it could not penetrate directly into the countryside. The 
state had to employ the local elite as the “brokers” to finish the job. As a result, these 
“brokers” became more and more powerful, and gradually replaced the state as the 
dominant player in the rural area73. “In other words, the Republican government had 
endeavored to form a centralized administration system. However, the result was a 
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topsy-turvy stuff. The government neither integrated the local elite by ideology and 
material incentives, nor stopped them from grabbing political power and extracting 
other social resources.”74 The Republican period, in the scholar’s eyes, was a period 
that “the state authority failed totally and the state political system fell apart.”75 
Nevertheless, as one scholar suggests, we do not need to spend too much time 
and energy in criticizing the weakness and failure of Guomindang, but instead to 
concentrate our attention on the party’s efforts of strengthening the state power76. 
What disturbed the central government of Guomindang was that it lacked the 
institutional capacity. Thus, Jiang and his central government tried to find an 
institutional breakthrough, by which they could adjust the central-local relations. 
Some scholars criticizes that China in the modern period was not a “state” but 
still an “empire”77. In their arguments, the difference of “empire” and “modern state” 
is such that in an empire, there is no distinction between the state’s power and the 
locality’s power. The control over the local society is predicated on which one is more 
powerful. On the contrary, in a modern state, the division of power between the center 
and the locality is clear-cut. The centralized-mode of modern state stresses that 
top-down control, and the decentralized-model state recognizes that the locality 
should enjoy the full autonomy. In the modern period, the key focus of Chinese 
political modernization was to transform the country from an empire to a modern state. 
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From the late Qing to the Nanjing decade, every central government followed the 
centralized model, and attempted to reverse the weakening trend of the state. The 
Nanjing central government, under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi, endeavored to 
increase its power by the military, political, and legal means. 
In 1930, the number of the troops under Jiang’s direct control was around 
400,000 while the number of the major regional militarists’ troops was more than 
600,00078. The major regional militarists—Li Zongren, Feng Yuxiang, and Yan 
Xishan—controlled Zhengzhifenhui (the Branch of the Central Committee of Politics) 
in Wuhan, Kaifeng, and Taiyuan. In the provinces controlled by these militarists, they 
maintained a semi-independent status and Nanjing could not interfere in the local 
affairs. To change the situation, Jiang had to resort to military suppression. In the 
spring and summer of 1929, after the war with the gui-clique regional militarists and 
Feng Yuxiang, Jiang forced Li Zongrong and Bai Chongxi to retreat from Hunan and 
Hubei, and drove back Feng to Shaanxi. The decisive war, or the Great War of the 
Central Plains, broke out in the May of 1930. Using political tactics, Jiang won the 
support from Zhang Xueliang, the most powerful regional militarist of Manchuria. 
When Zhang sent his troops to the north China, Jiang very quickly defeated Feng 
Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and the gui-clique militarists. In this war, the military power of 
Feng was destroyed completely, and Yan and Li Zongren could only keep their power 
in Shanxi and Guangxi respectively. 
Guangdong was one of the bases of anti-Jiang power, and was dominated by the 
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military strongman Chen Jitang79 . Because Guangdong was far away from the 
political center and was strong economically, Jiang could not launch a direct military 
attack. In 1936, he bought over Huang Zhigang, the commander of the air force of 
Guangdong. Huang publicly declared his loyalty to the central government. As such, 
the military power of Chen Jitang was weakened seriously. With the help of Sun Ke, 
the eldest son of Sun Zhongshan, Jiang persuaded some senior officials of Chen’s 
regime to stand on the side of Nanjing. By the July of 1936, Chen was forced to leave 
Guangdong and his regime collapsed80. 
In the early 1930s, some influential civil leaders inside the central government 
challenged Jiang’s status. Hu Hanmin and Wang Jingwei were two of such leaders that 
were the opponents of Jiang. Hu felt that the new central government should strictly 
abide by the political teachings of Sun Zhongshan. He also hoped that the personal 
power of Jiang could be limited. Jiang was displeased with this, and in 1931, he put 
Hu under the house arrest. This provoked the opponents’ reaction. Shortly after Hu’s 
arrest, the opponents formed another “central” government in Guangzhou81. Jiang had 
to change his strategy. As a compromise, he resigned as the Chairman of the national 
government and the President of Xingzhengyuan (the Executive House). Hu did not 
go to the office of Nanjing and he passed away in Guangzhou in 1936. 
After Hu’s death, there was only one man in the party—Wang Jingwei, one of 
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the radical disciples of Sun Zhongshan—that could challenge Jiang. At the first look, 
Jiang and Wang cooperated peacefully in the top echelon of Guomindang and 
administered the military and executive affairs respectively. Beneath the surface, they 
were trying to squeeze the other out of political power82. In 1935, Wang was seriously 
wounded in an assassination attempt. Using the excuse of Wang’s health, Jiang 
resumed his control over the Executive House. In 1938, Jiang established 
Yuanshouzhi (the party director-general system), which greatly diminished Wang’s 
power in the nationalist party. 
The long-time fight against regional militarists and the endless factional strife 
seriously undermined the Guomindang’s politics83. Firstly, the whole party and the 
central government were militarized. The military men dominated the senior posts, 
and the military affairs had the priority in the distribution of social resources. 
Secondly, the complex factional strife forced Jiang to rely on client groups that he 
could firmly control. Under such circumstances, creating an institutionalized and 
efficient central civil bureaucracy became increasingly difficult. It brought about the 
poor efficiency and rampant corruptions in the Guomindang’s administration. Lloyd 
Eastman argues that the “ineffective administration” and corruption might be the most 
distinctive character of Nanjing84. 
A vicious circle happened. The central government was ineffective and 
unsuccessful in the control over the local society. Jiang thought more that the power 
was “less” centralized. In spite of reforming the politics, he did what all he could do to 
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seize power for himself. Jiang secretly identified that the fascist way of monopolizing 
power would be an ideal solution to the poor performance of the central government. 
One scholar even calls the rule of Guomindang the “Confucian Fascism” 85 . 
Guomindang’s fascism was combined with Neo-Confucianism and was different from 
fascism in Germany and Italy. The German-Italy style placed greater emphasis on the 
mass mobilization while the Guomindang’s type stressed on the personal—Jiang’s— 
military tutelage. Such deep ideological change seriously affected the development of 
the central-local relations in the Nanjing decade. Guomindang extended the 
centralization of power at the expense of the autonomy of the locality. It was 
epitomized in the Guomindang’s policy of promoting local self-government. 
Before the Second Sino-Japanese war, the most important law for regulating 
central-local relations was The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China for 
the Period of Tutorial Government (1931). The law explicitly stated that it followed 
Sun Zhongshan’s idea of junquan, or “the balanced-power”, in determining the power 
of the central and local government. However, as one scholar points out, the Law did 
not explain what the central power and the power of the locality were. It just pointed 
out that the locality should be guided by the central government and the right to 
interpret the law was possessed by the Central Executive Committee of Guomindang. 
In this case, he argues that the power of the locality was not clearly stated and the 
ultimate goal of the Law was definitely to strengthen the power 
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centralization86.Because of the vagueness of the law, Guomindang was able to tighten 
control over the locality. 
First of all, the central government tried to strengthen the control over the 
provincial administrative organ. Although Nanjing could not rule the provinces that 
were controlled by the regional militarists, it was able to put the provincial 
government in the provinces controlled by Guomindang under its supervision87. In the 
1920s, the chairman of the provincial government was the top official in a province 
and was recommended and elected by the local assembly. Usually, the influential local 
leaders occupied the post. By revising The Organic Law of the Provincial 
Government (1930), Nanjing took back the right to appoint the chairman. The Law 
stipulated that the chairman of the provincial government must be directly appointed 
by the central government. Besides the chairman, the committee members of the 
provincial government also played important role in the local politics. They had the 
right to pass resolutions that were directly related with important local affairs. To put 
them under control, Nanjing ordered these members to discuss the matters that were 
mandated by the central government. Any resolution that passed by the committee 
could not be implemented until the central government approved it. Under the 
chairman, there were functional departments in the provincial government. The 
candidate of the head of department, as Nanjing provided, must be verified by the 
Executive House and finally appointed by the central government. The provincial 
department or bureau must be responsible for and supervised by the relative central 
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ministry. The control over the departments and bureaus by the provincial leader was 
weakened. Therefore, the departmental heads could check the provincial chairman in 
case he becomes too powerful to be controlled by the central government. 
Managing the county-level government was a headache for Guomindang. The 
reason could partly be attributed to Sun Zhongshan. In modern states, one way of 
central-local power configuration is centralization, in which the central government 
firmly controls the political power and the locality is granted with very few 
autonomous rights. The other is decentralization, in which except the powers that 
must be possessed by the central government such as national defense and diplomacy, 
the locality also enjoys a full autonomy. However, for Sun Zhongshan, neither was 
suitable for China. The centralized model could easily fall into authoritarianism, and 
the decentralized one was not useful in maintaining national unification. Therefore, he 
proposed the model of “balanced-power”. In this model, neither the central 
government nor the locality was the subject of political power. The power was 
configured on the base of duties and responsibilities such that the center and the 
locality. In other words, the balanced model was a solution to how to distribute the 
power of handling concrete matters between the central government and the locality. 
As Sun pointed out:  
When it comes to the distribution of power, we should consider more 
seriously what the nature of the power that will be distributed was, but not 
which one, the center or the locality, should be given more power. The power 
that is better for the central government to have should be given to it. Equally, 
the locality should have the due power.88  
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The national-level matter, such as the national defense and foreign affairs, should 
be handled by the state (the central government). For the matter of social development, 
such as economy, education, and culture, a national plan was necessary and it was 
better for the locality to deal with them, because the concrete circumstances varied 
from place to place. The ideal of Sun was that, by the balanced model the new 
revolutionary government, could have been more flexibility and avoided both the 
rigidity of the centralized model and the separation of the decentralized model.  
In Sun’s balanced model, the full-fledged county-level self-government was 
sine qua non to the new Chinese politics. In his The Nation-building Program of the 
National Government, when xunzhen shiqi (the tutorial period) began, the key task of 
the revolutionary party was to promote the county self-government, in which the 
people would enjoy the four direct political rights: suffrage; recall; initiative; and 
referendum. The self-governance of the county advocated by Sun was a solution that 
incorporated the ruling party, government and the people. One scholar argues that the 
modern state comes from the process of narrowing down the distance between the 
government and the people, or the expanding of the people’s participation in 
politics89.  
Sun proposed that the ruling party should provide trainings for the people and 
increase their capabilities of participating in politics. The central government would 
grant full autonomy to the county-level society in which the people would perform 
their political power. In his county of self-government, it was completely 
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self-governing and its autonomous power should not be interfered by the superior 
government90. 
In the August of 1928, Jiang Jieshi declared the beginning of the tutorial period. 
However, Jiang could not follow Sun’s idea of local self-government because he held 
that the national father’s plan gave too much power to the locality. As such, the 
authority of the central government would be weakened. In the Nanjing decade, The 
Organic Law of County (1928) was the prime law of adjusting the county 
administration. In the Law, Guomindang flaunted that it would follow strictly the 
teachings of Sun and promote the county self-government in the tutorial period.  
As we know, to promote the self-government of county, the county must first of 
all, be the subject of power and enjoy full autonomy. Unfortunately, the Law did not 
clearly stipulate the autonomous status and power of county. According to the Law:  
There is only one government in every county, and the county government is 
under the supervision of the provincial government. The county government 
has the right to handle the executive affairs and supervise the local 
self-government affairs.91  
One scholar points out that because the right that county “enjoyed”—the right to 
supervise the affairs of local self-government was not the “power of autonomy”—the 
county was not the true subject of the local self-government 92 . Besides it, the 
executive rights of county were given and supervised by the provincial government. 
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Hence, we can draw a conclusion that in the Nanjing decade, the county 
administration was not an autonomous organ that represented the people of the 
grass-root society, but just a dependent organ that was responsible for the superior 
government. As such, Nanjing totally deviated from the spirit of Sun Zhongshan’s 
local self-government. 
Under the system, the county magistrate who should be originally elected by the 
local people, must be selected and appointed by the superior government. According 
to The Regulations of Appointing the County Magistrate (1934), the Department of 
Civil Affairs of the provincial government had the duty of choosing the magistrate 
candidates. The chairman of the provincial government presented the candidates to 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs for examination. If the candidate passed the 
examination, he would be officially appointed as the magistrate by the provincial 
government. In this way, the central government firmly retained the right to choose, 
appoint, and check on the local officials. 
In the county government headed by the magistrate, there were four ke (section) 
in charge of the affairs of public security, education, and finance. By the 1920s and 
1930s, besides the ke system, there was ju (bureau). Usually, in an individual county, 
there were four ju—the public security, finance, construction, and education bureau. 
The ju was more autonomous because its head was influential gentry in the county. 
The head of ke was appointed by the provincial government. Hence, this could be 
regarded as a result of Guomindang’s efforts in bureaucratizing the grass-root 
administration. The coexistence of ke and ju in one county was not good for 
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improving the efficiency of local politics and hence should be reformed. The first step 
would be to incorporate the office of ke and ju. Before the reform, the office of ju 
located outside the county government. To facilitate the magistrate in coordinating the 
matters of ke and ju and to reduce the number of excessive personnel, Nanjing 
required that ju must work in the county government. The second step was taken in 
1937 when the central government passed a law which stipulated that all public 
security, finance, education, and construction ju in county should be rescinded and all 
the affairs of ju were handled to the ke of the county government. 
The reform was significant to the modernization of Chinese politics. In a mature 
modern state, every level of its administration has to be bureaucratized. Otherwise, it 
would be difficult for the state to perform the large-scale social administration. From 
this view of point, the Guomindang’s efforts in bureaucratizing the grass-root 
administration were beyond rapprochement. However, these efforts did have negative 
influence. The more rigid the Guomindang’s control over the county government was, 
less autonomous the county became. 
To some extent, promoting the local self-government and strengthening the 
control over the local society appeared to be a zero-sum game. In the Nanjing decade, 
the efforts to centralize regardless of where they happened—in the central, the 
provincial, or the county government—directly or indirectly damaged the autonomy 
of the locality. The promise of promoting the full-fledged local self-government was 
just a promise. One scholar of the 1930s, who studied the local self-government in 
China, asked: “Why after so many years of efforts put in promoting the local 
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self-government, nothing much was achieved?” This was because “the people had no 
real opportunity to perform it”93. Another scholar of the same period, who wrote a 
book on the county administration of China, tactfully criticized the local 
self-government of China for having deviated from the true autonomous spirit and 
degenerated into either the “official government” manipulated by the state or the 
“gentry government” controlled by the ambitious local elite94. 
In the central-local relations, excessive stress on either the center or the locality 
exerted negative influence on the country. If the locality claims too much, and the 
regional sentiments are manipulated by the people that had political ambition, a 
separatist tide will surged. If the center emphasizes too much on its own interest, the 
energy and enthusiasm of the locality will seriously be choked. Consequently, the 
attempts to develop the local society, especially the rural society, will become 
increasingly difficult. Regardless of how powerful a central government is, its 
capability is not limitless. China has a vast rural territory and the hundreds of millions 
of peasants. Therefore, no matter how hard it works, it is impossible for the state to 
attend to everything. To the country, what is the proportion of the central-local power 
configuration appropriate to achieve a win-win situation for the state and the locality? 
From the late Qing, to Guomindang and even in present day communist government 
of China, none of them could offer a satisfactory answer. 
 
                                                 
93 Dong Xiujia 董修甲, Zhongguo difang zizhi wenti 中国地方自治问题 (The Problems of Local 
Self-government in China), p.18. 
94 Cheng Fang 程方, Zhongguo xianzheng gailun 中国县政概论 (An Introduction to The County 
Administration of China), p.464. 
 63
2) The rural north China: banditry and social militarization, the case of Henan 
Since the late Qing, the decline of the central government accelerated the 
weakening of the mechanism of social control, and the rural area was caught in 
disorder. The traditional authority was overthrown in the 1911 revolution led by Sun 
Zhongshan and the new authority was not established soon enough after the demise of 
the imperial court. Yuan Shikai did not succeed in creating a new political authority, 
and a period of militarist politics followed. The regional militarists exerted very 
negative influences on the rural society. In the chaos, the banditry’s power developed 
conspicuously.  
In the north China, besides the weakening social control mechanism, the natural 
disasters, man-made calamities, the pressure of population, the declining of 
traditional rural economy and the deep transformation of the rural social structure 
stimulated the development of banditry. From the late Qing to the 1911Revolution, 
there were serious natural disasters in almost every year in Zhili (Hebei), Shandong, 
Henan, Shanxi, and Shaanxi. In the Republican period, the floods and droughts still 
persistently disturbed these provinces95. The war among the regional militarists was 
the most devastating man-made calamity. From the mid 19th century to the Nanjing 
decade, the ever-increasing population exerted tremendous demographic pressure on 
the farmland. In many rural areas, peasants could not maintain their subsistence by 
only the land. Many peasants had to give up crop planting and try to find other ways of 
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making a living. In the meantime, the traditional small handicraft industry in the 
countryside was impinged seriously by the new economy, and a lot of craftsmen lost 
their job. These desperate peasants and craftsmen constituted a special social 
class—youmin, or the rural vagabonds. In the past, the traditional clan organizations 
could provide these wandering people with some basic help. But in the Republican 
period, these organizations became irrelevant as a result of modern politics, education, 
and culture, and lost their relief capabilities96. As a result, some destitute peasants had 
to join the bandit organization for survival. The regional militarists helped the 
development of banditry. Those military strongmen, especially the smaller ones, had a 
short political lifespan. When they lost a major battle, their troops would be dispersed 
and many of these disbanded soldiers turned to banditry. 
As early as the 1850s, the gentry in the north China began to organize the local 
armed force to fight against the Taiping and Nian rebels. In the Republican period, the 
rampant banditry provided stimulus to the development of local militarization. For 
instance, in the case of Henan during the late Qing, it was renowned for its rampant 
banditry. By the 1920s, there were three bandit-ridden zones in the province—the 
western, south western, and eastern Henan. Usually, the bandits were active in the 
outer areas. The bandit could even turn the key cities such as Kaifeng and Luoyang 
upside down97. In Phil Billingsley’s study, the number of the bandits in Henan in the 
1920s was more than 100,00098. It was ranked the first in China. As such, he calls 
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Henan a “Bandit World”99. 
The main reason behind the banditization of Henan was the chaos caused by the 
regional militarists. In the 1910s and 1920s, large-and-small-scale wars among them 
had never ceased. These wars destroyed the political orders and brought about 
numerous serious social problems. Henan, because of its unique geographical position, 
became a place contested by the big regional militarists. In the 1920s, there were more 
than ten major wars and countless small military conflicts in the province. As a result, 
Henan became a giant military camp. According to the statistics, it had 23,000 troops 
in 1912100. In 1920, the number increased to 56,550. By 1924, the troops stationed in 
Henan soared abruptly to 200,000. In 1926, just along the Beijing-Hankou railway, 
there were 300,000 troops. If the troops in the northern part of Henan were added in, 
in the mid 1920s, the total number of soldiers in the poor rural province was at least 
400,000. 
These troops belonged to different regional militarist. There were endless open 
strife and veiled struggles among them. In that time, more than eighty-percent of the 
provincial finance was used to finance the military101. The politics of the province was 
ruined. In just one year, between 1926 and 1927, there were seven governors 
appointed by military strongmen in Henan. One of them stayed in the post for only 
one month102. The Nanjing central government could not improve the situation. On 
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the contrary, the tangled war of Jiang Jieshi, Feng Yuxiang, and Yan Xishan in 1930 
brought more calamites to the poor province. The main battlefield was in Henan. To 
meet the needs of the war, militarist that controlled the province greatly increased the 
amount of taxes, and the local economy was driven to the verge of collapse. In some 
places, the desperate peasants had to join the bandits to make a living. In addition, the 
small and big bandit gangs also recruited the disbanded soldiers of those defeated 
militarists. 
The continuous worsening situation of the public security was an impetus to the 
local militarization of Henan. In the province, the local militarization commenced 
from the period of the Taiping Rebellion. In 1854, the northern expedition army of 
Taiping invaded Henan. To resist the powerful peasant army, the government had to 
request the prefectures and counties to build strongholds and organize the local armed 
force. For instance, in Sui County, a small county in the eastern Henan, there were 
more than fifty strongholds were built in this year103. After the Taiping Rebellion, the 
government became weaker and could not check both the banditry and the local 
militarization. In the Republican period, the power of the banditry reached their peak. 
Correspondingly, the local militarization of Henan was speeded up. In his study of the 
Xinyang County, which is located in the southern Henan, Shen Songqiao points out 
that by 1934, there were 571 strongholds. Among them, more than four hundreds 
strongholds were built after the collapse of Qing. Even in the 1930s, the county built 
two hundred and fifty strongholds. In other words, more than forty-percent of the 
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strongholds were built in the Nanjing decade104. Shen regards these strongholds as the 
decline of the central authorities and the rise of the power of the local elite105. 
Militia was the marrow of the local armed force. The history of militia could be 
traced back to the ancient time and was not something new to China. However, in the 
modern period when the state power began to decline, the militia organized by the 
local elite took on a new meaning. One scholar points out that this marked the 
devolution of power from the weakened state to the local elite106. That is to say, in the 
modern time, besides the traditional function of maintaining the social order in the 
locality, the militia became a tool for seizing political power from the state. In the 
Nanjing decade, this trend was not changed greatly. One study argues that in the ten 
years (1927-1937), the widespread existence of militia “indicated a basic weakness in 
the nationalist government’s relationship to local elites and a clue to its ultimate 
failure to achieve broader state-building objectives.”107 To the local elite, recruiting 
militia had become an important means of gaining and maintaining their political 
dominance in the grass-root society. The local self-government of Wanxi was a good 
example. Zhang Xin points out that in the southwestern Henan, controlling the militia 
laid the solid foundation of creating the local self-government, and helped the local 
elite to resist successfully the Guomindang’s provincial government’s effort of 
resuming the state power in this region108. 
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In the name of promoting the local self-government and by the way of 
organizing the local armed force, the local elite could shake off the state’s control. It 
was one of the ways to expand the gentry-power. In the Nanjing decade, one of the 
important aspects of the central government’s work of state building was to restrain 
the gentry from extending their power109. However, Guomindang was not successful 
in doing so. Philip Huang mentions that in the rural north China, the power structure 
was a triangle, in which there was the complex relationship between state, local elites, 
and village. Although the Guomindang’s central government tried its best to control 
the countryside and improve the tax-collection by bureaucratizing the village-level 
administration, the outcome was but a “power vacuum” in the rural area110. Also, 
because the state was too weak to penetrate the countryside, the countryside became 
the place dominated by “local bullies and evil gentry”. Nevertheless, this thesis does 
not agree with Huang’s argument. It is not true that all local elites that controlled the 
political power in the rural area were either “bullies” or “evil gentry”. Rather, some of 
them were capable and respectable local leaders. For example, in Wanxi, the local 
elite did their best to stabilize and develop the local society, and what they did greatly 
benefited the ordinary peasants in this region. 
It leads us to think about a more profound question: how is it possible to 
stabilize and develop the countryside? Because of a lot of reasons, from the late Qing 
to the Nanjing decade, the efforts to create a powerful central government failed in 
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China. One of the worst results of the failure was that the state could not give the 
countryside prompt, sufficient and effective help. Hence, the importance of the 
countryside to the country went without saying. Agriculture was the “soul” of the 
national economy of China111, and the stability and prosperity of the countryside was 
indispensable for the long period of peace and order of the country. 
Guomindang did put in efforts in rehabilitating the rural area. There were 
sixty-two administrative organs in the central government of Nanjing responsible for 
rural rehabilitation. However, the achievement of these organs was very limited. 
Lloyd Eastman argues that the party’s poor performance in the rehabilitation was a 
result of a number of factors: first, most of the plans and program proposed by 
Guomindang lost the contact with the rural reality; second, the central government 
was short of funds to implement its rural program; third, the money that was allocated 
to the rural program was often wasted in planning and executive affairs112. This left 
Nanjing in an embarrassing situation. Because of the bureaucratization of the local 
administration, the government instead of benefiting the peasants, caused more pain 
and suffering to them in the countryside. The basic reason behind Guomindang’s 
failure in the rural rehabilitation could be attributed to fact that the top echelon of the 
party paid less attention to the rural problems113. In the party’s plan of national 
modernization, the countryside had been regarded as a secondary concern. To some 
extent, the rural area was a victim of the urban modernization. The scenario was 
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indeed tragic. In one of his books, James Sheridan mentioned that:  
Under Chiang’s government, there were two Chinas: one was the modern, 
semi-westernized cities of the eastern coastal provinces, inhabited by an 
urban elite of Westernized intellectuals, businessman, merchants, 
professionals, and officials who had little contact with life in the countryside; 
the other was rural China, unchanged in its poverty, ignorance, and hardship, 
the helpless prey of local officials, warlords, and the conservative local 
gentry.114  
However, although the official efforts of rehabilitating the countryside was not 
successful, the intellectuals who concerned themselves with the fate of China and 
believed firmly that a rehabilitated countryside was the foundation of the national 
modernization, decided to act on their own to bring about a new life to the 
countryside. 
 
3) The Rural Reconstruction Movement 
Between the 1920s and 1930s, the rural reconstruction experiments developed 
into a social movement. Statistics have shown that prior to 1937, there were more than 
six hundred rural reconstruction organizations and more than one thousand rural 
reconstruction experiments in China115. The background of the participants was very 
complex. In the movement, there were intellectuals, government officials, local elites 
and even enlightened regional militarists. The reason why the rural reconstruction 
attracted so many people and became a national-scale movement was because the 
countryside fell into deep crisis in the period. One scholar of the 1930s argued that the 
deep rural crisis was caused by the imperialist economic and political invasion, the 
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continuous war of regional militarists, bandits, corruptions, and serious natural 
disasters116. Liang Shuming, the leading theory-builder of the RRM, divided the 
destructive force into three groups117. The first one was “political”—wars, bandits. 
The second was “economic”—the economic domination of the foreign powers. The 
last one was “cultural”—the fundamental changes in traditional thoughts, rites, and 
social customs in the rural area. 
The RRM was a response to the rural crisis and had a great diversity in form and 
content. An observer of the 1930s pointed out that these rural reconstruction 
experiments could be categorized roughly into two types—the official and the 
private118 . The official ones were the experiments that planned, organized, and 
implemented by the government. The private experiments, as the observer mentioned 
in his paper, were conducted by four kinds of social groups each having different 
goals. Firstly, the experiments carried out by the social and educational organizations 
wanted to provide the rural residents some practical services. Secondly, the 
universities, colleges, rural normal schools, and agricultural schools that participated 
in the movement, often conducted surveys and research work to collect data that were 
useful in developing the countryside. Thirdly, the government and semi-government 
banks expressed their interest in improving the rural finance and co-operative organs. 
Lastly, the experiments led by the local elite emphasized on the importance of local 
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self-government and followed the will of the local people. The observer made special 
reference to the local self-government of Wanxi in particular, and commended it as the 
“most notable example”119. Cheng Fang had a different categorization120. In his book, 
experiments such as the Ding County experiment led by Yang Yangchu (James Yen) 
and Huang Yanpei in Xugongqiao of Jiangsu Province were regarded as 
“organization-centered” because they were carried out by the National Association of 
the Mass Education Movement (MEM) and the National Association of Vocational 
Education of China (NAVEC). Also, some experiments were seen as 
“school-centered”. For example, Tao Xingzhi’s Xiaozhuang experiment and Liang 
Shuming’s Zouping experiment were headed by the rural normal school and the 
village school respectively. Finally, the author regarded some experiments, such as 
those carried out in Lanxi and Jiangning County, as “government-centered” because 
these experiments were planned by the central government and focused on the county 
administration reform. 
The “government-centered” rural reconstruction experiment had close 
connections with the County Administration Construction (CAC). We can also see it 
as the official edition of the RRM. Nonetheless, it did not emphasize on developing 
the countryside but rather on reforming the county administration to strengthen the 
party’s control over the local society. In fact, it was one of the central government’s 
responses to the urban political problems but not to the rural issues. 
In the 1930s, the Communist Party of China (CPC) changed the strategy and 
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focused its work in the rural area. By creating the revolution base and launching the 
Agrarian Revolution, CPC won the support from peasants in its controlled regions. 
Next, the party began to extend its power on the territories that they administered. 
Nanjing felt the challenge. Jiang Jieshi knew that if he lost the support of peasants, it 
would be very difficult for the party to maintain its rule in China. In 1932, he said that:  
Agriculture is the foundation of China. To increase the national wealth, we must 
count first on the peasants. The nation’s fate is entrusted with the countryside. 
Our country’s peace and prosperity is predicated on the stability of the 
countryside and the happiness of peasants.121  
Therefore, while Nanjing intensifying the military suppression on the 
communist base, it also tried to offset the communist party’s influence in the rural area. 
One of the measures was the County Administration Construction (CAC). 
In the Second National Conference of the Internal Affairs (1932), the central 
committee of Guomindang initiated a program to promote the experimental county of 
CAC. According to the program, the goal of CAC was to improve the people’s living 
and develop the local society. The method to promote the CAC was “four in 
one”—the incorporation of political tutelage, education, economy, and defense—and 
had two stages. In the first stage, or the period of reestablishing administration, the 
main task was to consolidate the officials in the county government. In the second 
stage, or the period of construction, the new county government would work hard on 
improving agriculture, developing local traffic, and universalizing the primary 
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education122. By the August of 1933, there were twenty experimental counties in 
China123. Jiangning, a county that was very close to the capital city, was the first 
experimental county of promoting CAC. 
As soon as Jiangning was selected as the first experimental county of CAC, the 
provincial government of Jiangsu passed “The Organic Rule of Jiangning 
Experimental County” (1933). It stipulated that the committee of county 
administration was the highest legislative body. It had 9-13 members and its duty was 
to work out the plan of county administration reform. Under the committee was the 
county magistrate. In name, the provincial government of Jiangsu administered the 
county. In reality, it was directly controlled by the central government. Mei Siping, the 
county magistrate, was the head of department from the Department of Political 
Science in the Central School of Politics. Not surprising, the President of the 
prestigious Central School of Politics, which was regarded as the cradle of 
Guomindang’s senior cadres, was none other than Jiang Jieshi. Thus, most of the 
section heads of the county government were also from the school. As such, Jiangning 
was a political experimental field created by the central government thus enabling the 
county to obtain some privileges that other counties could not imagine124. 
The experiment of Jiangning was totally different with other rural 
reconstruction experiments. One scholar points out that Jiangning experiment was 
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unique in three aspects125. Firstly, it had political privileges. In the government of 
Jiangning, many senior members came from the central government and were 
influential figures in the party. In the eyes of the provincial government, Jiangning 
was not an inferior county but a prestigious political enclave of the central 
government. The plan and program proposed by Jiangning would not be interfered 
by the government. Secondly, Jiangning was given economic privileges. The county 
was exempted from paying land taxes to the provincial government. Lastly, the 
county had privileges in the allocation of personnel. The staffs assigned to the 
experimental county government were selected by the central government from the 
pool of outstanding teachers and graduates from the Central School of Politics. The 
magistrate of Jiangning, Mei Siping, was a famous professor in politics. In Lanxi of 
Zhenjiang Province, another similar experimental county, the magistrate Hu Ciwei 
was a renowned jurist. When compared with their counterparts in those ordinary 
counties, the quality of these professor-officials was certainly more superior. 
The Jiangning model was the party’s experiment in administering directly the 
countryside. Its ultimate goal was not reconstruction but rather to strengthen the 
political control. Guy Alitto points out that Guomindang was “looking for a method 
by which they could both mobilize and control the local rural communities”126. 
Indeed, the central government’s “rural work was rooted in a faith in official force; 
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its aim was to extend political power down into the villages”127. Philip Kuhn also 
made similar criticisms and he argues that the “Nanking-administered experiments, 
it could be said, had such heavy bureaucratic input that they were unable to generate 
more than a pallid local response.”128  
In the 1930s, it was the prominent educators and intellectuals, such as James 
Yen, Huang Yanpei, Tao Xingzhi, and Liang Shuming, who carried out the most 
reputable rural reconstruction experiments. These experiments often arise from 
certain abstract academic or cultural theories. To some extent, they were utopian in 
nature. Among them, the most notable ones were: mass education theory of James 
Yen; the rural education program of Tao Xingzhi; and the cultural rehabilitation plan 
of Liang Shuming.  
James Yen received his education in America. After his studies, he returned to 
China and promoted the mass education movement (MEM). By his excellent work 
on urban MEM, Yen won a great reputation in China. While his career was 
prospering, he realized that China was a rural China and regarded the countryside as 
the true foundation of the nation. During his time, China was undergoing a series of 
profound political, economic, and cultural transformation. In this process, the 
countryside fell in a state of deep crisis. In order to save China, the countryside must 
first be saved. The rural reconstruction undertook the immense task of rehabilitating 
the countryside. With the ambition of saving the countryside by the method of mass 
education, Yen left city and came to Ding County of Hebei Province. He said:  
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There are thousands of problems in the countryside. But, among them, there 
are four basic problems. I use four words to describe them–illiteracy, 
poverty, disease, and civic inertia.”129  
“Illiteracy” was a major problem in the countryside. As such, the illiteracy rate 
was very much higher than in the urban area. Most of peasants knew nothing beyond 
what happened in their small village. “Poverty” was another serious problem faced 
in the countryside. For many of them, even the life of subsistence was a luxury 
dream. The poor health status of peasants was another serious concern. Because of 
the lack in quality public medical system in the countryside, the death rates were 
much higher than in the cities. “Civic inertia” was one characteristic of the peasant 
mentality. The peasants were indifferent to the public affairs and the collective life. 
The reason behind these problems was because education could not be 
universalized in China in general and in the rural area in particular. Therefore, 
peasants had little opportunities to go to school. In order to solve the rural problem, 
the government must begin by universalizing education. In Yen’s plan, the method 
was an integrated program of education, livelihood, public health, and civic 
consciousness130. 
The goal of the “education” program was to eliminate the illiteracy and teach 
the peasants basic knowledge and could be divided into two parts. In the first part, 
Yen would help peasants to master 1,000 or so words and cultivate their interest in 
reading. The second part was “art education”, in which the peasants would learn 
some basis knowledge in painting, music, and drama. Yen and his team thought that 
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drama was the most popular form of entertainment in the countryside, and it could 
be used as a tool for spreading knowledge. He hoped that after his “art education”, 
the peasants would have a more positive attitude towards life. In the “livelihood 
education”, peasants should be taught some modern agricultural knowledge and 
technology. As Yen proposed, the key of the work was to send the people, who had 
studied the modern agriculture, to the countryside. In his public health program, Yen 
emphasized that the public medical policy should be reformed in which the medical 
resources - hospitals and doctors - should be redistributed. The countryside should 
have a basic public medical system, which could provide the rural residents with 
affordable medical care. Besides that, the peasants should also be inculcated with 
basic medical knowledge and good living habits. To change the “civic inertia”, Yen 
promoted the “citizen education”. Firstly, the peasants would be taught the esprit de 
corps. Yen hoped that the peasants would understand that the individual is a member 
of the social group, and only unity and cooperation could help them to achieve their 
goal. Secondly, the peasants would learn how to improve their morality, increase 
their ability to judge, and cultivate a sense of righteousness. Lastly, the peasant 
should be taught the national consciousness, or the love for the country and the 
nation. To achieve that, Yen asked his colleagues to tell stories of great figures and 
events in Chinese history to the peasants, using easily reading textbooks with 
pictures. 
To promote his plan, Yen built a “super fleet” in Ding County. There were 
seventeen members in the leading body of his team. . Sixteen of them studied in 
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America and one was educated in France. Among them, there were six PhD 
graduates – three from Harvard, two from Cornell, and one from Iowa131. The team 
also had some master’s graduates from Princeton and Columbia University. The cost 
of employing these foreign-educated PhD and master’s graduates was startlingly 
high. Li Jinghan, who obtained his master’s degree from Columbia University and 
was in charge of the social survey section of the experiment, complained that his 
“poor” salary—one hundred and fifty silver dollars a month– was “barely enough 
for the daily life.” However, the salary for doing the same work in Zouping County, 
where Liang Shuming did his experiment, was only fifteen dollar132! 
Nevertheless, monetary issue was not a problem for Yen. Educated in 
Columbia and Princeton, and converted to Christianity in his young days, Yen’s 
educational and religious background was a major advantage to him in raising 
money in America. From 1928 to 1929, Yen toured the big cities of America and 
gave sensational speeches, in which he called on American corporations and 
individuals to make donation in support for the MEM in China. Yen successfully 
raised half-million USD in his fund raising campaigns133. In 1935, the Association of 
MEM was given another one million dollar by the Rockefeller Foundation134. 
Could the Ding County model, which was dependent solely on the foreign 
financial aid, be universal? In 1932, the League of Nation issued a report that 
                                                 
131 p. 467. 
132 Guy S. Alitto, The Last Confucian, p. 240. 
133 Wu Xiangxiang 吴相湘, Yan Yangchu zhuan: wei quanqiu xiangcun gaizao fendou liushi nian 晏
阳初传——为全球乡村改造奋斗六十年 (James Yen: Sixty-year Struggle for the Global Rural 
Reconstruction) (Taipei: China Times Publishing , 1981), p. 145-9. 
134 Ibid, 325- 。8  
 80
criticized Yen’s experiment. The report points out that the cost of the experiment in 
Ding County was too high to be universalized in China. Ding County was just a 
special case and if similar works were to be promoted in other counties, they would 
definitely be doomed to failure135. As early as in 1929, Liang Shuming commented 
that the Achilles’ heel of Yen’s work was that it could not mobilize the countryside 
to find solution to the rural problems136. He also noticed that the same problem in 
Huang Yanpei’s experiment in Xugongqiao of Jiangsu Province, on which he had 
made a positive comment. Liang ironically pointed out that:  
[In Xugongqiao] the personnel employed come from the outside, and their 
salary is paid by the outsider. All the money of building the offices, roads, 
and schools are donated or raised outside the countryside. At the first look, 
there is no difficulty of reconstructing the countryside. In fact, it is false. 
They do not settle the problems, but escape from them.137  
Liang concluded that it was impossible for China to free the countryside from 
the crisis using Yen and Huang’s model138. 
 Moreover, the MEM led by James Yen was anti-Chinese. In this thesis, 
“anti-Chinese” is not a political but cultural term. It refers to the basic idea of Yen’s 
rural reconstruction and practice for being a non-Chinese solution but an American 
social delusion. Guy Alitto points out: Yen was basically hostile to the traditional 
Chinese culture and uncritically worshipped the Western culture. Yen thought that by 
using the Western spirit, technology and aid, he could create a new countryside for 
China139. His idea was called the Ting-hisen-ism. In the 1930s, a critic argued that 
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“the Ting-hsien-ism was based on the abstract idea of human being.”140 In 1985, 
Yen wrote in the preface of one book that the goal of rural reconstruction was to 
achieve “the liberation of human spirit”141. In other words, the ultimate aim of his 
rural reconstruction work had no connection with Chinese countryside and the 
peasants. It was an abstract freedom which could be applied to all human beings. 
Before the freedom, the distinction of personal identity—peasant, worker, 
intellectual, or official—had no significance. Charles Hayford contends that the idea 
of Yen was “a sinification of liberalism”. As such, it was seen as American 
liberalism that put on a Chinese cloak, and embodied in the MEM142. Hayford 
argues that the career of Yen, “with its explicitly liberal and democratic allegiance, 
shows how Americans hoped to change China.”143 Finally, he asks an interesting 
question: “Was Yen ‘made in America’?”144 The answer found in his book is a 
“yes”. 
Like James Yen, Tao Xingzhi also received his education in America, and then 
returned back to China to promote his rural education reform. He thought that the 
rural education was the decisive work of developing the countryside. Tao vividly 
mentioned that:  
The rural education determines the fate of the three hundreds and forty 
millions people! If it is successful, it can raise the peasants unto the 
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Heaven! If it is a failure, it will drop the peasants into the Hell!145  
However, in Tao’s time, the (rural) education:  
[W]alks in a completely wrong way! It teaches people to leave the 
countryside and swarm into cities; it teaches people to enjoy rice but not to 
labor in the field; it teaches people to put on clothes but not to cultivate the 
cotton; it teaches people to live in the house but not to plant the tree. It 
teaches people to admire the luxury urban life and look down upon the 
agricultural labor.146  
In other words, the (rural) education had divorced totally from the reality of 
the countryside and could not meet the basic need of peasants147. Therefore, to save 
the countryside, one must fundamentally the transform rural education. As Tao 
pointed out, first of all, we should basically change our understanding of education. 
The prime principle of education was “life”. If it was correct, the prime principle of 
the rural education was correspondingly the rural life. That is to say, the new rural 
education would be integrated with the rural life, and it could teach peasants 
“self-reliance, self-government, and self-defense” and “has the power to transmute 
the countryside into a land of happiness”148. How then was it possible to develop 
such kind of rural education? The key to do so was to train a larger number of 
quality teachers, who were educated in the new rural normal school, and then resend 
back to the countryside.  
Tao’s rural normal school was a brand-new kind of normal school, which was 
startlingly different with its counterparts in the cities. It was “the center for the 
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transformation of the countryside”149. The students that were educated in these new 
schools had three features - “the talent of the peasant, the mind of science, and the 
enthusiasm of remolding the society”150. The “talent of the peasant” was that the 
students knew all aspects of the rural life and could live well on their own in the 
countryside. The “mind of science” referred to the modern agricultural science and 
technology that these students studied in the normal school. The “enthusiasm of 
remolding the society” was that these students had the grand ideal of eliminating 
poverty and illiteracy in the rural area. To promote his program, Tao worked out an 
ambitious plan:  
Our new mission is to recruit one million comrades, set up one million 
rural schools, and change one million villages! Earnestly and sincerely, we 
invite all compatriots to join us! …We resolve to bring a new life to every 
village, and finally to create a totally new life to the Republic of China!151  
The words of Tao were exciting. However, the rural society was like a giant 
and complex machine. Education was just one part of it. The rural education could 
solve some problems in the countryside, but it was not a panacea. Nevertheless, Tao 
was a respectable idealist in his time. He gave up the professorship of a prestigious 
university, and left the comfortable big city. Then, he went to the poor countryside 
and struggled for his dream. 
Although he was one of the best friends of James Yen, Liang Shuming was the 
antithesis of Yen. Yen was a devoted worshipper of the Western culture, but Liang 
was the strongest admirer of the traditional Chinese culture. Liang was from a 
declining noble family of Beijing. In his young days, Liang was obsessed with 
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Buddhism and almost became a modern recluse. After an unimaginable “sudden 
enlightenment”, he returned from the Buddhism. By his outstanding Buddhist 
studies, he got a teaching position in Peking University, and became one of the most 
prestigious scholars in the 1920s. As a great thinker, the head of Liang was filled 
with profound philosophies. He created the most delicate cultural conservatism in 
the world152. To Liang, the rural reconstruction was the completion of his sudden 
enlightenment, and it was one practice of his great theory of rehabilitating the 
Chinese culture. 
Liang’s culture was holistic, and it referred to the distinctive spirit, manner, 
and way of life of a nation. In his theory, the so-called culture was the “attitude”—or 
yiyu 意欲 (the will)—towards life153. There were three kinds of culture in the 
world154. The first one was the Western culture, in which people tried to change the 
reality to meet their wills. The second type was the Chinese culture, which 
emphasized that people should accommodate the personal will and the reality to 
achieve a spiritual balance. The last one was the transcendent Indian culture, which 
gave up all the worldly wills and was after the immortal spiritual emancipation. 
Liang stratified the three cultures. The Western culture was the lowest and Chinese 
culture was at the intermediate level. Indian culture was the highest one. Guy Alitto 
says that, the stratification of Liang “depicts the three stages of the evolvement of 
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the mankind civilization—from the simple modernization, or the Western style of 
modernization, then to the humanization (of China), and finally, to the 
spiritualization (of India).”155  
According to Liang’s words, the normal evolvement of the world civilization 
had three stages. Firstly, by the Western aggressive attitude of life, people tried to 
achieve the material modernization. Then, by the Chinese accommodating attitude, 
people began correcting the malpractice of Western modernization and endeavored 
to turn the world into a more humane and harmonious heaven. In the last stage, the 
transcendent way of life of the Indian culture will help people to achieve the 
complete humanity and the true spiritual liberation.  
Liang had the linear view of history. In his mind, the world civilization should 
evolve step by step. However, China did not follow the way. Without finishing the 
first stage—modernization, because of the genius of culture, Confucius, China 
arrived directly at the second stage. Thus, Liang called Chinese culture “a baby 
prematurely delivered”156. The good result of the prematurity of Chinese culture was 
that it became culturally superior to the West. The bad consequence of the 
prematurity was the stagnancy of the Chinese society in the past two thousands 
years, in which there was no fundamental change in economy and politics. In the 
ancient time, because there was no great threat from foreign powers, such the 
stagnancy did not bring disasters to China. But, when history came to the modern 
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time, and the door of China was opened forcefully by the gunboat of Western 
powers, the country was put into the danger of collapsing. 
The most dangerous thing was that the countryside fell in the deep crisis. It 
happened in two aspects. On one hand, the economic and political invasion of the 
imperialist states generated the poverty and instability in the countryside. One the 
other hand, the attitude of Chinese towards the traditional culture changed 
fundamentally. The latter was the most devastating for China. In the process of 
contacting with the Western powers, Chinese became more and more admiring to the 
Western culture, and began questioning the superiority of Chinese culture to the 
West. As a result, China promoted the Western-style modernization. However, in 
Liang’s critical eyes, what China did—the urban-centered modernization—was just 
a poor imitation. It neglected the basic reality that China was a rural country, and 
brought more damages to the countryside157. Liang criticized fiercely such the 
lopsided model of modernization158. 
Liang points out that there were two main roots of Chinese culture159. One was 
the concrete, or the countryside itself. The other was the intangible—laodaoli 老道理 
(the traditional hows and whys in the countryside). In Liang’s implication, these 
laodaoli was the true Chinese culture, and he believed firmly that the culture was 
preserved in the countryside. In a metaphysical context, the Chinese culture, as Liang 
argued, was none other than the countryside that preserved the traditional culture. 
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Nonetheless, in his days, due to the external and internal crisis, the countryside, or the 
main root of Chinese culture, was being undermined. Liang did not think the 
urban-centered modernization could save the countryside and its culture. He hoped 
that people could understand that it was the countryside and its culture that was the 
lifeblood of the nation, and they were in danger160. Anyone who wanted to save China 
must, first of all, find the way of saving the countryside. 
How then can one save the countryside? Liang argued that neither the capitalist 
way—the European style of democracy, nor the socialist way—the model of 
revolution invented by the Russian communist party, could do the work. The 
“democracy” road, which stressed on the separation and check of power, was 
incompatible with the Chinese culture and could not be applied to the majority of the 
people161. The “revolution” road could not be initiated in China, because there was no 
the class distinction, an indispensable foundation of the socialist revolution162. There 
was only one possible way of saving the countryside—the rural reconstruction. For 
Liang, it was cultural. Here, “cultural” meant that the goal of rural reconstruction was 
to create a new culture in the countryside. “New” had twofold meaning. First, it was to 
rehabilitate the traditional Chinese culture, which was despised and neglected in the 
modern period. Second, the rural reconstruction would borrow something useful from 
the Western culture and add them into the Chinese culture. In a nutshell, the rural 
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reconstruction was the work of promoting the modernization within the framework of 
the traditional Chinese culture. The nucleus of the work was to establish new social 
organization—the reformed village school—in the rural area. Liang transformed the 
village school, which was could be found everywhere in the north China, into a place 
in which the peasants could learn both the traditional culture and the modern 
knowledge. Besides this education function, the village school would play the role of 
administering the grass-root rural society. Liang believed that, by his program, the 
countryside would be rehabilitated and became the solid foundation of the national 
modernization. 
Both the totally westernized mass education plan of James Yen and Liang 
Shuming’s proposal of rehabilitating the traditional Chinese culture were utopian. In 
the history of modern China, there was no any individual or organization that could 
remold the country by a model of wholesale Westernization, regardless of how it 
looked “perfect”. Likewise, in an integrating world, it was impossible for anyone to 
fulfill the modernization by the way of resuming the so-called “pure” traditional 
Chinese culture. It is not surprising for us to see Liang’s failure in Zouping County of 
Shandong Province. To the failure, Liang blamed himself that his program was far 
from the reality of the countryside, and local residents were lukewarm to it. He 
pointed out that “we are too ignorant to understand their (peasants’) sufferings and 
feelings.”163 Finally, the rural reconstruction movement became an empty slogan. 
Liang admitted the failure and mentioned that “we brag that we will mobilize the 
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countryside. However, the result is that the peasants prefer the inaction to action.”164 
One Western critic argues that the fundamental reason behind his failure is that there 
was no compatibility between Liang’s rehabilitation of the traditional Chinese culture 
and the Western modernization165. 
It is easy for us to have an impression that the rural reconstruction experiments 
promoted by scholars, like James Yen, Tao Xingzhi, Liang Shuming, and other less 
known figures, had no political dimension. However, this thesis argues that these 
utopian rural reconstruction works were political and influenced also the central-local 
relation in the Republican period. Guy Alitto points out that there was “natural 
antagonism between centralized control and the real goal of rural reconstruction”166. 
That is to say, to mobilize the rural area could threaten the rule of Guomindang. We 
can regard the RRM as an embodiment of the tension of state and society. The private 
rural reconstruction experiment itself was a satire on the authority of the central 
government. 
With the biting sarcasm, Liang Shuming argued that “the (central) government 
is the inertest and the most unprogressive”167. In addition, he said that the ruling party, 
Guomindang, had finished its task in Chinese history168. When it came to how to 
stabilize and develop the countryside, which was one of the most important topics of 
the Republic, Guomindang accomplished nothing. Liang totally lost his confidence in 
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the central authorities:  
In China, it is ridiculous to expect the state (the central government) to do 
something (for the countryside). However, if we let the locality to handle the 
rural problems, it will be reasonable and fruitful.169  
Liang implied that, under the present circumstances that the state was incapable 
and inefficient, the countryside could act itself to settle its problems. And, the action 
should be put under the guide of the virtuous intellectuals. What Liang implied was a 
competition with the state for the power to reconstruct the countryside.  
In Tao Xingzhi’s Xiaozhuang experiment in Jiangsu Province, we can also find 
the same implication. Philip Kuhn argues that Tao tried to reform the rural society by 
the rural normal school, which was the “agent of control and manipulation in the 
countryside”170. Also, Tao hoped that the whole country would be reorganized by his 
way. 
Both Liang and James Yen did not welcome the central government’s 
involvement in the rural reconstruction movement171. Liang had contended that one of 
the difficulties of promoting the rural reconstruction was that many experiments could 
not be separated from the government172。If the work depended on the government, it 
would be manipulated and changed into a tool of extending the state power. “If we 
cannot change the situation, the rural reconstruction will be bureaucratized. When this 
really happens, how can we reform the rural society?”173 
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One scholar argues that the unofficial rural reconstruction experiment was an 
“ambitious” alternative to the more bureaucratic government-sponsored 
modernization, and its influence on the central-local relation was that it could increase 
the power of the locality174. For example in Liang’s experiment, the village school 
was not only an educational and cultural organization, but also an autonomous 
administrative organ of the grass-root society. In his program, the village school was 
“voluntary, independent, and indigenous”, while at the same time it was “modern, 
progressive, and socially responsible”175. These characteristics were similar with 
those of the civil society in the urban area. Hence, this thesis calls Liang’s plan of rural 
reconstruction was an effort of creating a rural civil society. Conversely, as another 
scholar points out, the “vitality” of the central government could be weakened in this 
process176. 
Moreover, as Guy Alitto argues that the rural reconstruction experiment could 
not avoid the issue of local self-government, and it implies that the state should create 
the relative political organizations to increase the people’s participation in the politics 
of the county and sub-county society177. The majority of the unofficial experiments 
did not want the Guomindang government’s interference, and hoped that they could 
be more autonomous in promoting their program. But, in the government’s eyes, it 
was a potential threat to the legitimacy and authority of the central government, and 
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the ruling party would definitely not sit back and watch without action. On one hand, 
the central government promoted its own rural reconstruction program, like the 
“top-down style” experiment in Jiangning and Lanxi178. On the other hand, Nanjing 
tried to limit and guide the private experiments and prevented them from grabbing the 
political power. To some “radical” cases, the central government oppressed them at 
the necessary time. For example in 1930, the Xiaozhuang Rural Normal School was 
closed by the central government, and the President, Tao Xingzhi, was put on the 
wanted list179. Tao went into exile in Japan, and his school was not reopened until 
1932180. Hu Hanmin, one of the leaders of the national government, mentioned that 
the government had to close the School because it colluded with the opposition 
faction and “disturbed” the social order181. In fact, the true reason was that Tao’s 
experiment was so close to the capital city, and what he did would undermine the 
authority of the central government. Guomindang’s response to the private rural 
reconstruction experiments showed that the party had turned out more conservative. 
When it came to the rural reform, the government preferred the “technological” to the 
“institutional” reform182. 
This thesis hopes that above brief discussion on the central-local relation, 
banditry, local militarization, and RRM in the 1930s will be helpful for our 
understanding of the significance of the local self-government of Wanxi to the history 
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Chapter 2 – “Militarized County”:  
The Local Self-government of Wanxi, 1930-1940 
 
As we know, if one competitive local political system expects to gain a full 
autonomy, it must have enough power resources, especially the military resource. As 
one county political system, the work of local state building of Wanxi depended on 
the military resource it extracted. In the 1920s, the rampant banditry gave the local 
elite a wonderful excuse to organize the local armed force in Wanxi. On the base of 
mintuan, or the people’s militia, the elite established the self-government and 
established firm social control over the region. 
 
1) Wanxi in the 1920s 
Wanxi was a poor, backward, and bandit-ridden region. The chaos caused by 
the collapse of Qing exacerbated the situation. Wanxi was an important passage of 
the trade of opium, mountain products, painting, and oil, and the annual tax on these 
goods was estimated around one million dollars. The military strongmen were very 
avaricious for the money. To monopolize the wealth, those strongmen appointed the 
magistrate in each of the counties of Wanxi and forced them to collect the tax for his 
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Year Number 
 Zhenping Neixiang Xichuan Deng 
1926 2 6 2 6 
1927 3 8 3 1 
1928 1 1 3 1 
1929 0 1 5 3 
1930 1 3 2 6 
Table1: numbers of county magistrate of Wanxi in the1920s 
In this time, the county government of Wanxi was just a tool of collecting money 
for those military strongmen. They had neither capability nor intention to administer 
and develop the region. Under the circumstances, the problem of banditry turned out 
more and more serious. In the 1920s, the region became one of the bandit centers of 
Henan Province184. 
For example in Zhenping, before 1926, there were thirty-two bandit gangs, and 
the total number of bandits was 3,700. After 1926, the number of gangs decreased to 
nine, but the number of bandits increased to more than 10,000185. It showed that the 
bandit in the region had developed from the scattered and small-scale team to the big 
and well-organized bandit gang. In the September of 1929, the bandits invaded the 
county capital of Zhenping. They burned more than 9,000 houses and kidnapped a 
great number of innocent people. The direct economic lost of the county was more 
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than three million dollars186. The ordinary peasants were the most miserable victims. 
They had neither gun to defend home, nor the money to buy safety. There was a folk 
ballad in Zhenping, in which it said “If you don’t want to die, please lead your family 
and run through the mountains all night!” 
Meanwhile, the militarist’s troop was another headache for Wanxi. To expand 
their troop, some militarists even recruited bandits. Sometimes, the troops even 
colluded with the bandits and shared the booty. The worst case was that those troops 
directly robbed the villages. In the August of 1930, one troop passed by Deng County. 
When the residents refused the troop’s excessive demand, the troop launched a cruel 
attack, in which more than three thousands people were brutally killed and countless 
valuable things were robbed187. One official of the self-government of Zhenping 
called such the kind of troop the out-and-out feijun (bandit-style army)188. 
The bandits and bandit-style armies seriously disturbed the rural life, and the 
social order of Wanxi was destroyed. In that time, the county and provincial 
government could not free the region from the chaos. One author of the county 
gazetteer of Neixiang points out that “there is no time that can be more chaotic (than 
the present)!”189 Under such circumstances, Wanxi must organize a powerful local 
armed force to resume the social order as soon as possible. “The continuing political 
instability and the growing banditry of this period led to a steady increase in the 
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number and size of such forces (militia)”190. In Wanxi, Peng Yuting, Bie Tingfang, 
Chen Shunde, and Ning Xigu worked hard on organizing and training mintuan, or the 
people’s militia. 
Peng Yuting was born in 1893 in Zhenping County. His father had taught in a 
Confucian-style private school, and run a small shop of traditional Chinese medicines. 
When the imperial Civil Service Examination system was abolished in 1905, Peng 
went to Kaifeng for his middle school education. Then, he was admitted to a 
university in Beijing, but he did not finish his study191. In 1919, he was recommended 
to the general Feng Yuxiang and became a senior officer of the Northwest Army. Feng 
had a good impression on Peng and wrote two poems for him192. By the mid 1920s, as 
Shen Songqiao said, Peng had become a “national elite”193. 
1927 was the turning point of Peng’s life. In the fall, his mother passed away. 
When Peng got the news, he went back home in a hurry. Nevertheless, on his way 
home, some bandits stopped Peng for a long time. And, when he finally arrived, his 
brothers told Peng that their mother had already been buried. Peng was badly upset by 
the incident, and decided to use the most traditional Chinese way—“warm the tomb 
for one hundred days”, or—of keeping vigil to express his remorse. In those days, 
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through the conversation with his relatives and friends, Peng know how cruel the 
bandits were. They bound a man’s legs in different tree branches and used the elastic 
force of the branches to tear his body apart. They then took off the clothes of the 
young girls, tied two little bells on their nipples, and forced them to make noodles for 
them, which was called having “bell noodles”. The lawlessness shocked Peng, and he 
realized that the most serious problem in his hometown was banditry. Saving the 
innocent people from the hands of these vicious bandits would be both a contribution 
to his hometown and the best repayment to his beloved mother. As such, Peng 
resigned his job in the army and began suppressing bandits in Zhenping. 
Peng was appointed the head of the South District of Zhenping. In an 
announcement 194 , he told the people that he was going to promote the local 
self-government and self-defense; every village should organize the ganzidui (the 
cudgel patrol team of club); any people who colluded with the banditry or gave them 
shelter would be severely punished. Peng collected thirty guns and chose some young 
and robust peasants to form the 1st team of mintuan, and invited an experienced 
martial art master to train them. Although the number of the new militia was small, it 
had a powerful fighting capability. Soon after the establishment of mintuan, it killed 
three notorious bandit chieftains and beat a big bandit gang195. To expand his troop, 
Peng issued an order, in which he demanded that people who had 15 mu farmlands 
should donate one gun, 30 mu two guns, and reasoned out the rest by analogy. In 1928, 
Peng established the 2nd and 3rd team. Then, he reorganized the troop, and set up the 
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headquarters of the mintuan of Zhenping. The new troop had four detachments and an 
independent artillery squadron. The total number of the troop was more than 2,000196. 
By then, Zhenping mintuan had developed into a powerful local armed force. 
Bie Tingfang was born in Neixiang County in 1883. He had studied in the 
Confucian-style private school for ten years. After class, he liked reading The 
Romance of the Three Kingdoms and Water Margin. The trickeries and the greenwood 
spirit in the two novels greatly influenced him. When his parents passed away, he left 
the school and began practicing the martial art and shooting. Then he was invited as 
the head of Tiger stronghold197, which was build by a landlord to fight against the 
banditry. In 1912, he routed one bandit gang and captured alive the bandit chieftain. 
After the battle, he became a famous people in Neixiang. From then on, he took the 
Tiger stronghold as the base and began expanding his private troop. In the mid 1920s, 
Yuan Xu, the county magistrate of Neixiang, and other officials of the county 
government were mad at Bie’s activities. Bie mercilessly assassinated Yuan and other 
senior members of the county government198. After the purge, Bie dominated the 
political stage of Neixiang and became a powerful military strongman in Wanxi. In 
1925, the number of his troop had exceeded two thousands199. In 1927, Bie set up two 
headquarters of mintuan in Neixiang. By 1929, the mintuan of Neixiang had nine 
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regiments and the number of its soldiers was more than 20,000. 
Chen Shunde was born in 1891 and from a noble family of Nanyang. In 1920, he 
was appointed the president of the normal school of Xichuan. In this period, Xichuan 
faced the serious problem of banditry as well as other counties did. In the August of 
1920, more than one thousand bandits invaded the county and kidnapped two 
hundreds people. One of Chen’s younger brothers was also kidnapped. After the 
incident, Chen went back Xichuan and began recruiting mintuan. In 1923, Chen was 
appointed the director of public fund bureau and concurrently the head of self-defense 
corps of Xichuan. In 1926, by the help of a senior officer of the Northwest Army, He 
became the county magistrate. By 1930, his troop had more than four thousands 
soldiers. 
Ning Xigu200 came from Deng County and was born in 1905. He had studied in 
the Whampoa Military Academy and participated in the two North Expeditions in the 
1920s. After the war, he returned to his hometown and witnessed the cruelty and 
rampancy of the banditry. He heard that Peng Yuting was training mintuan in 
Zhenping. Then, Ning visited Peng and became one of his senior assistants. In 1929, 
there was a drought in Deng, and the bandits intensified their robbery. The residents of 
Deng invited Ning to organize mintuan and fight against the bandits. Ning was elected 
as the commander of the mintuan of Deng. He beat a ferocious bandit gang and 
executed some gentry that had colluded with the bandits. Before his death, there were 
ten regiments and four guerrilla attachments in his troop. 
                                                 
200 Ning was assassinated by the Guomindang’s provincial government in 1930. After his death, the 
autonomous work of Deng County winded up.  
 101
2) Mintuan or the people’s militia 
Facing the growing banditry in the region, Peng realized that it was better for the 
counties of Wanxi to be united and take unanimous action. Bie, Chen, and Ning 
agreed with the idea. In the September of 1930, they convened the Joint-defense 
Conference of Wanxi in Yangji town of Neixiang. The mintuan of the four counties 
was incorporated and reorganized. The Office of Joint-Defense was set up in Neixiang, 
and Bie Tingfang was elected as the chief commander. In the new incorporated 
mintuan of Wanxi, there were four detachments. The 1st Detachment was the troops of 
Neixiang and had twelve regiments. The 2nd Detachment was commanded by Ning 
Xigu and had regiments thirteen through sixteen. The commander of the 3rd 
Detachment was Chen Shunde, who was in charge of regiments seventeen through 
twenty-two. Regiments twenty three through twenty-five regiments formed the 4th 
detachment and were led by Peng Yuting. The total number of the local armed force 
was around 50,000201. 
Organization and equipment of mintuan 
Mintuan imitated the compulsory military service system of Switzerland. Peng 
pointed out that:  
In the present world, the best military system is the Swiss compulsory 
service. If mintuan can follow the way, it will meet the principle of 
‘increasing the strength (of the army) and reducing the burden (of the 
people).’202 
The organization of the standing mintuan was same as the official army. The 
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soldier was recruited from the volunteers. The difference was that all the members of 
the standing mintuan must participate in the agricultural work. The member of the 
reserve mintuan was from the village residents. To a great extent, the member of 
mintuan was both a soldier and peasant. The service system “was different with other 
regions. People at the right age were organized by squad and platoon, and were given 
guns and bullets. In every month, there were several training sessions. If there were 
emergency, they would be put together promptly. In the peaceful time, they stayed 
home and labored in the farmland.”203 Because the system would not disturb their 
daily life, the peasants of Wanxi were willing to join mintuan. 
In Zhenping, there were around two thousands standing soldiers. They were 
selected from the able-bodied men of villages. The standing mintuan was stratified 
into regiment, battalion, and platoon. The training of mintuan has two parts. The first 
part was for the military officers. All officers must take both xueke–the political and 
theoretical course, and shuke–the physical and technological training. The second part 
was for the ordinary soldiers, in which, besides the regular physical training, there 
were some basic vocational courses204. 
After four-month compulsory service in the standing mintuan, all able-bodied 
men (age of 18-30) would automatically become the reserve force. They were 
reorganized into team in every village. At the first day of each month, the head of team 
would call together all reserve forces and lead them to the battalion quarter, where the 
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officer checked their attendance and distributed the basic allowance. Then, they 
would clean and maintain the weapons. In the middle of every month, the reserve 
force would be put together again and take some drills. Every three months, there 
would be an assessment for the reserve force. The plan of Peng Yuting was that, after 
seven sessions of training, all able-bodied men of Zhenping would be reorganized and 
trained205. 
The organization of Zhenping mintuan was complete. If there were 100 
able-bodied men in one village, they would be reorganized into one team, named as 
“X Team of Zhenping mintuan”. Each team had one head and one deputy-head. One 
team could have 1-3 sub-teams. All team heads, deputy-heads, and sub-team heads 
must take military and political training. All of them had a salary paid by the 
self-government of Zhenping. Besides the military duties, the team head and 
deputy-head should teach physical exercise or other courses in the village school206. 
Like Zhenping, Neixiang had the standing and reserve mintuan. The standing 
troop was never dismissed and stationed in every important passage and checkpoint 
of Neixiang. The headquarters paid all the cost of the standing troop. The reserve 
troop was in the nine wards, and its member was the able-bodied man with gun. The 
reserve force had no salary, but the member would be given allowance in the 
training session207。Under Bie’s rule, the mintuan of Neixiang was continuously 
expanding. In 1929, Bie had nine regiments, twelve standing battalions and twelve 
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reinforced companies directly attached to the headquarters. In 1933, Bie decided to 
enlarge his troop by the way of “reorganizing militia by gun”208. If there were ten 
guns in a village, one squad would be organized, and every three squads formed one 
platoon; every three platoons formed one company, and every three companies were 
reorganized into one battalion. If there were two battalions in one ward, they would 
form one regiment. From 1934, Bie began organizing the military force “without 
gun”. It included the cudgel patrol team, semi-military teams of peddler, the training 
teams of able-bodied man, the patrolling team of able-bodied man, and the 
order-maintaining team. 
In the mid 1920s, there were four teams of mintuan in Xichuan. In 1928, Chen 
Shunde expanded them into nine battalions. In the next year, Chen set up the 
headquarters of mintuan, which had the military tribunal, the section of supplies, and 
the secretarial office. In 1935, Chen reorganized his troops and divided them into six 
regiments. The standing troop had two regiments, and the reserve force had four 
regiments.  
The able-bodied man was another major component of the local armed force of 
Xichuan. In 1936, there were 75,000—the thirty-percent of the adult population of 
Xichuan—able-bodied men in the county. Chen divided them into two 
groups–“group with gun” and “group without gun”209. The group with gun was 
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organized according to gun, just as Bie did in Neixiang. Under the system, in every 
three jia, if there were ten to fifteen guns, one squad was formed; in every two bao, 
if there were more than thirty guns, there would be one platoon; in every joint-bao, 
if there were one hundred or so guns, one company would be established. All these 
able-bodied men must take three months military training. The group without gun 
was organized in every village, and took the training in the slack season. 
The quality weapon was one of the guarantees of the fighting capability of 
mintuan. To improve the military equipments of their troops, the leaders of Wanxi 
enthusiastically established arsenals. In the winter of 1930, Peng Yuting raised 
110,000 dollars from landlords and local businessmen to building an arsenal in 
Zhenping. In order to keep the secrecy, the arsenal had the name of “The Ironware 
Factory of Zhenping”. Peng employed an experienced weapon technician from 
Luoyang, and bought some advanced equipments made in Germany. The factory 
could manufacture rifle, pistol, machine gun, hand grenade, and so forth210. Chen 
Shunde set up the arsenal of Xichuan in 1928. 
Bie Tingfang did his utmost to improve the equipment of mintuan. From 1927, 
he built small arsenals in some towns of Neixiang. In 1930, he invested more than 
three millions silver dollars to extend the Houzhai arsenal. Bie purchased advanced 
equipments and high-quality steels from Shanghai, Wuhan, and Nanjing, and hired 
some engineers as the product supervisor. The arsenal had more than four hundred 
workers. It could manufacture rifle, heavy and light machine gun, 150mm cannon, 
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82mm mortar, and other relatively advanced weapons. Bie put the arsenal under the 
strict military-style administration. He issued an order that anyone without the 
permission of the headquarters could not enter the factory. Moreover, he dispatched 
a special battalion to protect the arsenal. By 1940, it manufactured twenty thousands 
rifles, one thousand and five hundreds heavy machine guns, five thousands light 
machine gun, four 150mm cannons, one hundred and fifty-six mortars, and more 
than one hundred thousands shells. In 1933, Bie set up an additional grenade 
manufacturer in Neixiang. 
The training of mintuan 
In the early days of the Republican period, there were some militia 
organizations211, such as the “Crop-watching Society” and the “Defending Corps”, 
in Wanxi. These militias had a nickname “juzi (station)”. Their duties were to keep 
public order, check households, and collect tax. However, because of the political 
disorder, some powerful families controlled them and transformed them into a 
personal tool of exploiting and oppressing the rural residents. These poorly trained 
and organized old militias were of little use in Wanxi212. Generally speaking, the old 
militia had no explicit political goal, and was in poor discipline and incomplete 
organization. To settle these problems, Peng Yuting worked out a rigorous program 
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of training. He hoped that after the training, the militia would take on a totally new 
look. 
In the Outline of Training, the training of political idea was put on the top. It 
emphasized that:  
(By the political idea training) the soldiers of mintuan will understand the 
current situation of China, and what the danger that the country is facing. 
Moreover, they will know that the local self-government is an 
indispensable way of saving the nation. And, to promote the local 
self-government, the work should start from the county. In the work, the 
self-defense and the self-government cannot be separated.213  
Such the training was helpful for these peasant soldiers to improve their 
political consciousness. They would understand what the significance of their 
activity was: mintuan was one of the best methods of self-defense; self-defense was 
the foundation of local self-government; and the ultimate goal of local 
self-government was to save the country. 
The second part of training was the basic vocational education. Peng required 
that there should be one elementary vocational training center in every company of 
mintuan. The third part was about morality. The goal of the morality training was to 
change every member of mintuan into both a “good soldier” and “good citizen”. The 
fourth one was the vitality training, in which the mintuan solider was taught a 
positive attitude towards life. The fifth was the discipline training, in which every 
soldier was told that the strict discipline was the lifeblood of mintuan. The ceremony 
and propriety training was indispensable for a quality troop. In the training, the 
officer would learn how to treat his subordinates fairly, and the soldier would be 
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taught how to respect their officers properly. Besides them, there were physical, 
technological, hygienic, and military skill trainings214. 
To help the training, Peng composed a famous “Training Song” and demanded 
every solider of mintuan recite and sing it every day215. In the song, first of all, Peng 
told the mintuan soldier that a man should not be out for money and power, but take 
the lofty ideal of saving the country and hometown as the life goal. Peng hoped that 
his troop could show a distinctive mentality. Therefore, he wrote in the song that 
every soldier should have the spirit of fight and sacrifice. In the old militias, there 
were many ruffians, who were the lackey of powerful families and were regarded as 
the black sheep in the countryside. Peng said that the lyrics of the song declared that 
mintuan, the new militia, would strictly obey the disciplines and was maintained in 
good order, and the troop would behave like the legendary yuejiajun216. Because the 
members of mintuan were not professional soldier, Peng encouraged them to learn 
knowledge and vocational skills. Lack of the sense of responsibility was common in 
the old militias. Thus, Peng demanded that his troop should have the strong sense of 
obligation and take fighting against the banditry and safeguarding the hometown as 
a sacred charge. Lastly, Peng hoped that every soldier understand well the 
significance of promoting self-defense and local self-government in Wanxi. 
Mintuan played an extremely important role in the local self-government of 
Wanxi. To prevent the soldiers from being arrogant and overbearing, Peng issued ten 
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prohibitions217: no soldier was allowed to be cruel, ruthless, and officiousness; 
soldier could not do anything to cheat and extort; soldier could not be impolite and 
arrogant to the residents; without the permission of the resident, soldier could not 
enter into the private house; smoking, wining, gambling, and whoring were strictly 
forbidden in the troop, and so forth. Any soldier that violated any of these 
prohibitions would be severely punished and be removed from the troop. 
Compared with Peng, who emphasized on the political training of mintuan, Bie 
Tingfang paid more attention to the military training. As early as in 1927, he set up a 
training school for his troop. In 1932, Bie established the training centre of officer and 
appointed Bie Guangdian, one of his nephews and a graduate of the Military 
Academy of Baoding, as the director. The center organized three training sessions, 
and each session lasted six months. There were five hundred and fourteen officers, 
who were from the mintuan of Neixiang, Zhenping, Deng, and other counties of 
Wanxi, took the sessions. The courses provided by the center included the regulations 
of infantry drill, the battlefield service, and the skills of night fighting, digging 
trenches, and shooting. In the first session, the trainee was the company commander 
and platoon leader. In the second session, all the platoon leaders were required to 
attend the course. In the third one, squad leaders were selected to take the training. 
These trainees became the backbone of Wanxi mintuan. 
Suppressing banditry 
The prime goal of organizing mintuan was to suppress the rampant bandits in 
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Wanxi. Peng Yuting began the work as soon as he returned to Zhenping. Bie Tingfang 
had the most powerful local armed force in the region and played the decisive role in 
suppressing the bandits. Compared with Zhenping and Neixiang, the banditry in 
Xichuan was less serious. By Chen Shunde’s efforts, the social order of Xichuan had 
been restored in 1930218. Here, this thesis briefly describes the two major battles 
commanded by Peng and Bie. 
In the February of 1931, Cui Erdan, one of the most ferocious bandit chieftains 
of Nanyang, led more than four thousands bandits to invade Zhenping. Peng ordered 
the 23rd and 25th regiment to hit out, and commanded himself the 24th regiment to 
attack the bandits. Bie Tingfang sent his elite troop to the front. The battle was in 
deadlock. At the day of Chinese New Year, while it was snowing, Peng launched the 
final attack. After a hand-to-hand combat, more than one thousand enemies were 
eliminated219.  
In the winter of 1932, Wang Tai, another major bandit chieftain of Nanyang, 
reorganized the defeated bandits and expanded his gang into thousands. Peng kept an 
eye on Wang Tai and ordered his troop to increase patrolling in case of any emergency. 
In the next February, Wang Tai began attacking Zhenping. Bie Tingfang dispatched 
his troop to support Peng. The mintuan of Zhenping and Neixiang bravely resisted the 
bandits. Peng told his soldiers that there was only one choice—“fight to death”. 
Scared by the mintuan’s fierce resistance, the bandits began retreating. Peng ordered 
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the 23rd, 24th, and 25th regiment hit out immediately. While Wang Tai and his troops 
were crossing a river, Peng and Bie ordered their troop to attack the most vulnerable 
part of the bandit gang. More than one thousand bandits were captured or annihilated. 
Peng did not stop the attack and chased Wang into Hubei province. Peng and Bie won 
the decisive battle in suppressing the banditry220. 
The local people recognized the efforts of Peng and Bie. When Peng’s troop 
passed Heilongji, a small bandit-ridden town, “all the residents turned out, and anyone 
who saw Peng Yuting was regarded as the happiest person that day.”221 After the 
battle against Wang Tai, Bie’s mintuan returned to Neixiang. On their way home, the 
residents set table and foods in front of the door to welcome these brave soldiers. 
Spontaneously, the peasants held memorial ceremonies for the soldiers who sacrificed 
in the battle. 
Bie was the leading figure in suppressing the banditry. The troop he controlled 
had the most advanced weapons and the strongest fighting capability in Nanyang. Not 
only in Neixiang, but also in Zhenping, Deng, and other counties of Wanxi, his troop 
fought against the bandits. When the banditry in Wanxi was put down, Bie 
participated in the battles in the eastern Nanyang. After 1934, the banditry, which 
disturbed Nanyang for decades, was mopped up. In the process, Bie was rewarded 
many times by the provincial government. 
After their reorganization and systematic training, and especially after the test of 
battles against the bandits, Wanxi mintuan developed into a powerful armed force that 
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no one could look down upon. In the May of 1934, Liu Zhi, the chairman of the 
Guomindang’s provincial government of Henan and a veteran general, inspected 
Wanxi. On the both side of the Zhenping-Neixiang highway, there was a soldier every 
fifty meters. The soldiers’ discipline, appearance, and bearing impressed Liu, and he 
realized that the mintuan of Wanxi was not an ordinary militia. 
Mintuan was extremely important for the local self-government of Wanxi. Bie 
said: “In Wanxi, the soldier should never put down his gun, and the gun should never 
‘leave’ the region. Everybody is soldier and should do his best to protect the 
hometown. And, the local armed force should not be administered by the 
(Guomindang’s) government.”222 The powerful mintuan marked that the local elite of 
Wanxi had extracted the military resources of social power in the region. The 
extraction of the military resource laid the solid foundation of creating the local 
self-government. Peng pointed out that “there is the mintuan, there is the local 
self-government” and “Mintuan is the driving power of the self-government of 
Zhenping.”223 It was mintuan that guaranteed the local elite of Wanxi could promote 
the local self-government and resist the provincial government’s penetration. 
To Wanxi, it had to take the military organization as the premise of promoting 
the local self-government, because the situation of banditry was so serious. People in 
the 1930s could understand this. Zhuang Zexuan, a scholar of local self-government 
in the 1930s, argued that Peng Yuting’s goal of organizing mintuan and promoting the 
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local self-government was to suppress the bandits as soon as possible224. Cheng Fang, 
who studied the county administration in the 1930s, pointed out that the basic reason 
of promoting this defense-centered local self-government was the social instability225. 
Leonard Hsu, a delegate of the central government to the Nations League, defended 
Wanxi that what Peng did met the need and will of the local people226. 
It must be noted that the defense-centered local self-government had a 
shortcoming: the local politics was militarized. That is to say, when it came to the 
social administration, the methods employed by such the local self-government were 
usually oversimplified and crude. The true power center of the counties of Wanxi was 
the headquarters of mintuan. For example in Neixiang, the headquarters in Xixiakou 
town, in which Bie Tingfang set up his office, firmly controlled the military, political, 
financial, and personnel power. The local residents joked that the headquarters looked 
like the imperial court227。Bie divided the county into nine wards, seventy-two 
joint-bao, three hundreds and twenty bao, and more than three thousands jia, and 
demanded that every bao and jia must take military training228 . Therefore, the 
militarized bao-jia system replaced the grass-root civil administration. In other words, 
Bie achieved the politicization of the military means, which brought about the tight 
social control and indiscriminate execution in Neixiang. In the 1930s, Bie was 
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renowned for his draconian laws. Even Peng Yuting was affected by the militarization 
of politics. Li Zongren said in his Memoir that Peng “executed people like flies”229. 
The similar case that mintuan played the dominant role in the grass-root social 
administration could be found in Guangxi230. Usually, we think that, in the province 
controlled by two powerful regional militarists, there would be a huge amount of 
official troops. However, it was different in Guangxi. In the mid 1930s, the number of 
the official armies of Guangxi was only around 20,000-50,000. The main part of Li 
Zongrong and Bai Chongxi’s military force was mintuan. A Western observer noticed 
that Guangxi had the capability to mobilize one million people to join the war; 
although these people had poor equipment, they were outstanding soldier. The secret 
of the one million soldiers was mintuan. Guangxi mintuan was organized and 
administered by the provincial government led by Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi. Bai 
declared that all the able-bodied men at the age of 18-45 would take the military 
training and become the quality resource of troop. He called such the way “the army is 
being incorporated into mintuan”. Li and Bai divided the province into several 
districts, and set up the headquarters of mintuan in each of them. The district 
headquarters had the right to administer the county headquarters of mintuan. Under 
county, there were reserve teams of mintuan in every ward, sub-ward, and village. 
The mintuan of Guangxi was not just a military organization. It performed the 
                                                 
229 Li Zongren, Li Zongren huiyilu 李宗仁回忆录 (Memoir) (Nanning: CPPCC of Guangxi广西自治
区政协, 1980), vol.2, pp. 800-1. 
230 See: Zhu Hongyuan 朱浤源, Cong bianluan dao junsheng: Guangxi de chuqi xiandaihua 从变乱
到军省: 广西的初期现代化, 1860-1937 (From the Rebellion to the Militarized Province: The Early 
Modernization of Guangxi, 1860-1937) (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1995), pp. 177-8, 196-9, 202-17, 
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administrative function in the grass-root society. Li and Bai paid a great attention to 
balance the military and political function of mintuan. Their ultimate aim was to 
transform mintuan into a political-military organ, in which “thirty-percent of its 
functions are the military, and seventy-percent are the political”. In the training course 
for the cadre of mintuan, we can see the administrativization of mintuan. In the 
beginning days of the 1930s, the course focused on the military training. By the mid, 
the political and administrative course became the main part in the training session. 
The officer of mintuan was not only a military commander but also a civil 
administrator in the grass-root society. In county and sub-county, the head of mintuan 
was concurrently the director of the administrative organ and the primary school. 
Guangxi mintuan was a good tool of mobilizing and controlling the grass-root 
society. When it comes to the social control and mobilization, the military method has 
the highest efficiency, because it adopts the vertical administrative system. The 
militarists in Guangxi ingeniously integrated the military organization into the civil 
administration. By this way, the provincial government of Guangxi maintained the 
efficiency of mobilizing the society, while at the same time, reduced—to a certain 
extent—the harm to the civil politics caused by the excessive militarization. In the 
1930s, Guangxi was praised as the “model province” in social administration. The 
achievement of Guangxi should give, at least partly, the credit to mintuan. However, 
the basic spirit of the politics of Guangxi was still military. That is way one scholar 
calls Guangxi a “militarized province”. 
Similarly, mintuan exerted a great influence on Wanxi. Philip Kuhn argues that 
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the self-governments of Wanxi developed from the network of mintuan231. Hence, this 
thesis calls Wanxi the “militarized county”. The militarization was one of keys of 
understanding Wanxi’s work on rural reconstruction. In the 1930s, Wanxi enjoyed a 
high reputation in the Rural Reconstruction Movement (RRM). Many advocators of 
the RRM praised its efficiency, which was a conspicuous lack in the RRM 
experiments led by intellectuals. One of the reasons of Wanxi’s success was that, by 
the way of organizing mintuan and integrating it into the grass-root administration, 
the local self-government of Wanxi could mobilize the peasants to participate in the 
rural reconstruction work. To some extent, Wanxi provided a solution to Liang 
Shuming’s emotional sigh—“Why we act enthusiastically, but the countryside prefers 
inaction to action?” What Liang and his counterparts did not find in their experiments 
was just the effective method of mobilization, like mintuan. 
 
3) Autonomy 
Promoting the local self-government was a systematic project, which included 
politics, economy, education, culture, public security, and so forth. Peng declared that:  
[Promoting the local self-government] must start with politics. On the base 
of politics, we can develop education. With the help of politics and 
education, we can improve rural economy and distribute fairly the social 
wealth. In the process of economic development, education will be more 
universal, and politics will be more enlightened. Finally, all social problems 
will be settled232.  
The politics Peng talked here was about how to create the self-government in 
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232  Zhenping xianzhi 镇平县志  (The General Records of Zhenping County) (Beijing: Fangzhi 
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Wanxi. The work included two successive stages—“Overthrow the official 
administration and avoid the gentry-politics”233. 
“Overthrow the official administration” 
The self-government of Xichuan was the earliest one in Wanxi. In 1926, after a 
discussion with Bie Tingfang, Chen set up the Xichuanzizhixiejinweiyuanhui (the 
Committee of Promoting the Local Self-government in Xichuan). In the next year, he 
set up the general office of the eight wards of Xichuan, which was the chief 
administrative organ of the county234. After 1930, it was renamed the Committee of 
Local Self-government of Xichuan. In the same period, there was a Guomindang’s 
county government in the county. Although the government had a complete set of 
sections, like civil affairs, judicial affairs, construction, and education, it did not have 
any power. The Committee led by Chen was the true government. The Committee had 
the right to appoint the important officials, like the senior officers of mintuan and the 
head of ward, and it was in charge of collecting taxes. “The so-called Guomindang’s 
county government of Xichuan was just a mere skeleton.”235 
In 1930, Bie established Neixiangjianshecujinweiyuanhui (the Reconstruction 
Committee of Neixiang). The committee sent some instructors to the wards, towns, 
and villages to help the residents to perform self-government. In fact, the true power 
center of Neixiang was the mintuan headquarters commanded by Bie himself. The 
reconstruction committee was just attached to the headquarters. The headquarters 
determined important affairs of the county, such as the farmland survey and 
                                                 
233 Ibid. 
234 Xichuan xianzhi 淅川县志 (The General Records of Xichuan County), pp. 26-7. 
235 Ibid, p. 413. 
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reconnoitering, tax collection, finance, road building, and improving agriculture. 




SM1: Structure map of the local self-government of Neixiang 
The Financial Office was in charge of the revenue and expenditure of the 
self-government, tax collection, and the administration of grains; the Mediation 
Committee was a kind of Xisonghui (dropping lawsuit society), which was the 
“supreme court” of Neixiang; the duty of the Reconstruction Committee was to put 
all the policies and resolutions into practice. All directors and heads of these 
committees and offices were selected and appointed by the headquarters of mintuan. 
In the 1930s, there was the Guomindang’s county government in Neixiang, but 
it was just in name. Every morning, the county magistrate appointed by the provincial 
government could not enter the county government from the main entrance, but from 
the side door. Then, because mintuan had “borrowed” his office, the magistrate had to 
find an empty office to work. From 1927 to 1940, there were eighteen GMD 
appointed county magistrates in Neixiang236. All of them found that they could not 
coexist with Bie Tingfang, because Bie demanded that the magistrate must report 
everything, important or insignificant, to the headquarters. 
In the October of 1930, Peng set up the general office of the ten wards of 
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Zhenping237 . The duty of the office was to be “in charge of all affairs of the 
self-government of Zhenping including self-defense, dropping lawsuits, education, 
reconstruction, and so on.” The office consisted of three departments: the executive 
office; Committee of Self-government; and the general society of dropping lawsuits. 
The executive office consisted of four sections - general affairs, social survey, 
financial affairs, and propaganda. The Committee of Self-government was to discuss 
important affairs of the self-government and pass relative resolutions. The committee 
was composed of the ten ward heads and all section heads of the self-government. 
Finally, the general society of dropping lawsuits had five prime mediators238. 
With the development of the local self-government, Peng found that many 
works of the general office and the committee were overlapping. In 1931, Peng set up 
the “Committee of the Local Self-government of Zhenping County (CLS)”239. CLS 
was the legislative body and the highest administrative organ in the county, and there 
were twenty-five members in the Committee. Its responsibilities included:  
Verify the budget of each section of the self-government; resolve all the 
policies and regulations of the self-government; review the proposals and 
suggestions submitted by the sections, wards and the people; recommend 
and appoint the head and deputy-head of the general office and the section 
head, etc.240 
The general office of the self-government became an executive organ of the 
Committee. In 1932, the Committee passed an organic regulation and elaborated the 
duty of each section241. The duty of the section of general affairs was to “keep and sort 
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out all official documents, and do the accounting and auditing work”. The section of 
finance was in charge of “working out the budget of the self-government and 
administering the public fund”. The work of the section of social survey included 
“doing the farmland survey, reconnoitering, and conducting census”. The function of 
the reconstruction section was to “build road, carry out afforestation, build and 
maintain the irrigation work, and improve agriculture”242. 
In 1933, just before Peng passed away, two more administrative organs were 
added into the Committee. The section of militia was to handle some basic affairs of 
mintuan. The function of the new mediation committee was to deal with some civil 
legal cases in the countryside. By this time, the independent self-government of 
Zhenping totally replaced the Guomindang’s official administration in the county. 
Following is the structure of the self-government of Zhenping: 
 
SM2: Structure map of the local self-government of Zhenping 
                                                 
242 Ibid, pp. 5-7. 
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When Xichuan, Neixiang, and Zhenping established the semi-independent 
self-government respectively, the Guomindang’s administration was forced to leave 
the region. In the 1930s, although the Guomindang’s government was kept in the 
counties of Wanxi, it had been an empty shell.  
These new self-governments had good cooperation in many works. The office 
of the Joint-defense of Wanxi was the highest administrative organ of military affairs 
in the region. Bie Tingfang was elected as the chief coordinator, and became the 
military leader of Wanxi. In the Rural Normal School of Wanxi, there was a board that 
was composed of the leader and senior members of the self-government of each 
county of Wanxi. To a great extent, the normal school was the political center of the 
region, in which the influential figures of Wanxi discussed the important matters of 
the local self-government. Peng Yuting was elected as the President of the board, and 
his political idea was taken as the guiding theory. Peng became the spiritual leader in 
Wanxi. Therefore, in an outsider’s eyes, Wanxi looked like an incorporated 
government. An observer even called Wanxi the “Federated Self-government Union 
of Chengping, Ssichuan and Neihsiang243. 
Every county had its own characteristics. Chen Shunde had a mild attitude 
towards Guomindang, and there was no serious conflict between the self-government 
of Xichuan and the Guomindang’s provincial government. In the late 1930s, Chen 
even cooperated with Guomindang to administer the local affairs. On the contrary, 
Peng Yuting firmly believed that Guomindang had no capability to develop the local 
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society. He took a firm stand and executed the county magistrate appointed by the 
provincial government. When it came to the social administration, Peng was 
relatively civil and tried to establish a complete set of grass-root administrative 
system. Bie Tingfang was a hundred-percent military strongman, and his rule in 
Neixiang was characterized by the tight social control and the draconian laws. 
However, his attitude towards Guomindang was much more tactful than Peng. If only 
the provincial government did not interfere in the local affairs of Neixiang, he would 
do his utmost to avoid the direct conflict with the ruling party. 
 “Avoid the gentry-politics”244 
Peng, Bie, and Chen were not the old-style gentry, but belonged to the group of 
new local elite in the Republican period. One scholar argues that the new local elite 
refer to one “who was a native of one place, and had been a GMD appointed 
grass-root official. In the place, they were influential figure and their reputation and 
capability were recognized by the local people”245. The leaders of Wanxi met the 
definition. Peng Yuting had been appointed the head of the Southern Ward of 
Zhenping County. Bie Tingfang used to be the head of the civil corps of the Second 
                                                 
244 The slogan might be confusing. Without any doubt, Peng himself was influential local gentry. Why 
did he advocate “avoid gentry-politics”? His purpose was to prevent the local self-government to be 
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That is why Peng tried his best to reshuffle the grass-root administration and replace established 
lineages by new officials chosen by the local self-government of Zhenping County. Some established 
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one of the gentries of Zhenping. 
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Western Ward of Neixiang County. Chen Shunde had held the post of county 
magistrate of Xichuan. In the eyes of Zhenping people, Peng was an outstanding filial 
son and the hero of suppressing banditry. In Neixiang, Bie was an awesome military 
strongman, and was regarded as the unmatchable leader of resisting banditry. For the 
people of Xichuan, Chen was a noble, well-educated, and public-spirited man. 
Compared with the traditional local gentry, they had the modern nationalist idea. They 
were well-read in the situation of the world and the country, and concerned 
themselves with the fate of the nation. They held that the traditional way of 
administration had not been suitable for the rural area because it was easily controlled 
by powerful families and degenerated into a tool of oppressing the peasants. 
Therefore, they hoped that they could replace it with a modern grass-root social 
administrative system. Peng’ work was relatively successful. 
When the local self-government commenced, Peng reorganized Zhenping into 
ten wards. Under the ward, there were 171 villages and 19 towns246. In 1931, the 
Committee of Self-government resolved that there should be one head, one 
deputy-head, and one secretary and concurrently accountant in every village; 
depending on the size, an administrative village could have 1-3 policemen; every 
village should set up a society of dropping lawsuit, and it was directed by the 
deputy-head of the village. 
In the past, the wealthy and powerful families occupied the post of village head. 
They handled the village affairs at will, and the account of the village finance was a 
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mess. In the countryside, there were many land and property disputes. But the 
ordinary peasants were usually illiterate and ignorant of the legal procedure. Thus, 
with the excuse of helping the peasants to deal with the lawsuit, the powerful families 
colluded with the village police and the judge of the county court and asked excessive 
money and goods from the poor residents. In the eyes of these powerful families, the 
peasant was just an insignificant pawn in their hands and could be pushed around as 
they pleased. 
Peng tried his best to change the situation. After the self-government appointed 
the full-time accountant in each village, the village finance became more and more 
transparent and standardized. Under the strict accounting system, it was extremely 
difficult for any member of the village administration to embezzle the public funds. 
The new village policeman was totally different with the old one. The Committee of 
Self-government strictly trained these new village policemen, and warned them not to 
collude with powerful families. Otherwise, they would face a severe punishment. The 
setup of the society of dropping lawsuit was very significant for the countryside. By 
the way of mediation, the members of the society tried to settle the dispute between 
the villagers, and persuaded them from going to the court. They told the peasants that 
going to the court would cost much more time and money and would be easily cheated 
by the pettifoggers. 
While the grass-root political organization was reorganizing, Peng conducted a 
general election in Zhenping, in which the people would elect all heads of village and 
town. Peng mentioned that “the village and town are the cornerstone of the local 
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self-government, and the head of village and town will play a critical role in the local 
politics.”247 Peng spent much time and energy in this election and demanded that the 
head and deputy-head of the general office and other senior officials of the 
self-government must come to the villages in person and help the villagers to 
participate in the election. In the villages and towns, those officials encouraged the 
capable and moral peasant to join the election and serve the self-government. At the 
same time, they kept watch on powerful families and prevented them from doing 
anything to sabotage the election. After two months’ effort, one hundred and ninety 
new heads of village and town were elected. Peng felt very satisfied with the result. 
The next step was to elect the head of ward. According to the regulation248, the 
Committee of Self-government would nominate three candidates and the people had 
the right to choose one of them as the ward head. 
The self-government promulgated The Organic Rules of Ward and stipulated 
that the general office was the highest administrative organ in a ward and it was 
directed by the ward head; the ward head had the right to choose one deputy-head249. 
Under the general office, there were the executive, reconstruction, and education 
section, which had the duty to do the concrete work. The committee of mediation was 
attached to the general office. At the end of every month, the ward general office must 
submitted a report the Committee of Self-government, in which there was a detailed 
record of all affairs the office dealt with in the month. The Committee would check 
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and evaluate the report. 
Peng Yuting placed his hope on the two hundreds new heads of ward, village, 
and town. They must rapidly and effectively put into practice all the policies, plans, 
and program proposed by the self-government. Otherwise, the grand ideal of the local 
self-government would turn out a mere scrap of paper. To make sure that they would 
be competent in their post, Peng worked out the training program for these new 
grass-root officials. Every month, the heads of village and town would be put together 
and take training course twice. The Committee would check their performance at any 
time, and anyone that was found disqualified for their job would be immediately 
replaced. 
The training course included: sanminzhuyi; the general knowledge of local 
self-government, rural political organizations, and militia; the method of social survey; 
the forms and formulas of official document, and so on. At the beginning of each 
training session, every official must make a declaration:  
I, with honesty, swear here: from now on, I will do my best to get rid of all 
bad habits and to be a moral, decent, and qualified citizen. Abiding by the 
teachings of the late Prime Minister Sun Zhongshan, I will, with my heart 
and soul, serve the career of promoting the local self-government. … I will 
do my utmost to create an open, fair, and enlightened politics, and to bring 
the happy life to every people.250  
Peng also wrote a manual, in which there were nineteen regulations that the 
grass-root officials must abide by251. 
The strict nineteen regulations, training, and supervision from the Committee 
generated a great binding force on the grass-root officials, and prevented them from 
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being degenerated into the black sheep in the countryside. To the members of the 
wealthy and powerful families, if they were moral and would like to serve the locality, 
they could join the self-government. To those immoral and vicious guys, the 
self-government and mintuan mercilessly cracked them down. 
 
4) The relationship of Wanxi and the Guomindang’s provincial government 
It was impossible for a ruling party to give up willingly the control over the 
locality. For example in Zhenping, Guomindang did endeavor to extend its power into 
the remote county252. In 1926, there was a party headquarters of Guomindang in 
Zhenping. However, it did not begin working. In 1929, the provincial headquarters of 
Guomindang in Henan sent two people, who had been trained in Kaifeng, to 
reestablish the party organization of Zhenping. The party headquarters was resumed. 
Nevertheless, because there were communists inside the headquarters, it was 
disbanded on the next year. 
After the Great War of the Central Plains, the political situation of Henan 
changed greatly. In the October of 1930, Liu Zhi, one the closest follower of Jiang 
Jieshi, was appointed the chairman of the Guomindang’s provincial government of 
Henan. Liu was a veteran general. When he was an instructor of the Whampoa 
Military Academy, he had a good relationship with Jiang, who was the President of 
the prestigious Academy. The Great War of the Central Plains broke out in 1930, and 
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Jiang appointed Liu the chief commander of the 2nd Army Group253. After the war, to 
reward his outstanding performance, the central government selected Liu as the new 
chairman of Henan. 
Liu followed strictly Jiang’s teaching—“Rule by the Party”—and tried his best 
to refine the party organizations in the province254. He reestablished the Guiding 
Committee of the Party Affairs of Henan Province, and took up himself the post of 
standing committee. The Committee enlisted a great number of influential figures of 
Henan. Liu strengthened the party organization at the provincial level, and at the same 
time, he worked hard to expand the municipal and county level party organization. By 
the way of heart-to-heart conversation, he increased the cohesion of the grass-root 
party organization; by the way of re-registration, he recruited many new members for 
Guomindang. He required all the party organizations should clear up the estrangement 
and cooperate sincerely to improve the efficiency of the local administration. 
Moreover, he selected some young and capable members of the party to joint the 
ward-head training program, by which he hoped that the party could penetrate into the 
grass-root society of Henan. 
Besides the party reorganization, another important work done by Liu was to 
consolidate the county-level administration. The key of the work was to reshuffle the 
officials of the county government, and appoint the capable and loyal people the 
county magistrate. On one hand, these new magistrates would improve the local 
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politics; on the other hand, they would not hinder the provincial government’s efforts 
of extending the state power. Before the reform, Liu accused that many local officials 
of Henan were “opportunistic. And they collude with the warlords or the evil gentry 
and local bullies”255. Such the kind of local official was a great harm to the local 
politics. To change the situation, from 1931, Liu set up the Training Center of Local 
Officials in Kaifeng. The center had two parts. One was for the county magistrate and 
the candidate of county magistrate; the other was for the section head of county 
government. Meanwhile, he revised the regulation of appointing county magistrate 
and required the Department of Civil Affairs of the provincial government make a 
monthly inspection tour to every county256. In 1932, Liu conducted a registration of 
county magistrate candidate, by which he hoped the provincial government could find 
more capable candidates257. In 1934, the provincial government passed the Bulletin of 
Promoting the County Administration, in which there were detailed instructions on 
how to perform the administration258. 
Liu Zhi did not spend much energy in promoting the local self-government. In 
1932, the Headquarters of Suppressing (Communist) Banditry of Hubei, Henan and 
Anhui, which headed directly by Jiang Jieshi, issued an order that stopped all the local 
self-government and began reorganizing the bao-jia system259. Liu started the work 
immediately when he got the order. Then, the key work of the county administration 
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of Henan turned out reorganizing and upgrading the bao-jia system. By the October of 
1933, the provincial government of Henan finished the job 260 . The goal of 
reorganizing the bao-jia system was to control and mobilize more effectively the 
grass-root society. 
To check the tide of local militarization, Liu worked hard to reorganizing the 
local armed force. The provincial government declared that:  
In the province, there are so many local armed forces. Most of them are 
controlled and manipulated by the local bullies and evil gentry. They are a 
method of self-defense in name, but a great harm to the local society in 
reality.261  
Liu Zhi offered a solution:  
All the standing local armed forces are incorporated into the team of 
maintaining public security, and all the reserve armed force into the 
sub-team. The province is divided into six districts. In each district, the 
provincial government appoints one commander to administer these teams 
and sub-teams.262  
In those days, it was a regular practice for the people of Henan to buy and store 
some guns for self-defense. In his Memoir, Liu estimated that there were around 
800,000 private guns in the province263. Liu thought that these private weapons were 
an impetus for establishing the local armed force. Therefore, he demanded the county 
governments confiscate and destroy these private weapons as soon as possible264. 
When he was appointed the chairman of Henan Province, Liu Zhi was only 
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thirty-nine-year old. A young and successful general, he had grand political ideal. He 
wrote:  
I ascend a height and enjoy a distant view. Before me, there is a long road. I 
understand the central government places a great career on me. I resolve to 
accomplish the task and never let the Party down265.  
As a loyal and devoted disciple of Jiang Jieshi, he knew well that the most 
important work was to secure that the state power could penetrate into the grass-root 
society of Henan. His political idea determined the unavoidable conflict of Wanxi and 
the provincial authorities. In Liu’s eyes, what Wanxi did was totally illegal. In a report 
to the central government, he wrote:  
In name, the local self-government of Zhenping, Neixiang, and Xichuan is 
the self-government by people; in reality, all political power of the 
self-government is monopolized by one or two evil gentry. All their political 
organizations are illegal266.  
Therefore, among them—the determined chairman, stubborn Peng Yuting, and 
smart Bie Tingfang, there were vivid, bloody, and comic power shows. 
The bleeding head 
A guest asked Peng Yuting the following questions: 
Guest: Right now, the political power is in the hands of the bureaucrats and 
warlords. How can you promote the local self-government?  
 
Peng: The work should start from the reorganization of the local 
government.  
 
Guest: How difficult is it? 
 
Peng [Answered proudly]: When the county magistrate is executed, and the 
                                                 
265 Liu Zhi 刘峙, Wo de huiyi 我的回忆 (Memoir) (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe 文海出版社, 1982), p. 
116. 
266  Liu Zhi 刘峙 , Xunshi Xiangcheng, Nanyang, Zhenping, Neixiang, Dengxian deng wu xian 
xianzheng zhuangkuang ji ying yu xingge zhengli ge shixiang 巡视襄城南阳镇平内乡邓县等五县县
政状况及应予兴革整理各事项 (The Report of the Supervision tour in Xiangcheng, Nanyang, 
Zhenping, Neixiang, and Deng County) (1934), Neizheng gongbao 内政公报 (The Bulletin of the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs), vol. 7-39. 
 132
bandits are defeated, the morale of the people is boosted greatly. Then, there 
is no any obstacle [for the local self-government].267 
In other words, beheading of Kan Baozhen, the GMD appointed county 
magistrate, marked the end of Guomindang’s power in Zhenping. 
Kan Baozhen was the county magistrate of Zhenping. He knew that Peng Yuting 
was very influential and popular in the county. While Peng was suppressing the 
bandits, Kan felt that Peng’s activity would threaten his status. And, Kan understood 
that if Peng promoted successfully the local self-government, he would be a mere 
figurehead. Therefore, he tried his best to keep the status quo. When he heard that 
Peng came back from the Academy of Village self-government of Henan, he sent 
Peng five hundreds silver dollars and hoped that Peng would leave Zhenping as soon 
as possible. Peng refused determinedly his money. Then, Kan began spreading the 
rumor that Peng Yuting was a propagandist of communism and would stir up a 
rebellion in Zhenping. Peng was extremely mad at these rumors. 
Liu Zhi had noticed the vigorous development of the local self-government of 
Wanxi, and felt that it was necessary for him to take some actions to check the 
centrifugal force. Liu knew that Ning Xigu graduated from the Whampoa Military 
Academy, where he taught for years. To disintegrate the leading echelon of the local 
self-government, he appointed Ning the commander of the militias of Deng, Xinye, 
Nanyang, and Zhenping County. Then, he invited Ning to come to Kaifeng and 
promised Ning a senior post in the provincial government. Ning discussed the matter 
with Peng. Peng said that if Ning could get an important post in the capital city, it 
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would be very helpful for them to promote the local self-government in Wanxi. After 
the discussion, Ning decided to accept Liu’s invitation and go to Kaifeng 
immediately. 
The invitation was a carefully calculated plot. Kan Baozhen bought over some 
gunmen and asked them to ambush in the road by which Ning would pass. In the 
eastern suburb of Qinyang County, Ning Xigu was assassinated268. The news 
shocked Peng. He realized that it was too naive for him to believe that the provincial 
government would give Wanxi support. Compromise could only bring about more 
terrible calamity. There was only one way of promoting the local self-government: 
overthrowing totally the Guomindang’s official administration in the region. First of 
all, he must get rid of Kan. 
After the assassination, Kan knew that Zhenping was not a safe place for him, 
and he was transferred to Xinye County. Peng wrote a letter to Kan and said that he 
had arranged a big farewell banquet for Kan, and hoped that the magistrate would 
give him a “face” to attend. As soon as Kan arrived at the dining hall, Peng arrested 
him. To tell the people that he had resolved to overthrow the Guomindang’s 
administration in Zhenping, Peng decided to execute Kan in public, and pasted up 
the notice on the wall of every main street. After Kan was beheaded, Peng put the 
bleeding head before Ning’s tomb and wrote himself an elegiac couplet269. 
The execution caused a stir in Henan. When Liu Zhi got the news, he flied into a 
rage. Some people sent an urgent mail to Zhang Zhijiang, who used to be the superior 
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of Peng in the Northwest Army and now was working in the central government. 
Zhang came to Kaifeng in person and mediated the matter. Zhang wrote a letter to 
Peng:  
When a mantis is stalking a cicada, it should be aware of an oriole standing 
behind. I know you want to promote the local self-government in Wanxi, but 
you should understand firstly that who has the world of China? Alas! I 
cannot speak out all my feelings. I do hope you would like to think thrice 
before you act!270 
Three month after the incident of Kan Baozhen, the provincial government sent 
a representative, Zhao Hailou, to reorganize the party headquarters of Zhenping. Peng 
told Zhao that he must leave Zhenping immediately. The man had no choice but to put 
the inscribed board of “Guomindang” on the wall of a middle school, and planed to 
recruit some members from the teachers. The school objected what he did and 
threatened to smash the board. The frightened representative fled to the downtown of 
Nanyang. It was a joke that the party headquarters of Zhenping became a 
“headquarters-in-exile”271. 
How long could Guomindang keep its temper under control? Shen Songqiao 
points out that “facing such the powerful local self-government, which had become 
‘an armed state within the state’, the feeling of Guomindang was like a prickles down 
one’s back, and what the party wanted to do was to eliminate it as soon as possible.”272 
The mudded hands 
Bie Tingfang had an unshakable principle - nobody was allowed to poke his 
nose into Neixiang. Nevertheless, he witnessed the tragic end of Peng Yuting, who 
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conflict openly with the provincial government, and the decline of the 
self-government of Zhenping after Peng’s death. By the way of overtly agreeing but 
covertly opposing, and by his political tricks and social connections, Bie tried to 
avoid the direct conflict with Guomindang. There were five confrontations between 
Bie and Liu Zhi, in which Bie did his best to head off the disaster273. 
In 1931, Liu Zhi held that Neixiang had developed into a separatist regime. In 
the name of inspection, he dispatched a senior military officer with some soldiers to 
Neixiang, and asked the officer to find an opportunity to get rid of Bie. When the 
officer reached Neixiang, Bie sent his elite troop to “welcome” the officer. In the 
meantime, Bie did his best to entertain him. Facing the kindest hospitality and the 
strong bodyguards surrounded, the officer found no way of starting his plan and had 
to come back empty-handed. 
The humiliated Liu Zhi decided to launch a direct military attack on Neixiang. 
He discussed the matter with Li Jingzhai, who was from Nanyang and the director of 
the Department of Civil Affairs of the provincial government. However, Liu did not 
know that Li was one of the good friends of Bie. During the meeting, Li told Liu 
that there were three reasons for the provincial government not to attack Neixiang. 
Firstly, dispatching an official army to invade a remote county was not good for the 
fame of the troop. Secondly, because Wanxi had a good reputation in RRM, the 
military attack would be definitely criticized nationwide by the RRM activists. 
Lastly, even though the provincial government won the battle, the social order of 
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Wanxi would be seriously damaged, and the restoration work would take a long time. 
After the discussion, Liu cancelled his plan. 
In 1934, Liu decided to go to Neixiang and persuade Bie to take a post in 
Kaifeng. Before Liu’s arrival, Bie contacted with Pang Bingxun, the commander of 
the 40th Army. Pang was from the Northwest Army of Feng Yuxiang, and his 
relationship with Liu Zhi was not good. Pang promised Bie that he would try his 
best to protect him. While Liu was inspecting the county, in the name of protecting 
the chairman, Pang stood side by side with Bie from beginning to end. For the safety 
of Bie, Pang let Bie sit in his sedan during the inspection. It was difficult for Liu Zhi 
to take action. If he acted forcefully, Pang Bingxun would be wounded, even be 
killed, which would cause a great stir between the former Northwest Army and the 
central government. Liu Zhi had to give up the idea of assassination. 
Before Liu Zhi, the performance of Bie was impressive. He stood the roadside 
and waited respectfully for Liu. As soon as he saw Liu, Bie was crying his heart out 
and said that he promoted the self-government because he wanted to bring happiness 
to the people of Neixiang. Unfortunately, some despicable men vilified him, and he 
hoped chairman Liu would uphold justice for him. Liu was completely lost in the 
unexpected weeping welcome, and even did not know what he should do but speak a 
few comforting words. When they crossed a river, the wheel of Liu’s car fell into the 
mud. Bie took off his shoes and jumped into the cold river. While he saw Bie 
digging the mud with his bare hands, Liu forced a smile. In Neixiang, what Liu saw 
were the straight and smooth roads, green hills, and the orderly villages. Finally, he 
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said the word “satisfying” to Bie and left in a huff. 
Liu changed his strategy. After he returned to Kaifeng, he wrote a letter to Bie 
and invited him to be the commander of the 3rd detachment of the provincial public 
security troop. It was not difficult for Bie to see what was behind it, and he declined 
politely the invitation. However, Yang Jiesan, one of the senior assistants of Bie, and 
Tian Ziyue, the director of the militia of Deng County, were interested in the post. 
Bie told them it was a trap. They turned a deaf ear to Bie’s words and went to 
Kaifeng. Then, the two men were arrested and executed. Although Bie lost two 
capable assistants, he could still live safely in his regime. 
The chance came. In the March of 1936, there was an important conference 
convened by the provincial government. Bie Tingfang came to Kaifeng and was held 
in custody by Liu Zhi. Bie’s assistants asked some influential figures for help. 
Meanwhile, Bie sent precious gifts to some senior members of the provincial 
government. Under the pressure, Liu had to release Bie. What he got was just a 
guarantee written by Bie, in which Bie “promised” that the militias of Wanxi would 
be commanded by the provincial government and the counties of Wanxi would pay 
all the taxes on time. Then, Bie returned to Neixiang. Soon after, Liu Zhi was 
transferred to another post. 
Bie was a sophisticated and matter-of-fact politician. He tried to keep good 
relationship with the political force outside Guomindang. For example, Bie made 
friends with many senior officers of the former Northwest Army in exchange for 
their military and political support. In the 1930s, although Jiang Jieshi controlled the 
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central government, some figures of Guangxi clique, like Li Zongren and Bai 
Chongxi, still had a great political influence in China. They were friendly with Bie. 
In 1937, Li Zonghuang, an advocator of local self-government in Guomindang, 
organized the influential figures of Henan, including Bie Tingfang, to visit Guangxi. 
Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi met the delegation. During the meeting, when it came 
to the local self-government, Li and Bai said that “since we learn the local 
self-government from Wanxi, why you forgo what is close at hand and seek what is 
far away.”274 
In 1937, the Sino-Japanese war broke out and the political situation of China 
changed totally. To help the war, Guomindang thought that the powerful local armed 
force could be mobilized to fight against the Japanese army. In 1938, Zhu Jiuying, the 
commissioner of Nanyang, recommended Bie Tingfang to Cheng Qian, the new 
chairman of the provincial government of Henan. With the help of Zhu and Cheng, 
Bie had an opportunity to visit Jiang Jieshi. Before he went to Wuhan, where he would 
meet Jiang, he called on Li Zongren. Li encouraged Bie to meet Jiang and promised 
that the meeting would be safe275. Then, Bie Tingfang played a comedy in Wuhan. 
Bie did not put on the formal attire, but wear specially the homemade clothes. 
The upper was a short and tight hand-woven shirt, and the lower was a baggy 
ankle-length trousers. His shoes were a pair of black handmade shoes with white 
stings. Because he tied up the trouser legs, Bie looked like a big round lantern. When 
he arrived at the President’s residence, it was time for dinner. As soon as Bie saw 
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Jiang Jieshi, he bowed so low that his head almost touched the ground. Then, he raised 
his head and asked Jiang: “Did you have soup?” Jiang was confused and asked Zhu 
Jiuying, who was standing beside him what these words meant. Zhu told Jiang that 
they were the greeting words in the countryside of Nanyang. Jiang and other senior 
officials in the meeting room could not help laughing. The tense atmosphere was 
alleviated and everybody felt relaxed. Jiang praised the achievement of Wanxi and 
awarded Bie a medal276. 
 
5) Guomindang: The final winner 
However, no matter how hard the leaders of Wanxi worked, it was impossible 
for the region to maintain its semi-independent status for a much longer time. Besides 
the existence of the powerful mintuan, there were two reasons of why Wanxi could get 
out of the provincial government’s control. Firstly, it was the charisma of the leader. In 
Wanxi, Peng was so popular and influential that he could mobilize the mass to fight 
against any military attack. Secondly, the geographic position gave Wanxi a natural 
protection. As a veteran general, Liu Zhi understood that the cost of invading the hilly 
region would be startlingly high. Nevertheless, when the charismatic leader passed 
away, the cohesion of the mass would decrease sharply. Liu did it by the way of 
assassination. And, when the Sino-Japanese war broke out, and the political center of 
Henan moved into the southwestern part, the geographic advantage of Wanxi was 
losing. 
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The death of Peng Yuting 
Zhenping, under Peng’s rule, had become an “armed state within the state”. 
Guomindang even could not establish a party headquarters in the county. Of course 
the provincial government did not turn a blind eye to the small regime. In 1932, a 
business man, alias Huang Chuan, came to Zhenping. His goal was not to run a shop 
but to find a person that hated Peng Yuting. Yang Ruifeng, one gentry of Zhenping, 
was strongly against Peng’s policy of banning opium and dropping lawsuit. Finally, 
Yang became Huang’s close friend. Then, they bought over Yang Tianshun, the chief 
bodyguard of Peng. On a night in March 1933, Yang and other two assassins 
murdered brutally Peng while he was asleep277. 
In Zhenping, the death of Peng was like a bolt from the blue. Huang Chuan 
escaped from Zhenping as soon as his plan was done, and returned to Kaifeng. Yang 
Ruifeng and Yang Tianshun were arrested and executed in the cruelest way, and other 
people that had a hand in the plot were shot death. When Liu Zhi got the news, he 
handled tactfully this matter. On one hand, he issued a wanted circular and demanded 
that the police investigate the case “at all cost”. On the other hand, he sent a special 
delegate to attend Peng’s funeral. A rumor was spreading in Zhenping that Peng was 
murdered because there was fierce clique strife within the self-government. 
The funeral was held in the May. Many celebrities expressed their condolences. 
Liang Zhonghua, the President of the Academy of Rural Reconstruction of 
Shandong, attend himself the funeral. Sun Ke, Huang Yanpei, and other people sent 
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the elegiac couplets. Feng Yuxiang, who understood well Peng because Peng had 
worked for many years in his troop, put his couplet on both side of the memorial 
hall:  
You died to achieve virtue and can be regarded as living Buddha for the 
people! You laid down your life for the just course and become a perfect 
man of our time!278 
The self-government of Wanxi did not escape the fate–when the leader passed 
away, his politics died. After Peng was murdered, Guomindang resumed gradually 
its control over the county. “Since the assassination of Peng Yuting, Guomindang 
became more and more active in Zhenping.”279  In the May of 1934, in his 
inspection tour to Zhenping, Liu Zhi cancelled forcefully the general office of the 
self-government of Zhenping, and established the committee of improving local 
economy. Simultaneously, the mintuan of Zhenping was renamed the team of 
maintaining public security and was administered directly by the provincial 
government280. By then, the self-government of Zhenping just existed in name. In 
1937, the party headquarters of Guomindang in Zhenping was reestablished, which 
marked the end of the local self-government of Zhenping281. 
Bie Tingfang: the honeymoon and humiliation 
After 1937, because the Japanese army invaded the northern and eastern Henan, 
the capital city was forced to move from Kaifeng to Luoyang. And, for the reason of 
safety, many important administrative organs of the provincial government, 
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universities, colleges, and schools moved to Nanyang. Usually, they chose Wanxi, 
especially Neixiang County, as their destination. Under such circumstances, the local 
self-government of Wanxi faced a serious challenge. However, before the conflict 
became open, there was an unexpected “honeymoon”. 
When these organs and schools arrived at Wanxi, Bie Tingfang and Chen 
Shunde did their best to help them: choosing the safe places for them; providing 
houses and foods for these officials and teachers; and dispatching mintuan to protect 
them. In the beginning, there was a good relationship between Wanxi and the 
provincial government. In the fall of 1937, Zhu Jiuying was appointed the 
commissioner of Nanyang, who was sympathetic with the local self-government of 
Wanxi. With his help, the provincial government appointed Bie as the commander of 
the self-defense corps of Nanyang, and was in charge of all local armed forces of the 
thirteen counties. 
In the winter of 1937, Li Zonghuang, an influential activist of local 
self-government, became the chief coordinator of the party affairs in Henan. He 
appreciated very much the achievement of Wanxi and was very friendly with Bie. He 
invited Bie as the special commissioner of the party affairs of Neixiang, Zhenping, 
and Xichuan. Moreover, Li sent a report to the central government and hoped that the 
central authorities would like to award Peng and Bie. 
The honeymoon period was very short, and the smiling face of Guomindang 
was just an expedient measure. Bie had a bad relationship with Tang Enbo, a senior 
military officer of Guomindang, whose troops were stationed in Nanyang. The 
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morality of Tang’s troop was very poor and it was a headache of the local residents. In 
Henan, there was a saying: “We have four kinds of disaster–flood, drought, locust, 
and Tang Enbo.” Bie despised very much Tang and his troop. In 1938, when some 
soldiers of Tang’s troop were extorting money from the peasants, Bie arrested and 
punished them. Soon after, because one of Tang’s horses bit the willows planted by 
the self-government of Neixiang, Bie killed the horses as warning. 
In 1939, Wei Lihuang was appointed the commander in chief of the 1st Battle 
Zone, and concurrently the chairman of the provincial government of Henan. Tang 
Enbo sent a false report to Wei, in which Bie Tingfang was described as an outlaw and 
did numerous evil things in Wanxi. And, Wei felt that the existence of the local 
self-government of Wanxi had threatened the power the provincial government. 
Meanwhile, the senior officials in the provincial government, who were friendly with 
Bie, had been transferred to other places. Bie and the provincial government became 
more and more estranged.  
In the February of 1940, Bie received a telegraph from Wei and went to Luoyang 
to attend an important military conference. When Bie walked into the meeting room, 
he saw only Wei, Tang, and a few military officers sitting there. Wei and Tang 
reprimanded severely him and told Bie that: all the mintuan of Nanyang were to be 
disbanded immediately and were renamed the “national guards”; the GMD appointed 
county magistrate was the leader of these new “national guards”; and the provincial 
government had the right to administer and dispatch them. When Bie showed his 
disagreement, Wei detained him and forced him to write a statement of repentance in 
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the prison282. The humiliation destroyed Bie’s health. When he returned to Neixiang, 
Bie wrote his will:  
People suspect me and fear me, because they do not understand me! In the 
past twenty years, no matter how hard and dangerous it was, I did my best to 
promote the local self-government in Wanxi. Although we have achieved 
something, there are so many works we have not accomplished yet! Alas! I 
leave the world in sorrow!283  
In his last days, he realized that, under the circumstances of that time, promoting 
the local self-government was destined to fail in China. He told his son not to 
participate in the local affairs any more. And, he hoped that his grandchildren would 
work hard on their studies and leave the politics forever. In the March of 1940, Bie 
Tingfang passed away in Neixiang. The death of Bie Tingfang marked the end of the 
local self-government of Wanxi. 
The political success of Wanxi should give the credit to the local armed 
force—mintuan. By the way of organizing mintuan, the local elite of Wanxi extracted 
the military resource of social power. Such the extraction guaranteed that the local 
self-government of Wanxi could maintain its semi-independent status in a given time. 
To any modern state, the monopoly of the military resource is one of the basic 
guarantees of its authority. Although, in the Republican period, the locality could grab 
some military power by its own way, and the central government would, by force of 
circumstance, keep silent, the state could not tolerate it forever. When it comes to the 
military resource, there is a natural antagonism between the state and the locality. 
Between them, there will be no compromise. In ten years, the local self-government 
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of Wanxi, depending on the determination, wisdom and smartness of its leaders and 
the geographical advantage, it could resist the provincial government’s penetration. 
However, when the political center moved into the region, the perspective of the local 
self-government became dismal. Nobody could imagine that, in a time that the nation 
was being threatened by the ferocious Japanese army and the unification was much 
more important then ever, the provincial government of Henan would tolerate these 
semi-independent local regimes. 
Wanxi must answer the following questions. Firstly, what was the legitimacy of 
the local self-government? Secondly, how to justify its action of extracting the 
military resource and grabbing the political power? Peng Yuting proposed a 
“regionalism”, in which he connected his political idea with sanminzhuyi, and worked 












Chapter 3 – Ideology of the Local Self-government of Wanxi:  
Peng Yuting’s Regionalism 
 
In the competition among political systems, extracting the cultural resource of 
social power is indispensable. In this thesis, extracting the cultural resource refers that 
a political system must justify its act of grabbing the military and political power. To 
do it, the leader of the political system should work out a systematic idea, or an 
ideology. The ideology building is the key content of extracting the cultural resource 
of social power. In Wanxi, Peng Yuting argued that the reason of maintaining the 
powerful local armed force was that the banditry was too rampant and the official 
administration was too weak to give help; and, the goal of promoting the local 
self-government was not to build a separatist regime but to develop the local society. 
Additionally, Peng said that from a long-term point of view the effort of Wanxi would 
be helpful for the state building. 
The political idea of Peng Yuting is threefold: self-defense; self-salvation; and 
self-prosperity. Peng asked: “What is our idea? The idea was ‘regionalism’ and could 
be regarded as a combination of self-defense, self-salvation, and self-prosperity.”284 
 
1) The Academy of Village Self-government of Henan 
The political idea of Peng could be regarded as a theory of rural reconstruction. 
In the work of suppressing the banditry, Peng realized that the banditry was just one of 
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the serious problems that the countryside was suffering. Suppressing the banditry was 
not the final solution to the instability, poverty, and backwardness. If the countryside 
could not become stable and prosperous, there would be no powerful and peaceful 
China. Peng thought over the problem and expected that he could find a feasible 
program of improving the rural society. 
In 1929, Han Fuqu was the chairman of the provincial government of Henan. He 
invited Peng to work for the provincial government. Peng thought that it was an 
opportunity to discuss the matter of how to develop the countryside with the 
provincial leader. In Kaifeng, he told Han that suppressing banditry was not the basic 
way of settling the rural problem, and he hoped that the chairman would support him 
to set up an academy, in which the scholars could devote their time in studying the 
theory and program of rural reconstruction, and the government could train some 
specialists for the rural reconstruction experiment. Han agreed with Peng’s idea. In 
1930, the Academy of Village Self-government of Henan was established in Baiquan, 
a small town in northern Henan. 
Peng was appointed the President. He invited some famous scholars to take the 
teaching and administrative position of the Academy. Liang Shuming, the most 
influential figure in the RRM, was invited as the professor. He taught the rural 
reconstruction theory in the Academy, and wrote the goal and organic rules for the 
Academy. The Academy had five centers: the rural teacher training center; the 
village-head training center; the village-police training center; the experimental farm; 
and the primary school. To extend the influence of the Academy, Peng and Liang 
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published the Village Self-government Monthly (Cunzhiyuekan) in Beijing. 
Compared with scholars, Peng knew much more about the reality of countryside 
and was eager to find a program that could be easily applied to the rural society. Peng 
held that all courses should be based on the rural reality. He divided the courses into 
five sections285. The first two sections were about the political idea and the spirit of 
serving the countryside. In the third section, student would learn the knowledge of the 
rural self-defense. The fourth one focused on the methods of developing the rural 
economy. The last was the course of local self-government and rural education.  
The Academy enrolled two hundred and forty students from Hebei, Henan, 
Shandong, and Shanxi. The creative and pragmatic atmosphere of the Academy 
attracted nationwide attention. Many activists of the RRM came here and discussed 
the theory and program of rural reconstruction. Even some political figures, like Feng 
Yuxiang and Yan Xishan, visited it. Feng praised the mental outlook of the students, 
and Yan gave a lecture on the relationship of Three People’s Principles and the village 
self-government286. 
In 1930, Feng Yuxiang was defeated in the Great War of Central Plains. Han 
Fuqu, who used to be loyal to Feng, surrendered to Jiang Jieshi. Then, Han was 
transferred to Shandong. Without the financial and political support from Han, the 
Academy was caught in crisis. At this time, Peng was informed that his hometown 
was again put into disorder by bandits. He left all affairs to the vice president and 
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returned to Zhenping. In October, the provincial government of Henan closed the 
Academy. Although the ending of the Academy was disappointing, Peng had gotten 
what he need—the systematic theory of the local self-government of Wanxi. 
 
2) Peng Yuting’s regionalism 
One official of the self-government of Zhenping said:  
As we know, Mr. Peng’s theory comes from the practice. In other words, 
his idea is different with those imaginary ones that put forward by the 
theorists, who work behind closed doors.287  
Compared with those distinguishing intellectuals in the RRM, Peng had no 
time, energy, and even interest in cooking up a panacea for the countryside. It was 
the miserable life of his hometown that forces Peng to think over the rural problems 
and try his best to find the way of saving the countryside. 
The incident of missing the last chance to see his mother stimulated Peng to 
promote the local self-government and rural reconstruction work in Zhenping. In a 
speech, he said that “in all my life, nothing can upset me more badly than [the 
incident]”288 and he added that “I cannot imagine that my hometown has been 
turned into a world of bandit!”289 Hence, he gave up his senior post and began 
suppressing the bandits. At this time, he had only a superficial understanding of the 
rural problem. He believed that when bandits were suppressed, Zhenping would 
become automatically peaceful and prosperous. As he pointed out: “if we can 
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eliminate all the bandits, the pain of our people will disappear immediately!”290 
However, in the progress of suppressing banditry, he found that it was not the final 
solution to the rural problem. 
Around 1929, Peng became increasingly “depressed”. He said:  
After the two-year-work of suppressing banditry, I feel depressed. Why? 
Because I realize that it is just an expedient measure. The banditry is just 
one of the pains that the countryside is suffering. But how much pains are 
there? After suppressing the bandits, what should we do next? How can we 
fulfill Sun Zhongshan’s minshengzhuyi (the Principle of the People’s 
Livelihood) in the countryside? These questions linger in my mind all day 
and all night. They force me to look for a method of eliminating poverty.291  
It was the turning point of his idea. In these words, we can see clearly that his 
understanding of the rural problem was deepening. By now, he understood that the 
basic rural problem of was not the banditry but poverty. Therefore, the basic way of 
saving the countryside was not suppressing banditry but eliminating poverty. Then, he 
left Zhenping for some while and set up the Academy, where he thought over the rural 
problem and its solution. 
In the Academy, the rural reconstruction idea of Liang Shuming influenced 
Peng. He agreed with Liang’s argument that the countryside was the base of Chinese 
society. Peng said:  
The majority of Chinese population is peasant. The dominant part of the 
country’s economy is agriculture. And, both the national culture and the 
foundation of the people’s livelihood are in the countryside.292  
However, the countryside fell in a great crisis in the modern time. Then, how to 
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save the countryside? Like Liang, Peng held that neither the Western representative 
system nor the Russian socialism could apply to China and he mentioned that:  
In Europe and America, the representative politics performs well and has no 
problem. Nevertheless, when it is applied to China, it does not work and the 
representatives become ‘swine’.293  
In Peng’s eyes, the representative system established by the Republic of China 
was just a farce. The national congress (or the parliament) was off and on, in which 
the bribery election was a regular practice. Those representatives or parliament 
members, who had poor capability and morality, were just insignificant pawns in the 
hands of big “warlords”. The Russian way of communism could not be carried out in 
China, either. Peng added that:  
The socialist road invented by the Russian communist party is originally for 
the happiness of mankind. It is a great ideal. However, when it applies to 
China, it turns out totally different!294  
Here, Peng meant that in the countryside some vicious guys, in the name of 
communism, disturbed greatly peasants as bandits did295. Peng thought that the basic 
reason why China could not adopt the socialist road was that there was no the class 
base of the socialist revolution, or there was no the clear-cut class distinction in the 
countryside. He pointed out that “in the north rural China, there are only a small 
number of big landlords. The majority of the population is the small landowner.”296 
Zhenping was a case. 
One land survey showed that in the 1920s and the 1930s, in the 84,630 
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households of Zhenping, there were only 92 households that owned more than 
three-hundred mu farmlands. The percentage was approximately 1.09‰.297 Peng 
pointed out that in Zhenping, except a few big landlords, the people’s life was very 
hard 298 . The hardship was universal. As such, “Zhenping has more than sixty 
thousands families. There is no one family that is not suffering the hardship.”299 The 
sporadic big landlords could not form a class, which could be used as the target of 
class struggle. Thus, it was impossible for Zhenping to lead a socialist revolution. 
Under such circumstances, what should one do to save Zhenping from the crisis? 
Peng said that one must first of all understand what the crisis was. According to him, 
there were seven kinds of banditry in Zhenping300. 1) Ordinary bandits that gathered 
together and robbed peasants in the night. 2) The big bandit gang which had thousands 
members and could destroy the whole village or town in one night. 3) The 
“official-bandit”, in which he referred to, corrupted local officials. 4) The bandit-style 
army was the official army that stationed in Nanyang, which had poor discipline and 
disturbed greatly the countryside. 5) The “militia-bandit” which was the private 
armed force controlled by powerful families. 6) The “communist bandit” was the 
communist guerrilla. Lastly, the “foreign banditry” was imperialists that invaded 
China. Among them, the ordinary bandit, big bandit-gang, official-bandit, and the 
bandit-style army were the most serious threat to Zhenping. 
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Facing these bandits, Peng argued that Zhenping should do two works to resist 
them.  Firstly, the county must restore the social order as soon as possible. His 
method was to organize mintuan to fight against bandits and bandit-style army. 
Secondly, the county must establish the self-government, which would replace the 
corrupt and incapable local administration and work out a systematic plan of 
developing the countryside. The two methods interacted and Peng called them the 
“regionalism”. One official of the self-government of Zhenping explained:  
Mr. Peng shows us a new road, which can be called ‘self-salvation’, or the 
‘regionalism’. We call it ‘self-salvation’, because it is a bottom-up solution, 
in which the countryside is encouraged to find itself the proper ways to 
settle the rural problems. We call it ‘regionalism’, because it stresses that 
such the work should be done by the local people but not by the external 
force.301 
 Here, we can find the difference of Peng Yuting and Liang Shuming. Liang’s 
plan was made in advance. To Liang, it could be applied everywhere. Liang did his 
experiment in Zouping. If the experiment was conducted in Zhenping, the plan would 
be the same one. Nevertheless, Peng did not believe that there could be such a 
universal rural reconstruction plan. In the 1930s, China had almost two thousands 
counties. Each county had the different situation and problem. The plan that was 
suitable for Zouping did not mean it would be applicable for Zhenping, and vice versa. 
To Peng, one county should try its best to find itself the feasible way of social 
development, but should not expect an outsider, like Liang, to bring the panacea. Peng 
emphasized greatly that the locality should be independent, creative, and 
self-determined in dealing with the rural problems. 
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One remarkable characteristic of Peng’s regionalism was the self-salvation. It 
had two meanings. Firstly, the countryside should give up totally the “dependent 
mentality”. Peng criticized that the countryside had four “illnesses”. Among them, the 
most serious one was the “hemiplegicism” of the peasants (banshenbusui, 半身不
遂)302. That was to say that they were “dependent on tian (the heaven)”. The peasants 
were dependent on the natural settings and did not work hard to improve the 
agriculture. They were also “dependent on the good ruler and the incorruptible 
officer” and hoped that those wise and virtuous officials would bring happiness to 
them. Thirdly, they were “dependent on the stationed army” and expected those 
so-called “official” troops would suppress the bandits and restore the social order for 
them. Finally, they were “dependent on the local gentry” and believed blindly that 
these gentry would give them help, but forgot that the “local bullies and evil gentry” 
would never give up any opportunity of extortion. To cure the “illness”, Peng told the 
peasants that they could depend on nothing but themselves. 
Secondly, the self-salvation meant that, when the vested interests, such as the 
official local administration, the troops stationed in Nanyang, and the local gentry, 
were not willing to settle rural problems, the countryside should cut determinedly the 
connection with them. The job was extremely urgent for Zhenping. In the 1920s, the 
most serious social problems in the county were the banditry and poverty. 
Unfortunately, the provincial and county government was incapable of stabilizing and 
developing Zhenping. Peng said:  
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The corrupt local officialdom is one malign tumor in the body of the 
countryside. The ‘bandit-style army’, which colluded with those corrupt 
officials and the bandits, is another malign tumor. The government cannot 
save us. The official army cannot save us, either. If we do not take action to 
save ourselves, we cannot survive at all!303   
In a conference, Peng loudly appealed that “if we want to save our people, we 
must mobilize them to perform self-salvation!”304 His solution was to promote the 
local self-government. In Peng’s mind, the local self-government meant that the local 
affairs should be handled solely by the local people 305 . His idea of the local 
self-government was different with the Guomindang’s idea of promoting the local 
self-government. In the Republican period, the official local self-government was 
promoted and supervised by the central or provincial authorities. However, to Peng, 
the local self-government should be carried out without the government’s 
involvement306. In Zhenping, there was no other way of doing this work. Peng said 
there were three obstacles—the banditry, corrupt local officials, and the bandit-style 
army—in promoting the local self-government in the county. To the bandits and 
bandit-style army, they did not expect a stable Zhenping, because the stability would 
restrain their extortions and lootings. To the local officials of Zhenping, if they were 
from the “warlords”, what they could do was just collecting money for their master; if 
there were outsiders appointed by the superior government, they did not want to work 
hard to stabilize and develop Zhenping, because their post was transitory. 
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Therefore, according to Peng, “self-government will depend on neither the 
official county administration nor the official army.”307 The self-government and 
mintuan would replace them. He proposed a radical principle for the self-government 
of Zhenping:  
When we promote the local self-government, it will be dangerous to 
cooperate with the government. The prerequisite for establishing the 
self-government is toppling down the official administration.308  
Additionally, he worked out the “three regardless policies”: “regardless of 
government; regardless of law; and regardless of the official procedure”309. His 
policies brought about directly the collapse of the Guomindang’s rule in Zhenping. 
Peng’s words sounded like a revolution. In fact, he did regard his local 
self-government as revolution. Peng added that “in the present situation, the local 
self-government is the local revolution. They are the same thing!”310 He further 
argued that Chinese revolution was carried out at two levels. At the national level, it 
was the “national revolution”, which endeavored to achieve the national 
independence. At the local level, it was the “local revolution”, or a small-scale 
“national revolution”. The goal of the “local revolution” was to achieve stability and 
prosperity in the local society (esp. the countryside). Peng argued that:  
If we want to practice the national revolution in the locality, we must narrow 
its scope. In other words, we should choose a small portion of the country 
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(one county or some counties together) to do works with the spirit of the 
national revolution. That is why I call it the ‘local revolution’.311  
Originally, Peng thought that the local revolution would be bloodless such that 
“the method of the local revolution is ‘non-cooperation’, in which there will be no 
bloodshed”312. Could the peaceful ‘non-cooperation’ stop the bandits and bandit-style 
army from killing and looting? Could it persuade the official administration to retreat 
from Zhenping and give the full autonomy to the county? When he beheaded Kan 
Baozhen, the county magistrate appointed by Guomindang, the peaceful color of his 
local revolution totally faded away. 
Liang Shuming, one of the leaders of the RRM, felt uneasy about Peng’s radical 
idea. Liang did not oppose the local self-government. In his eyes, the local 
self-government, local self-salvation and the rural reconstruction were the same thing. 
They had the same goal: creating a stable and prosperous countryside and laying a 
solid foundation for the national modernization. Liang pointed out that “in China, the 
local self-government is a special way of local self-salvation”313, and “the RRM is the 
local self-salvation movement”314. Moreover, he argued that because the state power 
was too weak, the local self-government could not be promoted by the center, but 
must start from the locality315. 
Liang did not advocate the open conflict with the government. He said the rural 
reconstruction should keep at a certain distance with the government. And, if it was 
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possible, activists of the RRM should persuade the government to give their 
experiments help 316 . They should tell that ruling party, if it did not help the 
countryside to perform the self-salvation, or the rural reconstruction, the countryside 
would be ruined317. Liang’s attitude was ambiguous. On one hand, he did not think 
there was a quality central government that could save the countryside from the crisis, 
and the countryside must depend on itself to settle its problems. On the other hand, he 
expected that the central authorities would help the rural reconstruction. The 
ambiguity affected his evaluation on Peng Yuting and his experiment in Wanxi. 
Peng’s program was based essentially on the reality of Zhenping, and settled 
many pressing problems. It received the full support from the local residents. To this, 
Liang expressed his admiration and he declared that:  
The experiment in Zhenping and Neixiang is much better than ours. It is led 
by the natives (Mr. Peng Yuting and someone else) and does great work on 
suppressing the bandits. They even find ways not to pay the exorbitant taxes 
and levies. It is the true self-salvation in the countryside.318  
People thought that Liang would take Zhenping as the model of rural 
reconstruction. On the contrary, he denied the universality of the Wanxi model and 
pointed out that he does not think that the rural construction should follow the way of 
Zhenping.319 Liang knew exactly what happened in Zhenping. He thought what Peng 
did could easily be put under the label of separatism. If the rural construction 
movement followed such the way, the central authorities would take prompt action to 
check the “separatist” tide. Such the intervention would destroy all rural 
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reconstruction experiments. To Liang, it was an unaffordable risk. In fact, Peng 
understood also that his radical idea would put the local self-government of Wanxi 
into trouble. Thus, he tried painstakingly to incorporate his idea with Sun 
Zhongshan’s Three People’s Principles, and hoped that his effort could justify the 
practice of Wanxi. 
 
3) Peng’s regionalism and Three People’s Principles (sanminzhuyi) 
Peng said explicitly his regionalism was a kind of Three People’s Principles 320. 
Between them, there was no difference in nature. The difference was just the scope 
that they were applied to. Sanminzhuyi was the guiding principle of the national 
revolution. It depicted how to overthrow the imperialism and win the national 
independence and how to change China into a powerful, prosperous, democratic, and 
civilized republic. The regionalism was the guide of the local revolution. It focused on 
how to find a feasible way of stabilizing and developing the rural society, and how to 
help the local people to perform the political rights by the way of local 
self-government. The local revolution was an extension of the national revolution, 
and it was an application of sanminzhuyi in the local society. To Peng, without the 
success of the local revolution, the national revolution could not be accomplished. 
And, if sanminzhuyi were not regionalized, it would have no significance to the 
countryside. Peng believed firmly that only by the combination of sanminzhuyi and 
the reality of the locality, sanminzhuyi could be useful for the rural society and he 
                                                 
320 Peng Yuting, “dui mintuan guanzhang jianghua  对民团官长讲话 (A Speech to Officers of 
mintuan)”, Peng Peng Yuting jiangyan ji 彭禹廷讲演集 (The Speeches of Peng Yuting), p. 54. 
 160
said: 
Our country is so big that it is not easy for the national revolution to achieve in a 
short time. Therefore, we should reduce the scope of the national revolution and 
remold it to be suitable for a county, like Zhenping. When the local revolution of 
Zhenping becomes successful, other counties will follow the way. 321 
Peng argued that there was the consistency of his regionalism and sanminzhuyi, 
and he told his audience that “Sanminzhuyi emerges as the time demands.  It is living, 
not dead!”322 He explained that Sun Zhongshan’s Three People’s Principles had both 
“topicality” and “spatiality”. “Topicality” meant that there would be some changes in 
the contents of sanminzhuyi in different historic periods.  Peng discussed these 
changes in the three Principles respectively. 
In the late Qing, the chief goal of Sun Zhongshan’s nationalism was to 
overthrow the Manchu dynasty and establish the Republic. After the demise of Qing, 
China faced the serious threat from the foreign powers and was not a truly 
independent state. A new element—anti-imperialism—was added into the 
nationalism. Peng said:  
Although the Qing was toppled down by the revolution, the imperialist 
continued to use the unequal treaties as weapons to oppress our country. Thus, 
Sun Zhongshan advocated that we should unite all oppressed nations to 
overthrow the imperialism and achieve the true liberation of our nation.323  
Sun’s words showed that the content of nationalism was changing with time. 
At first, the goal of the principle was to establish the Republic of China. Sun 
held that with the establishment of the Republic all the political problems of China 
would be readily settled. Unfortunately, his expectation did not come true:  
                                                 
321 Peng Yuting, “tong xiangcun xiaoxue jiang sanminzhuyi zhi shijianxing yu kongjianxing  同乡村
小学教师讲三民主义之时间性与空间性 (A Lecture to Primary School Teachers on “Topicality” and 
“Spatiality” of Three People’s Principles.)”, Ibid, p. 81. 
322 Ibid. 
323 Ibid, p. 82. 
 161
Although the republic was founded, the Western-style representative system 
could not be applied to China. Therefore, Sun advocated promoting the 
direct democracy of the people. It means that the people can have four basic 
rights: the suffrage, recall, initiative, and referendum. The four direct rights 
of the people are the new elements that were added into the Principle of 
Democracy.324 
In the last days of Qing, agriculture was dominant in China’s national economy. 
The aim of the Principle was to equalize the land ownership in China. After the 
establishment of the Republic, to a certain extent, the capitalist industry and 
commerce was developed. To avoid the negative results of the “wild capitalism”:  
Sun added ‘checking capital’ and ‘industry nationalization’ into his program, 
lest China followed the old road of Europe and America. It is the evolution 
of the Principle of the People’s Livelihood.”325 
Peng thought that the spatiality of sanminzhuyi was a new idea. As such, “the 
topicality of sanminzhuyi has been frequently talked by other people” and “its 
spatiality has never been heard before. ”326 To add, “Sanminzhuyi not only keeps 
change with the time, but also adapts to different settings” and such was the 
adaptability of ‘spatiality’.”327 However, Sanminzhuyi was not one-size-fit-all. When 
it came to the local society, its contents must be changed accordingly. Originally, 
sanminzhuyi was for the national revolution. Peng criticized those people, who used 
the way of the national revolution to perform local jobs and concluded that they could 
not find the solution to the rural problems328. 
The national revolution and the local revolution were different type of 
revolution.  The social settings in which they happened and the idea and method by 
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which they used were totally different. Peng said:  
The national revolution will bring about a nationwide social change. However, 
the local revolution is promoted in county or counties, and it endeavors to settle 
the concrete rural problem.329  
To anyone who did the work of reforming the local society, he must “reshape the 
national revolution into the local revolution. The idea and method of the national 
revolution is sanminzhuyi. The reshaped national revolution, or the local revolution, 
will employ a reshaped sanminzhuyi”330. 
The reshaped sanminzhuyi 
How to reshape sanminzhuyi? Peng argued that:  
The basic unit of Chinese society was the county; and Sun Zhongshan had 
pointed out that the new Chinese politics should commence from the 
county-level local self-government. Thus, when people began promoting 
the local self-government in the countryside, they should reshape 
sanminzhuyi into a county sanminzhuyi, which should be suitable for the 
reality of the county. Because Peng Yuting did the rural reconstruction work 
in Zhenping, he changed sanminzhuyi into the “sanminzhuyi of Zhenping 
County”331.  
Because sanminzhuyi had three principles—nationalism, democracy, and the 
people’s livelihood, accordingly, there were the policy of self-defense, 
self-government, and self-prosperity in Zhenping. 
Sun’s nationalism focused on how to achieve the national independence. It 
would not give direct help to Zhenping332. In Peng’s days, one of the most serious 
problems in Zhenping was the banditry, which put the county into chaos. To Zhenping, 
it must find an effective way of restoring the social order as soon as possible. Peng 
                                                 
329 Ibid. 
330 Ibid. 
331 Peng Yuting, “dui xiangcun xiaoxue jiaoshi jiang suoxiao de sanminzhuyi对乡村小学教师讲缩小
的三民主义 (A Lecture to Primary School Teachers on Reshaped Three People’s Principles)”, Ibid, p. 
86. 
332 Ibid, 87. 
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said:  
Sitting down and bragging the grand ideal of nationalism is not very useful 
for the county. To help our work, the nationalism of Sun Zhongshan should 
turn out a county nationalism. What is the nationalism of Zhenping? It is the 
self-defense.333  
The method of self-defense was to organize mintuan, by which the county could 
suppress the rampant bandits. 
The nucleus of the people’s democracy of Sun Zhongshan was the county 
self-government. Peng thought Sun’s words justified his idea of promoting the local 
self-government in Zhenping and he pointed out that:  
Promoting the county-level self-government is one of the teachings of Sun 
Zhongshan, and is stipulated by the law of the central government. How can 
we be wrong in doing such the work?”334  
In Sun’s idea, the local self-government should be promoted and supervised by 
the central government. However, in Peng’s plan, the premise of promoting the local 
self-government was to overthrow the official administration335. Such the radical local 
self-government, which was characterized by the policy of no official administration, 
was the people’s democracy of Zhenping. 
The principle of people’s livelihood included the equalization of land ownership 
and “checking capital”. On the contrary, Peng argued that neither of them was suitable 
for Zhenping. Since there were only a small number of big landlords in the county, it 
was unnecessary to equalize the land ownership. Also, because Zhenping was a rural 
county where the industry and commerce were far backward, there was no need to 
check the capital. To the peasants, what they cared was how to improve the agriculture. 
                                                 
333 Ibid. 
334 Ibid, p.90. 
335 Ibid, pp. 90-1. 
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However, in that time, the superior governments could not do such the work. 
Therefore, Zhenping had to develop rural economy through its own efforts. Therefore, 
in Zhenping, the principle of the people’s livelihood of was the self-prosperity. 
In Peng’s eyes, the three Principles of Sun Zhongshan was the magic weapon of 
saving China, and his reshaped sanminzhuyi was the unique way of freeing Zhenping 
from the chaos and poverty. He argued that:  
If you want to save China, please come to sanminzhuyi of Sun Zhongshan! 
If you want to save Zhenping, what else you can choose except my reshaped 
sanminzhuyi?336  
Peng’s arguments were valid. Shen Songqiao pointed out that Peng, by the idea 
of the reshaped sanminzhuyi, did an excellent work on justifying the local 
self-government of Wanxi337. 
After Peng’s death, Bie Tingfang became the leader of the local self-government 
of Wanxi. He followed Peng’s idea and invited some local scholars to compile a 
pamphlet— The Local Self-government. In his time, the political situation of Henan 
changed greatly. Jiang Jieshi had defeated his main rivals and tried his best to tighten 
the control over the local society. The provincial government of Henan, which was 
ruled by Liu Zhi, a reliable agent of Jiang, was doing its utmost to extend the party’s 
power down into the grass-root society. Under such circumstances, Bie felt urgent to 
present more conspicuously the legitimacy of the self-government of Wanxi. 
When we open The Local Self-government, we will first read:  
                                                 
336 Ibid, p. 92. 
337  Shen Songqiao 沈松侨 , “Difang jingying yu guojia quanli: Minuuo shiqi de Wanxi zizhi, 
1930-1943 地方自治与国家权力：民国时期的宛西自治  (Local Elite and State Power: The 
Self-government of Wanxi in the Republican Period, 1930-1943)”, in Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi 
yanjiusuo jikan 中央研究院近代史研究所集刊 (Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History of 
Academia Sinica) (Taipei: 1992), no. 21, p. 407. 
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Promoting the local self-government is the teaching of the late Prime 
Minister Sun Zhongshan, and it cannot be questioned.338  
Bie put Sun’s The Bulletin of State-building of the National Government 
(Jianguodagang) on the top of the book and wanted to show that the local 
self-government of Wanxi was an implementation of Sun’s ideal. Closely after the 
Bulletin, there was the law of promoting the local self-government that promulgated 
by the central government in 1929. What Bie did was to tell the superior government 
that the local self-government of Wanxi was legal in both the ideology and the law of 
Guomindang339.As Peng did, Bie regarded the banditry and poverty as the most 
serious problems of Wanxi340. He pointed out that the two problems interacted:  
The banditry puts the countryside into political chaos, and damages the 
local economy. Thus, the peasants turn out poorer and poorer. It is called 
‘the instability causes poverty’. Because of poverty, some peasants have to 
join the bandits, which is called ‘the poverty generates instability.341  
Therefore, the purpose of promoting the local self-government was, firstly, to 
suppress the banditry and restore the social order; secondly, to eliminate poverty. To 
the local self-government, public security would be the base and economy would be 
the lifeblood342. In Wanxi, the work of promoting the local self-government had three 
stages. The first stage was the “self-defense”. The locale people would organize 
mintuan to restore and maintain the social order. And the new self-government would 
replace the official government to administer the local society. The second stage was 
the “self-assistance”. The self-government would conduct a thorough survey on land 
                                                 
338 Bie Tingfang 别廷芳, Difang zizhi 地方自治 (The Local Self-government) (Neixiang: 1940), p. 
1. 
339 Ibid, p. 6. 
340 Ibid, p. 19. 
341 Ibid. 
342 Ibid, p. 47. 
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and tax, and do all preparing works for the third stage. The last one was the 
“self-prosperity”. The self-government would work out a systematic plan of 
developing the local society and tried its best to implement it343. Bie believed that if 
Wanxi could achieve these works, it would be a model that other counties could 
follow344. 
 
4) Reshaping nationalism 
One scholar argues that the nation-state and nationalism is a modular, which can 
be reformulated or reshaped to adopt the local conditions345. The regionalism of Peng 
Yuting was a kind of reshaped nationalism. The reshaping of nationalism is a method 
of extracting the cultural resource of social power, and its purpose is to justify the 
activity one political system did or is doing. Every political system is competitive. In 
the competition, besides the military, political, and economic resource, the culture 
resource—the legitimacy—is the natural target of the political system. 
Any revolution, no matter what level it happens at, must justify its action. The 
Revolution of 1911 was a national revolution, which was justified by sanminzhuyi. 
Sanminzhuyi was a kind of the modern Chinese nationalism, and became orthodoxy in 
the Republican period. It was one of discourses of Chinese modernity, in which the 
national elite expressed their idea of how to achieve the national modernization. It 
was the mainstream ideology in the Republican China and exerted a great influence 
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345 Elizabeth J. Remick, Building Local States: China During the Republican and Post-Mao Eras 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 18. 
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on Chinese society. When sanminzhuyi was approved of by the majority of Chinese, it 
marked that the idea of modernization became the nucleus of the Chinese nationalism. 
In other words, how to achieve modernization was the hot topic. The plan of Sun 
Zhongshan was to, by the way of revolution, create a powerful centralized nation-state. 
As Sun expected, in the new Republic, there would be a powerful central government 
that led by the revolutionary party, and the government would not be autocratic or 
totalitarian. The new central government would be capable of performing the macro 
regulation, while at the same time it would give the locality a full autonomy. In the 
benign interaction of the center and the locality, the state would walk into prosperity 
and democracy. Nevertheless, in reality, the political discourse of Song Zhongshan 
was guided to different trajectories. 
In the Republican period, the central government headed by Jiang Jieshi 
transmuted sanminzhuyi into a special type of authoritarianism, or the Confucian 
Fascism, in which the absolute power was superior to anything else. In the 1930s, the 
ruling party’s prime work was to monopolize the power, but how to release the energy 
of the locality to develop the countryside turned out less important. To Jiang, the 
power of the locality must be given and supervised by the central authorities and any 
people or activity that violated the rule would be denounced separatist or illegal. It 
was a distortion of sanminzhuyi. By the state apparatus, the distortion generated the 
powerful ideological force, which was so pressing that choked the locality’s appeal 
for autonomy. Under such circumstances, the spontaneous local self-government 
promoted by the local elite would not only face the political oppression from the 
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central government, but also have to do its best to justify itself. 
Therefore, the local elites were forced to reformulate the orthodox nationalism, 
or sanminzhuyi. They declared that their action was based on the political idea of Sun 
Zhongshan, especially his idea of the local self-government. The regionalism of Peng 
Yuting was one kind of the representation. He called the local self-government of 
Wanxi a local practice of Sun’s national revolution, and his idea of self-defense, 
self-government, and self-prosperity tallied with Sun’s principle of nationalism, 
democracy, and the people’s livelihood. Moreover, he connected the local 
self-government of Wanxi with the rural construction movement, and called it the best 
way of saving the countryside. As a result, Peng’s effort won the sympathy and 
support from the local people and the rural construction activists. Thus, to some extent, 
we should not call the practice of Wanxi a “pirating”, but a reasonable and practical 
remolding of sanminzhuyi. 
In the two most sensitive fields—the military and political—Peng’s defense was 
pallid. Wanxi was a special case. Facing the growing banditry and the incapable local 
government, organizing mintuan and establishing a semi-independent 
self-government was an appropriate response. However, such way should be transient. 
To any modern state, the existence of a powerful local armed force will definitely 
undermine the authority of the state. Promoting the local self-government by the way 
of maintaining a local armed force and pushing out the state power was not Sun’s idea. 
Sun supported resolutely the local self-government, and took it as the sine qua non of 
the political modernization of China. However, he would never allow the local 
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self-government to be used as an excuse of grabbing political power from the state. 
Also, no matter how the local militarization looked reasonable and necessary in a 
chaotic time, it would bring about the excessive expansion of the local power and 
destroy the power balance of the center and the locality. Finally, the state would be put 
into danger. From this point of view, Peng’s idea was “dangerous”. Liu Zhi, the 
chairman of the provincial government of Henan, had sharply denounced the local 
self-government of Wanxi as an “evil force manipulated by the vicious local gentry 
and must be uprooted”346. In other words, although the reshaped nationalism sounded 
moving and powerful, it could not give full legitimacy to the relative political activity. 




















                                                 
346 Liu Zhi 刘峙, Wo de huiyi 我的回忆 (Memoir) (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe 文海出版社, 1982), 
pp. 119-20. 
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Chapter 4 – Local State Building:  
The Rural Reconstruction Work in Wanxi 
 
Peng Yuting declared repeatedly that the goal of the local self-government of 
Wanxi was to let the local people handle the local affairs, and asserted that the work 
would be helpful for the state building. In this thesis, state building refers mainly to 
the work of developing the society. Thus, this thesis distinguishes two kinds of state 
building. The first kind is the central state building, which means that the work should 
be done by the state, such as the macro control of politics and economy, the long-term 
strategy of economic development, the national defense, the foreign affairs, and so 
forth. The second kind is the local state building, which has twofold meanings. On one 
hand, it refers that the local government should try its utmost to implement the 
political, economic, cultural, and educational policies and program worked out by the 
central government. On the other hand, the local government should be given the 
autonomy to propose the policies and program that meet the local interest. Ideally, 
these policies and program should not be interfered by the superior government. 
In fact, to the state, there are so many policies and program that must be 
implemented by the locality. For example in the economic and educational program, 
although a national plan is necessary, it is impossible for the central government to 
carry out all concrete works. On one hand, the central authorities have neither enough 
financial resource nor the personnel to perform the work. On the other hand, the 
locality diversifies greatly in politics, economy, and culture in a big country like 
China. The central government cannot be omniscient and omnipotent. Only the 
national policies and program are combined with the local reality, or only they are 
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regionalized, they can be implemented in the local society. 
In the Republican period, especially in the Nanjing decade, the policy-maker of 
the national government usually did not pay enough attention to the local reality and 
interest. The capability of the central government was very limited, and could only 
control effectively a small number of provinces. To the county and sub-county society, 
the ruling body had neither the interest nor the idea to develop well them. In most 
cases, the rural policy and program of Nanjing became empty rhetoric. Under such 
circumstances, the work of developing the rural area could only be done by the 
locality itself. 
The local elite in the countryside knew well the rural reality and what the most 
feasible plan or program of development was. And, when they did the rural 
reconstruction work, they would give more considerations to the local interest and the 
demands of the local people. If these local elites were not to build a separatist regime, 
their work of stabilizing the social order, improving the local economy, and 
developing the rural education etc. would be very helpful for the state. What they did 
was to carry out the social careers that the state could not do itself. Although these 
works were local, from the long run, they would meet the national interest. Thus, this 
thesis calls these elites’ work local state building. In this thesis, the local state building 
refers to the circumstance that the state cannot play well the function of developing 
the rural society, the locality under the leadership of the virtuous local elite, replace 
the state as the vital role in the social development of the countryside. 
In China, county is an actually important but long neglected political unit. In the 
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Republican period, there were more than 1,900 counties. These counties faced 
vis-à-vis the rural population and undertook the extremely important task of 
implementing the central government’s policy in the grass-root society. To most 
peasants, their concept of the state was embodied in county, and the image of the 
provincial and central government was very vague. To China, the county was the 
platform in which the state and the (rural) society interacted. Developing the 
countryside was indispensable for the state building and such the work depended on 
the performance of the county administration. Unfortunately, in the Nanjing decade, 
the state building was conducted with the emphasis on the state power extension, and 
the way of bureaucratizing the county and sub-county administration could not stop 
the worsening situation of the countryside. The rural reconstruction was a natural 
response to the rural crisis. It emphasized that the unofficial force, or the local force, 
should play more important role in developing the rural society. Moreover, the local 
elite like Peng Yuting and Bie Tingfang, combined the rural reconstruction with the 
county self-government, and did their best to gain the full political autonomy. The 
autonomy became the prerequisite of their rural reconstruction experiment.  
 
1) Tightening the social control 
To promote the rural reconstruction work, there must be good social order in 
Wanxi. Depending on the powerful mintuan, the counties of Wanxi restored the 
social order in a short time. To maintain the order, besides mintuan as the prime tool 
of maintaining the public security, these counties tried many methods. In Neixiang 
 173
and Xichuan, the work was carried out with an emphasis on tightening the social 
control. In a meeting, Chen Shunde told Bie Tingfang:  
We should be like Zeng Guofan, who administered the chaotic society with 
severe punishments. I call his way ‘showing the heart of Bodhisattva by 
the way of thunderbolt ’.347  
These words became the gold rule of social administration in the two counties. 
Both Bie and Chen believed firmly that, in the rural area, the long stability could 
only come from the tight social control. Methods they employed were the 
well-organized bao-jia system, the rigorous “five permits” system, and the 
draconian laws. 
Before Bie’s reform, the bao-jia system in Neixiang was in a mess. The system 
lost its function of administering the grass-root society. The heads of bao and jia 
disturbed greatly the peasants’ life and degenerated into a nuisance in the countryside. 
When Bie controlled firmly the county, he began reorganizing the lax old bao-jia 
system348. He trained a large number of officials and appointed them the new head of 
bao and jia. Under the guide of the headquarters of mintuan, Neixiang conducted a 
census. Based on the territory and population in every village, every ten households 
organized one jia, every bao consisted of ten jia, and, every ten bao formed into one 
joint-bao. After the reorganization, the total population of Neixiang was divided into 
nine wards, seventy-two joint-bao, three hundreds and twenty bao, and more than 
three thousands jia. The detailed form of every bao and jia was printed out and the 
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headquarters asked every household to paste it on the door for check at any time. 
When the bao-jia system was reorganized, the headquarters promoted the 
system of lianzuo349. According to the regulation of the system, all people in the 
same bao or jia would be punished, if one resident of the bao or jia committed an 
offence. Besides its function of maintaining the public security, Bie developed the 
bao-jia system into a surveillance tool. He demanded that in every household, if 
there was any member that went out to visit the relative or friend, or there was any 
visiting relative or friend, the owner of the household must report it to the head of 
jia. Otherwise, the household would be fined or punished. 
In Xichuan, Chen criticized that the old bao-jia system did not work at all. 
Because of the lack of administration and supervision, most the forms reported by 
the jia and bao to the superiors were fabricated and could not stand any check. 
Usually, the head of jia was just a titular official, and he did not know much about 
the residents in his jia. The head of bao seldom supervised the work of jia head. And 
to make things worse, the head of joint-bao never checked what the head of bao did. 
As a result, the head of ward was blind to what really happened in villages. Under 
such circumstances, it was impossible for the county government to find outlaws in 
the countryside. Therefore, Chen said that the bao-jia system of Xichuan must be 
reorganized350. 
                                                 
349 Lianzuo was a special administrative system in the countryside of China. Under the system, in a 
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350 See: Wang Shifan 王士范, Xichuan xian difang zizhi sannian jihua gaiyao 淅川县地方自治三年
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The self-government of Xichuan mobilized all teachers of the primary and 
middle school, senior students, and officials of the county government to participate 
in the training session of population statistics. After that, they were sent to villages 
and towns to conduct the census. In the process, the surveyor should write down in 
details: how many members in every household; what their professions were; the 
values of family properties; and whether there was ex-serviceman. Anyone who had 
a bad reputation in the countryside would be put on the list and must be investigated 
more thoroughly. On the base of the census, Chen promoted the same bao-jia and 
lianzuo system in Xichuan as Bie did in Neixiang.  
Both Bie and Chen thought that one of the reasons of the decline of old bao-jia 
system was that the status of the head of bao and jia was too low to be respected by 
local residents. In the past, many heads of bao and jia were hooligans employed by 
the powerful and wealthy families in the countryside. The villagers despised very 
much these guys and called them the black sheep.  In the new system, the head of 
bao and jia were chosen from the educated people and most of them had a good 
reputation in their village. And they were regarded as the important “cadres” of the 
local self-government351. Chen and Bie demanded that if a senior official of the ward 
or the county government needed to meet the head of bao or jia, he must send a 
formal invitation or dispatched his assistant to inform the head; the superior officials 
were forbidden scolding or beating these grass-root officials. Anyone who violated 
the regulation would be punished by the self-government.  
                                                 
351 Bie Tingfang 别廷芳, Wanxi sanzi banfa tiyao 宛西三自办法提要 (The Précis of Self-defence, 
Self-government, and Self-prosperity of the Local Self-government of Wanxi) (Neixiang: 1930), p. 19. 
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Besides the bao-jia and lianzuo system, both Neixiang and Xichuan promoted 
the “five permits” system. It was an invention by Bie Tingfang. He said that Wanxi 
was a region that three provinces—Henan, Shaanxi, and Hubei—met. Thus, there 
were a huge number of floating people in the counties of Wanxi. The background of 
these people was very complex, in which there were bandits, disbanded soldiers of 
the “warlord” troops, and criminals in exile. To nip the vicious crime in the bud, Bie 
issued the permit of going out, beggar, peddler, moving out/in, and the border pass352. 
The headquarters of the mintuan of Neixiang demanded that all permanent residents 
and the floating population must live with these permits. Chen found that it was an 
efficient way of controlling the rural society and adopted it in Xichuan. 
The “permit of going out”. Any permanent resident of Neixiang, if he needed 
to go outside his ward or the county, he must fill an application form, in which he 
reported the head of jia the reason of going out, the destination, the date of departure 
and return. The head of jia would hand in the form to the head of bao. When the 
head of bao approved of the application, he would seal the form and issue a permit 
to the applicant. Only with the permit, the resident could leave his home. Any people, 
who had no the permit and went out, would be detained by mintuan. Any inn, hotel, 
or household that took people without the permit in would be fined. If the resident 
could not return on time, he must asked the owner of the hotel or household he 
sojourned to apply for an extension from the head of bao in which he was staying. 
When the resident returned, his permit would be promptly nullified. 
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The “border pass”. If any person outside Neixiang needed to come and stay in 
the county, he must apply for the pass. In the peaceful time, when he reached the 
destination, he must ask the owner of the household or the hotel he stayed to apply for 
the pass. The owner would report the guest’s name, age, profession, hometown, and 
why he came here, to the head of jia and bao. After careful examination, the head of 
joint-bao would issue a pass to the person. In the emergent time, as soon as the 
sojourner entered Neixiang, he must apply for the pass in the checkpoint. Anyone who 
had no sealed pass would be detained by mintuan. 
The “permit of beggar”. Some outlaws pretended to be beggar and watched for 
their chance in the countryside. Therefore, the headquarters of mintuan issued the 
permit to administer beggars in Neixiang. If a resident was forced to beg because of 
poverty, he could apply for a permit. Firstly, he must report his living condition to the 
head of jia and bao, and in the meantime he must ask a person to be his guarantor. The 
head of jia and bao would report it to the head of joint-bao. If the head of joint-bao 
approved of the application, the applicant would get the permit, which had one-month 
term of validity. When the certificate expired, if he did need to beg for a longer time, 
he must apply for a new permit. Beggar from other place could apply for the permit. 
Without it, they would be driven out of Neixiang. 
The “permit of peddler”. In that time, some bandits disguised themselves as 
peddlers and did illegal things in Neixiang. Thus, the headquarters stipulated that any 
resident, who wanted to run a small business, must apply for the permit. Before 
application, he must find a person as his guarantor and report his living condition to 
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the head of bao. Only when he got the permit from the head of joint-bao, he could star 
his business. The term of validity of the permit was one month. When it expired, he 
could reapply for it. Peddlers from other place must apply for the permit. Without it, 
they would not be allowed to enter Neixiang. 
The “permit of moving out/in.” If a resident want to move out and live in another 
village of Neixiang, he must report it to the head of jia and bao that he would move in. 
They would come to the applicant’s home and check how many members and family 
properties the household had, and why they wanted to move out. The head of jia and 
bao would write a detailed report to the head of joint-bao and the ward head. When 
the head of ward approved of the application, the applicant would get the permit. If the 
applicant were from a place outside Neixiang, there would be two-month probation. 
In this period, the head of jia and bao would come to his home at any time and check 
whether the members of the household were moral, decent, and law-abiding. When he 
passed the probation, he would be issued the permit. Without the permit, nobody 
would be allowed to move out or move in Neixiang. 
Bie Tingfang was extremely strict in promoting the five permits. One day, he 
went out to inspect the militias. Because he was in a hurry and forgot bringing his own 
permit of going out, when he passed a checkpoint, he was stopped by a soldier and 
was asked to present the permit. He could not do it and was sent to the office of the 
joint-bao head. The head of joint-bao recognized him and scolded the soldier. 
However, Bie awarded the soldier with ten silver dollars and told him that “you are 
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right to do that. Before the law, nobody can be privileged.”353 He then severely 
reprimanded the head of joint-bao. 
Although there were rigorous bao-jia, lianzuo and “five permits” system, Bie 
Tingfang still felt that it was not safe enough in Wanxi. To some extent, he believed 
that only the deterrent force of bloodshed could bring about the stability. In Wanxi, 
there were many stories that Bie executed the people who committed minor offence. 
Li Zongren mentioned in his Memoir that one of Bie’s sons-in-law was executed 
because he took some watermelons from the field without paying the owner354. 
Another story was horrible. One official visited Neixiang and wanted to know 
whether “no one picks up what left by the wayside” was true in this county. He 
intentionally left thirty silver dollars on the road he was passing. Then, he could not 
find them. When it was reported to Bie Tingfang, he asked mintuan to thoroughly 
investigate the matter. Consequently, thirty people were arrested and executed355. 
The above methods were helpful for stabilizing the social order in Wanxi. Many 
visitors were impressed by the stability and order of these counties. However, the 
negative influence of the rigorous social control was obvious. The lianzuo system 
caused a great psychological pressure on peasants. There was a folk song in Neixiang, 
it said:  
Laboring hard in the day and suffering greatly in the night! I even cannot 
have a good sleep in my life! I don’t fear there is no enough food or cloth, 
but I do fear I am implicated involuntarily in an unexpected crime!  
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354 Li Zongren, Li Zongren huiyilu 李宗仁回忆录 (Memoir) (Nanning: CPPCC of Guangxi广西自治
区政协, 1980), vol.2, p. 802. 
355  Chen Zhaoyun 陈照运  (ed.), Bie Tingfang difang zizhi jishi 别廷芳地方自治纪实  (An 
On-the-spot Report of the Local Self-government Led by Bie Tingfang), p. 83-4. 
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No matter how law-abiding he himself was, he would be definitely be punished, 
if anyone of his neighbors committed a crime. The “five permits” system greatly 
impeded the mobility of rural residents and intensified the closeness of this region. 
And the indiscriminate execution preferred by Bie was absolutely not a good way of 
administering the society. 
In fact, the leaders of the local self-government of Wanxi understood that the 
true way of achieving a long period of peace and order was to free the peasants from 
poverty. Instability came from poverty but not prosperity. Therefore, the leaders of 
Wanxi tried their best to reduce the land tax, improve the agriculture, and develop the 
local industry. And, at the same time, they work hard on developing the rural 
education. On the base of economic and educational development, the 
self-governments of Wanxi abolished the bad customs and habits in the countryside 
and let Wanxi take a new look. 
 
2) Land survey and tax reduction 
Bie said that, if the self-government did not exactly know the situation of land 
ownership in the countryside, it would be “harmful for both the government and the 
peasant.”356 For example, the total number of the land tax of Deng County should be 
thirty thousands taels of silver. However, the actual number the government collected 
was only ten thousands. This was because the county government did not know the 
exact number of farmlands people, especially those wealthy families, owned. Thus, a 
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great quantity of the land tax was dodged. Meanwhile, the tax was unfairly 
apportioned. To the ordinary farmers, although they had just a small piece of land and 
lived a destitute life, they were forced to pay the land tax as many times as they should 
pay. In the countryside, it was a regular practice: the big landowners paid much less 
tax than the poor peasants did. The voice of discontent could be heard everywhere. 
The collection of the land tax was bad. For example in Neixiang, in the past, 
there were sixteen wards. If the number of land tax was sixteen thousands silver 
dollars, it would be shared equally among the sixteen wards. That was to say, each of 
them should collect one thousand dollars. To make profits, when the collection began, 
the head of ward increase the number. As the ward head did, the heads of bao and jia 
increased the number higher. All of the excessive money would be paid by the 
ordinary peasants. In the process of collection, the heads of ward, bao, even jia, and 
the wealthy families tried their best to evade the tax. Without any doubt, these 
“escaped” taxes would be collected from the peasants. After the collection, those 
officials reported to the county government because the countryside was too poor to 
pay enough tax, and they begged the government would reduce or exempt the tax. The 
money reduced or exempted would be pocketed by them. Chen Shunde denounced 
these activities and argued that “the families with average income were reduced to 
poverty, and the destitute peasants were forced to be bandit”357. Therefore, the 
authorities of the self-government of Zhenping, Neixiang, and Xichuan conducted the 
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land survey and adjusted the land tax. 
The work of Neixiang was the earliest one358. From 1928, the self-government 
chose two hundreds people to take the course of land survey and tax calculation. Then, 
they were sent to every ward, town, and village to carry out the survey. In the county, 
all the farmlands, no matter who owned, must be reregistered, reconnoitered, and 
reevaluated. After the survey, all the old taxes were promptly abolished. The new tax 
was strictly based on the number of land one household owned. Anyone, who evaded 
tax, would be severely punished. 
In Neixiang, there was a flourishing land market. Nevertheless, in the past, the 
purchaser, who colluded with the go-betweens, cheated both the county government 
and the sellers (usually they were the poor peasants). When they bought the land or 
house from one poor family, they forced the price down by threats. Then, when they 
went to the county government to pay the tax, they deliberately played down the true 
value of the land or house so greatly that they could pay only a small amount of 
money. There were many disputes came out of these unfair deals, which threatened 
the stability of Neixiang. Bie Tingfang tried to change it359. In 1929, Bie set up the 
bureau of land business, which was in charge of all farmland and house business in 
Neixiang. The bureau sent inspector to every ward and the duty of these inspectors 
was to supervise the land and house deal and collect the tax. All the transactions 
must be registered by the ward office. The tax collected was used as the fund of 
education and military training. 
                                                 
358 Bie Tingfang 别廷芳, Difang zizhi 地方自治 (The Local Self-government), pp. 35-41. 
359 Ibid, p. 41-2. 
 183
In Zhenping, before the land survey, there was a census. After the census, the 
self-government knew that there were 84,634 households and the total population 
was 384,740360. Then, the land survey started361. Because land was the most 
sensitive matter in the countryside, Peng Yuting worked out the outline of the job. In 
the first stage, the self-government of Zhenping sent the experienced surveyors to 
the villages and towns, where they put the heads of village and town together and 
explain what the significance of the work was. Then, the surveyor taught these heads 
how to fill in the survey form. After the short training session, the village and town 
heads would repeat these explanations to the residents. 
Every household reported the state of land ownership to the surveyor. Then, 
the land survey team would go to the land and check whether the household’s report 
was true or false. In the process, the land of the local leader, the section head of the 
self-government, the ward head, the village and town head, and the wealthy family 
were to be checked first. After the examination, the survey team pasted the result 
form on the door of every household. 
After the survey, the reconnoitering work commenced. People who conducted 
the work were chosen from the moral people in the countryside and must be approved 
by the self-government. In 1932, Peng Yuting organized a training session for these 
surveyors, in which Peng taught them how to reconnoiter the farmland. The key of the 
work was to clarify who the true owner was and the quality of each piece of land. 
Based on the fertility of soil, the land was divided into five classes—“gold”, “silver”, 
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361 Ibid, pp. 101-9. 
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“copper”, “iron”, and “tin”. Soon after the reconnoitering work, the self-government 
adjusted the land tax. More lands a person had higher tax he must pay. And the big 
landowners were forbidden evading the tax they should pay. To the ordinary peasants, 
the self-government promoted the “progressively-decreasing taxation”. In other 
words, less lands one household owned lower tax it paid. If one peasant had less than 
five mu lands, he would be exempted from the tax. 
In Xichuan, the head of jia was first required to report in details how many lands 
he had and the quality of the land to the self-government. Next, every household 
followed the head’s way to report their land. The self-government would send 
surveyor to check these reports on the spot. Every month, the head of bao should 
report any changes of land ownership to the self-government362. The process of 
collecting land tax was reformed. The government pasted a notice on the wall of 
village, in which the tax each household should pay was to be clearly written. As a 
result, the wealthy families and other men of power in the countryside could not evade 
the tax, and the head of bao or joint-bao found no way to presumptuously increase the 
amount of land tax. 
After these efforts, in the counties of Wanxi, the authorities of the local 
self-government clearly knew what the true situation of land ownership. And the tax 
became much fairer than before. To some extent, the burden of the peasants was 
reduced. However, in Peng’s eyes, reducing the tax was not a positive way of freeing 
the rural residents from poverty. The best method of eliminating poverty was to 
                                                 
362 Wang Shifan 王士范, Xichuan xian difang zizhi sannian jihua gaiyao 淅川县地方自治三年计划
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increase the peasant’s income, which required the self-governments of Wanxi do their 
best to improve agriculture and develop the local industry. 
 
3) Developing the local economy 
A good natural environment will be good for improving agriculture. Although 
Wanxi was a hilly region, because of the long-time lumbering, there were many 
barren hills. In the rainy season, after a heavy downpour, the mountain torrents would 
rush down and joined the river, which could cause a huge flood. Thus, in the counties 
of Wanxi, afforestation and building river control project became an important work. 
Afforestation and building river control project 
In Zhenping, Peng Yuting thought the afforestation could not only improve the 
natural environment but also increase the peasant’s income. He invited some former 
students of the Academy of Village Self-government of Henan, who studied 
afforestation, to conduct a forest survey in the county. Then, they worked out an 
afforestation program: in the northern part, the residents should plant mulberry, and its 
leaves could be used to raise silk worm; in other places, like riverside, roadside, and 
deserted field in the villages, peasants could plant any kind of tree. In 1931, Peng set 
up a tree farm, where he nursed 12 mu saplings and spread two hundreds kilograms 
oak seeds. Soon after, he nursed another forty mu saplings and planted more than eight 
thousands trees. The self-government chose some people as the afforestation attaché, 
whose duty was to protect the trees. By 1932, the total number of trees that Zhenping 
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planted was more than four millions363. In Xichuan, Chen Shunde led the movement 
of afforestation. From 1932 to 1934, there were 4,520,000 trees planted in the 
county364.  
In Neixiang, Bie Tingfang’s story of afforestation and love for tree was very 
famous, and is even widely known today. In the county, the mountain vegetation had 
been wrecked severely. In the summer, when the mountain torrents joined the river 
Tuan, there would be a horrible disaster. In 1929, there was a big flood, in which 
eighty thousands mu farmlands were destroyed, and more than ten thousands people 
lost their life. Because there were too many corpses to be buried, the residents had to 
dig a huge pit and throw the bodies in. The pit was called “mass grave”. After that, Bie 
resolved to improve the natural environment of Neixiang365. 
In 1929, he went to Chimei County and visited the family of Chen Fengwu and 
Chen Fengtong, who had studied agriculture in Japan, and invited them to join the 
self-government. Bie appointed Chen Fengwu the head of reconstruction section. 
After one-year survey, Chen worked out a systematic plan of how to improve the 
natural environment in Neixiang. With Chen’s help, Bie organized the society of 
afforestation. According to the manual of the society: 
 In the steep hill slope, farming is forbidden because it will cause soil erosion; in 
the riverside, the residents should plant poplar and willow; in the empty land of 
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household, the owner can plant white mulberry, elm, Chinese catalpa, and 
Chinese toon; in the small hills, the peasant can plant tung oil tree, lacquer tree, 
toothed oak, and medical herbs; in the sandy lands, the residents can plant some 
fruit trees, such as peach, apple, and plum; in the remote mountain, planting pine 
and cypress will be better.  
To help the people to plant tree, Bie set up two nurseries and provided a huge 
amount of free saplings. 
Bie put together all the senior officials of the county government, the nine ward 
heads, and the seventy-two joint-bao heads, and asked them to take the course of 
planting tree, water control, and cultivating farmland. Chen Fengwu was the lecturer, 
and Bie Tingfang was the supervisor. After class, these trainees must labor themselves 
in the field366. When they finished these courses, they returned to the villages and 
trained the heads of bao and jia by the same way. 
Under Bie’s lead, from 1930, the self-government of Neixiang required every 
household plant trees in winter and spring. By 1933, the county spread 698,625 
kilograms oak seeds, and planted 9,703,000 poplars and willows, 3,530,000 tung oil 
trees and lacquer trees. All of these trees were owned by the self-government, and 
nobody was allowed to lumber them without the government’s permit. In every ward 
and joint-bao, there were persons that were specially assigned to protect the trees.  
People in Neixiang said that Bie Tingfang loved trees as he loved his life. He 
required all trees must be firmly planted. If the sapling could be pulled out easily, not 
only the planter, but also the head of bao and jia, would be caned. Any person, who 
wrecked one tree, would be caned first, then plant another one hundred trees as the 
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compensation. If one sheep or cattle bit the tree, the owner must kill it promptly. In the 
winter of 1936, Bie led thirty people to inspect the work of planting tree. In the 
joint-bao of Dinghe, when Bie saw one tree being pulled out by hand, he pushed down 
the joint-bao head, and caned him by the walking stick. In 1938, when Tang Enbo, a 
lieutenant general of Guomindang, passed Neixiang, one of his horses bit one willow, 
Bie shot the horse death. 
While the work of afforestation was in progress, the self-government of 
Neixiang and Xichuan began building water control projects. In Xichuan, Chen 
Shunde decided to dig an irrigation channel and build a dam. The irrigation channel 
was four-kilometer long, ninety-meter wide, and three-meter deep. The new dam was 
one and half kilometer long, six-meter wide, and five-meter high. Besides them, the 
self-government dug many ditches to irrigate the farmlands. According to a statistics, 
in the 1930s, the self-government dug more than forty-kilometer canals and ditches, 
which could irrigate four hundreds thousands farmlands367. 
Because it was a hilly county, Xichuan had only a small number of farmland. 
Thus, the self-government tried its best to create more farmlands for the peasant368. 
The self-government chose some suitable hill slopes and transformed them into 
terraced fields. In the slack season of winter and spring, the government organized 
peasants to mix sand into the loess slope of hill, and after some time the later would 
turn into the cultivatable farmland. Moreover, the government instructed the peasants 
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to choose one deserted delta that was close to their village, and build a dam to circle it. 
Then, they dug a ditch. In summer, when the flood was coming, it would rush into the 
circle dam through the ditch. When the flood subsided, it left a layer of mud and the 
field became a fertile farmland. The self-government distributed these new farmlands 
to landless peasants and reduced or exempted their tax. 
In Wanxi, Neixiang’s work of building water control project was the best. Bie 
Tingfang called the work of “taming river”369. The way of taming river was to build a 
giant stone dam, which could force the river to change its course. Outside the dam, 
there were three or four willow shelterbelts. Bie often went himself to the construction 
site and inspect the progress. He pushed his walking stick into the dam foundation, 
and then pulled it out. If there were more mud than lime on the stick, it showed there 
was inferior stuff in the construction materials. The supervisor of the project would be 
fined fifty silver dollars, and caned one hundred stokes. Bie even labored himself in 
the construction site. By 1939, the self-government of Neixiang built 
sixteen-kilometer stone weir, ninety-seven kilometers stone dam, one hundred and 
forty-nine kilometers irrigation channel, and created more than thirty thousands mu 
flood farmlands and fifty thousands mu terraced fields for the peasants. 
The Stone Dragon Dam was the symbol of Bie’s achievement in taming river 
and creating quality farmland. In 1929, Bie began the work and invited Chen 
Fengwu as the chief architect. By 1932, the project was completed. The Dam was 
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three-hundreds-meter long, three and half meters high, and the bottom was five 
meters wide, the top two meters wide. Because it looked like a dragon zigzagging 
forward, the local people called it the “stone dragon”. The main channel was 
twenty-five kilometers long, which could irrigate more than seven thousands mu 
farmlands. When the channel passed the Lotus Temple Ridge, a waterfall came into 
being. Where, Bie built a hydropower plant. In the irrigated area, there were forty 
pumping stations, which could supply power to arsenals, wineries, and paper mills. 
The Dam was very magnificent and had multiple functions, which was regarded as 
the landmark of the self-government of Wanxi. In the opening ceremony, the 
Commissioner of Nanyang named it the “Dam of the Revered Mr. Bie” and 
inscribed these words on the Dam. 
Improving agriculture370 
In Zhenping, Peng Yuting encouraged the farmers to plant more high-value 
crops. The soil of Zhenping was suitable for cotton. Thus, the self-government set 
up the society of promoting cotton to teach the peasants how to plant the high-yield 
American cotton. The self-government required all primary schools must offer a free 
cotton-planting course, in which the residents could learn the refined way of 
planting, applying fertilizer, irrigating, and picking. And, the self-government 
encouraged the peasants to raise more pigs and chickens to increase their income. 
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The government imported some high-quality breeding stocks and distributed them to 
the farmers. In 1933, the self-government set up the committee of improving 
agriculture. Its duty was to choose and spread good-quality corps, fertilizers, and 
livestock. And, the committee spent much time in studies of how to improve the 
agricultural technology and how to stop crop diseases and insect pests. The 
committee had branch in every village and town. 
In 1935, Chen Shunde set up the crop seed station in every ward of Xichuan, 
where the peasants could get the high-yield seed of wheat, corn, rice and cotton. In 
each joint-bao, the self-government offered some basic courses to the residents, in 
which they could learn how to select seed, plant crops, make fertilizer, raise domestic 
animals, and prevent insect pests of plant. In 1936, Bie Tingfang founded a model 
farm in Neixiang. The residents could take the free basic course of modern 
agricultural technology in the farm. To increase the production of grain crops, the 
self-government introduced two high-yield seeds of rice from Zhejiang and taught the 
peasants how to plant them. 
Developing local industry 
Peng mentioned that Zhenping was a remote and backward county, which was 
far away from the economic center and was not abundant in natural resources. It was 
impossible for the county to set up the advanced manufacturer. Zhenping had a long 
tradition of silk-making. The Shifosi town, one of the most prosperous towns in 
Zhenping, was a famous collecting and distributing center of silk in the north China. 
Silk-making had been flourishing in Zhenping. The average annual income of silk 
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maker was hundreds thousands dollars, and the income of some big silk merchants 
was even more than one million371. However, to make a higher profit, some 
manufacturers and distributors passed off the defective silk as the high-quality one. 
Their cheating behavior greatly damaged the reputation of Zhenping silk and many 
shops in Shanghai and Wuhan were forced to close. Thus, the self-government of 
Zhenping tried to rehabilitate the declining traditional silk industry. 
In 1932, Pang Zao, a businessman from Shanghai, who was running a silk 
factory in Zhenping, submitted a proposal of improving the silk industry of 
Zhenping. Peng Yuting showed a great interest in the proposal and convened a 
special conference to discuss it. After the meeting, the self-government set up the 
committee of improving silk industry of Zhenping. Peng was elected as the head of 
the committee and Pang Zao was employed as the chief consultant. The committee 
issued a strict regulation of silk making and distribution. It required:  
All the silk manufacturers must use the modern machine, otherwise they 
cannot get the manufacture permit from the self-government; all the silk 
products must meet the standard formulated by the self-government; the 
products that cannot meet the standard are strictly forbade from selling.  
Under such the strict supervision, Zhenping silk rapidly resumed its original 
fame and became again a popular product in the market of Shanghai and Wuhan372. 
At the same time, the self-government set up some “the people’s factories”, 
like the cotton-cloth factories and dye-works. These small factories employed the 
poor peasants. Their products were sold in Zhenping and neighboring counties. Peng 
hoped that, by this way, the peasant’s income could be increased. In 1931, the 
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self-government established the “woman’s workshop of plaited straw” and recruited 
poor young women in the countryside. Such the workshop was both a factory and a 
school, in which these women workers would learn the skill of making hats and take 
the basic course of reading and writing. 
From the late 1920s, Bie Tingfang began his work of developing the local 
industry373. In 1929, Bie established the Zhongshan silk factory in Neixiang. The 
factory had more than sixty workers and could manufacture the mountain silk, 
jacquard silk, and other silk products. The annual output of the factory was more 
than ten thousands rolls. Most of these products were sold to Henan, Hubei, Anhui, 
and Shaanxi374. In 1932, Bie set up the Yuda winery, which had fifty-five workshops 
and its annual output was sixty tons. The products were sold to Shaanxi and 
Hubei375. 
Chen Shunde mentioned that “in the economy of Xichuan, industry is the most 
backward.”376 After an investigation, the self-government of Xichuan found that the 
cheap and good-quality cloth was the goods that the peasants purchased the most. 
Thus, the self-government set up the people’s livelihood factory, which could produce 
the cotton cloth and other daily necessities. The workers of the factory came from the 
poorest families in the countryside. Because Xichuan was famous for its peach, plum, 
apricot, and vegetables, the self-government formed a canned food company. The 
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company purchased the fruits and vegetables from the peasants and canned them to 
sell outside the county. 
In the 1930s, the most remarkable achievement of the local industry of Wanxi 
was the Lotus Temple Ridge Hydropower Plant, which was built by Bie Tingfang in 
1933. Before the Plant, there was a small thermal power plant in Neixiang. It had 
one Siemens 12.5 kW DC generator, which could generate fifteen thousands kWh 
every year. But the small plant could not meet the demand of the economic 
development. In 1936, Bie Tingfang invested millions dollars to build a modern 
hydropower plant in the Lotus Temple Ridge. The general installed capacity of the 
Plant was 97.5 Kw, and it could generate 360,000 kWh every year. It was the first 
hydropower plant in the history of Henan. It caused a sensation in the province. On 
the main entrance of the Plant, there was a couplet:  
The blue water gives the industry impetus. And one million lights shine 
upon peace. 
Bie spent so much time and energy in the Plant. An Juchen, the chief engineer 
of the Plant, was employed by Bie with high salary from Xi’an. The salary was 
much higher than those of the senior officers of mintuan had. One of them felt unfair 
and detained An Juchen. When Bie heard the news, he came to the plant 
immediately. When he saw An being bound, he himself untied the engineer and 
cleaned dirties on his face. Then, before the crowd, Bie slapped the senior officer 
and forced him knelt down before the engineer to apologize377. 
Traffic and telecommunication 
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Before the local self-government, there was no highway and telephone in 
Zhenping. From 1930, the self-government invested a huge amount of money in 
building road. By the spring of 1931, there were eleven high-quality roads, and the 
total length of them was one hundred and twenty-six kilometers. These roads 
connected Zhenping with Nanyang City, Neixiang, and Deng. Inside Zhenping, every 
ward, key towns, and important villages had a main road that could reach the 
downtown directly. A roads network came into being in the county. Besides building 
roads, Peng set up more than two hundreds kilometers telephone line and built 
thirteen telephone stations378. 
Xichuan was surrounded by mountains and was the most closed county in 
Nanyang. The self-government tried to break the closeness by building roads379. In 
1935, it built the North road, which was one hundred kilometers long, four meters 
broad. Then, the self-government planed to build another eighty-five kilometers road, 
which would connect Xichuan with the road network of Neixiang. To make things 
convenient for the peasants, the government built the standard road inside every 
ward. Meanwhile, the self-government set up telephone line around the county. 
From 1931, building road became an important work in Neixiang. Bie 
Tingfang organized a reconnoiter team, and crossed over himself mountain after 
mountain to design the best route. When the work began, he demanded all officers 
of mintuan and all officials of the county government must participate in. By 1936, a 
                                                 
378 Zhenping xian difang zizhi shimo 镇平县地方自治始末 (The Local Self-government of Zhenping 
County), pp. 47-8. 
379 Wang Shifan 王士范, Xichuan xian difang zizhi sannian jihua gaiyao 淅川县地方自治三年计划
概要 (The Three-year Plan of the Local Self-government of Xichuan County), pp. 47-8. 
 196
complete road network was built in Neixiang, which connected Neixiang with 
Zhenping, Deng, Xichuan, and Hubei. The total length was 1,189 kilometers380. To 
help the peasants’ life, beside the highway, Bie constructed the “bullock cart road” 
on which the cattle carts could walk. The bao and jia along these roads were in 
charge of the maintenance work. After raining, the head of bao and jia would 
organize the residents to put sands on the road to prevent it being slippery; and after 
snow, they would lead the peasants to clean the road. On both side of these roads, 
there were trees planted in good order. 
There had been one telecommunication station in Neixiang. Nevertheless, 
because it had no fund, there was neither equipment nor staff in the station. In 1930, 
Bie decided to set up the countywide telephone line. Before his death, there were 
nine hundreds and ninety-one kilometers telephone line and more than two hundreds 
telephones in Neixiang381. Theses phones could directly dial to Nanyang, Zhenping, 
Deng, Xichuan, all bao offices, and all checkpoints of mintuan. 
The financial system 
To control the local economy, Bie Tingfang built a semi-independent financial 
system in Neixiang382. In 1928, the self-government issued its own currency 
“Neixiang Paper Money”, which had four denominations: one-cent, twenty-cent, 
one-hundred-cent and five-hundred-cent. In 1932, Bie printed one-dollar paper 
money in Wuhan, which was of equal value with one silver dollar. This paper money 
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could be used in Zhenping, Nanyang, and other counties. In 1935, Bie issued new 
paper money and the denomination included five-dollar and ten-dollar. Zhenping has 
its own currency, too383. It had three types: “silver”, “paper” and “copper”. They 
were circulated in Zhenping. Nevertheless, because these currencies enjoyed a good 
reputation, in some places of Shaanxi and Hubei, like Xi’an, Shangluo, and 
Xiangfan, they could be converted. Surprisingly, in Zhenping, the peasants had 
confidence in the difangpiao (the local paper money) rather than fabi (the official 
money issued by the central government). 
 
4) Public welfares 
In the countryside, if there were serious natural disasters or man-made 
calamities, the ordinary peasants’ life would be put into trouble. Usually, they had 
not enough money to buy the necessary crop seeds, production tools, livestock, and 
fertilizer. To survive, they had to borrow money under an extremely high interest, 
from the wealthy landowner or loan sharks. To change the situation, Peng Yuting set 
up the Peasant Loan Counter and Rural Credit Co-op in 1931384. In the same year, 
Bie Tingfang established the similar co-op organization in Neixiang385. By them, the 
self-governments of Wanxi could provide the peasants the necessary money to 
maintain their life in the year of disaster. 
In Zhenping, the social relief work was one of the important tasks of the 
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self-government386. In 1930, Peng extended the Zhenping Orphanage into a relief 
station, in which all homeless people, beggars, and orphans could live. The station 
would teach them some practical skills, like carving bamboo, carpentry, ironwork, 
construction work, and weaving. After the training, the self-government would give 
him or her some money to run a small business or recommend them a job. Besides 
the relief station, in 1931, Peng ordered that there should be at least one public 
granary in every village and town, which could provide the necessary grains for 
peasants when there was natural disaster. 
In Wanxi, the medical condition of the countryside was extremely poor. The 
self-governments of Wanxi tried to improve the situation by some practical ways387. 
In 1933, Bie founded a traditional Chinese medicine school in Neixiang and 
employed some retired military surgeons and experienced TCM doctors as the teacher. 
When the students of the school finished their study, they would go to the villages and 
towns and provide the basic medical service for the rural residents. In 1934, Bie 
established a hospital. When the peasants came here to see doctor, they need just to 
pay the registration fee, and all medicines were free. If the patient was hospitalized, 
except the living fee—twenty cents a day, they do not need to pay the medicine fee. In 
Xichuan, Chen Shunde thought the TCM hospital was much more suitable for the 
rural area, because it could provide good medical care with low price. Thus, he set up 
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a TCM hospital in the downtown and clinics in every ward. To prevent the smallpox, 
Chen asked the residents to get the free vaccination in every spring. 
To increase the peasant’s consciousness of hygiene, Bie Tingfang required the 
village night school offered the course of public hygiene to the residents. Moreover, 
the self-government taught the peasants that the toilet should be built in a place far 
from the household, and the members should try their best to keep it clean; 
everybody should kill flies; the parents should have their children vaccinated 
(against smallpox) on time, etc. In 1934, Bie built a public bathhouse for the 
peasants, and urged them to bath on a regular basis388. In 1935, he organized the 
labor service team, in which there was a hygiene sub-team. The duty of the sub-team 
was to inspect the public and household hygiene in the village, and teach the farmers 
some basic hygienic knowledge. Besides them, it did a free medical examination for 
the rural residents. In Xichuan, there were the similar medical teams in the 
countryside. 
 
5) The development of education 
In Zhenping of the 1920s, there were only forty-three primary schools, and most 
of them were in the downtown. The number of the students that registered in these 
schools was only 1,200. In other words, there were only three students in every 
thousand people in Zhenping. Peng realized that if the rural education could not be 
improved, it would be impossible for the county to achieve a great social development. 
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He required that, there should be at least one primary school in every ward and big 
town, and one simple primary school in every village. Besides these primary schools, 
the self-government of Zhenping set up some senior primary schools and middle 
schools. 
One of the problems of these new schools was that there were not enough 
quality teachers. Peng tried to solve the problem in multiple ways. He chose some 
teachers of the old-style private school and educated man in the countryside to 
participate in some short training sessions, in which they studied modern Chinese, 
phonetics, and mathematics. After the training, they would be the teacher of the 
village primary school. In the middle school, Peng set up the “class of normal 
education”. Students in such the classes were the potential teacher of the primary 
school. Lastly, the self-government encouraged some outstanding students to apply 
for the normal school in Kaifeng and other major cities of Henan. The successful 
applicants would be financed by the self-government. Peng hoped that, after their 
study, they would return to Zhenping. 
The education advocated by Peng was special, which emphasized that the rural 
education in Zhenping should meet the demand of self-defense, self-government, and 
self-prosperity. In his words, the rural education should be “three in one”, or an 
incorporation of “pen, hoe, and gun”. Peng explained that “pen” meant that these 
educated people could teach other people; “hoe” was that they were not eggheads, but 
could live well through their own labors; and “gun” referred that these people could 
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fight against the bandits and the bandit-style army389. 
Before the local self-government, there were only sixteen primary schools in 
Neixiang. When Bie became the leader of the county, he did his best to develop the 
local education390. In 1931, Bie Tingfang confiscated the land properties of more than 
one hundred temples and ancestral halls. He sold some of them to raise money for the 
education fund, and the left ones were used as the school campus. Then, the 
self-government ordered that there must be at least one senior primary school in every 
ward, and one primary school in every bao.  To encourage more children to go to 
school, the self-government worked out a program such that any child who studied in 
the public primary and middle school would be exempted from the tuition and 
miscellaneous fees; student in the primary school did not need to participate in the 
public works organized by the self-government; and student in the middle school was 
exempted from the military service. 
In Neixiang, teacher was respected very much. At the beginning day of every 
semester, from Bie Tingfang and other senior officials of the self-government, to the 
head of bao and jia, they would hold a feast for the teachers of the primary and middle 
school in the downtown and the countryside. In the feast, these officials would 
sincerely express their gratitude to the teachers. 
Chen Shunde did good works on developing the rural education in Xichuan. 
There was at least one senior primary school in every ward, and one primary school in 
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every village. To improve the teacher’s quality, from 1935, the self-government set up 
the summer school for the teacher of primary school. And, the government organized 
the committee of textbook, which had the duty of updating and upgrading the 
textbooks that used in the primary school. To the primary education, Chen Shunde 
emphasized that teacher should teach children four “keys” of the life—morality, esprit 
de corps, art, and independent spirit. 
In the middle school, there were special classes for the talented students. They 
were taught with the advanced mathematics, physics, and English, and some of them 
would be sent to college or university. Students from the poor families could get the 
financial aid of the self-government. Ordinary students could choose one practical 
course, like afforestation or raising silkworm. To the children that had the talent in 
writing, music, or drawing, Chen required the government organize an exam for them. 
If they passed it, they could take some special courses offered by the self-government. 
After their efforts, the rural education of Wanxi was greatly improved. By 1933, 
in Zhenping, there were four hundreds and forty-seven middle and primary schools, in 
which there were 23,901 registered students. Compare with 1927, the number of 
school and student increased twelve times. The percentage of students in the total 
population was 6%, which were twenty times as many as in 1927391. In Neixiang, by 
1940, there were more than three hundreds schools and more than thirty thousands 
students392. The work of Xichuan was the most successful. In 1931 and 1937, the 
Ministry of Education of the central government awarded the county’s work of 
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promoting the rural education, and marked it as the A class393. 
In the rural area, there were many illiterate adults. They were too busy in the 
agricultural work to take the full-time course. Therefore, the self-governments of 
Wanxi tried to offer them some basic courses of reading and writing that would not 
affect their labor. In Zhenping, Peng Yuting set up many village night schools for the 
adult peasants. The self-government required that all illiterate adult residents, aged 
from fifteen to fifty, take the basic course in the night school. To help them, Peng 
wrote himself the textbook in simple and vivid words394. From 1932, Bie Tingfang led 
the mass education movement in Neixiang. In 1936, there was one night school in 
every bao. Xichuan set up the “People’s school” in every village395. 
In the region, the Rural Normal School of Wanxi played an important role in 
the local education396. In the joint-defense conference of 1930, the four leaders of 
Wanxi unanimously agreed to set up the rural normal school in Neixiang. The 
construction work was completed in 1932. It occupied sixty mu lands, and had four 
hundreds classrooms and an auditorium that could hold eight hundreds people. 
Outside the campus, there was a twenty-mu playground. An independent 
experimental area was attached to the school. The school was divided into two parts. 
One was for the full-time students. The other was for the officials of the 
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self-governments of Wanxi. 
Peng Yuting was elected as the President. After his assassination, Bie Tingfang 
was in charge of the school. In 1933, it enrolled more than two hundreds students. In 
1935, the normal school incorporated three middle schools. In 1937, the number of 
the students increased to six hundreds. By 1940, it developed into a complete normal 
school. Before it was closed in 1948, in the school, there were one thousand and two 
hundreds normal school students, five hundreds advanced normal school students, 
and five hundreds secondary school students. In the period of the local 
self-government, it trained more than two thousands officials of the 
self-governments of Wanxi. 
The normal school was not only an education center, but also the political 
headquarters of the local self-government of Wanxi. Since Bie controlled the school, 
many important matters of the self-government were discussed in the school’s 
boardroom. The self-government of Zhenping, Neixiang, and Xichuan demanded 
that all grass-root officials, like the head of joint-bao, bao, and jia, and teachers of 
primary school must come to the school and take training sessions. The course 
included sanminzhuyi, the political idea of Peng Yuting, the local self-government, 
the rural reconstruction, and so on. 
 
6) Abolishing the bad customs and habits 
As other rural areas in the north China, in the 1920s and 1930s, there were many 
bad customs and habits in Wanxi. Among them, smoking opium, excessive gambling, 
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and the drowning of female infants were the most serious. When the local 
self-government started, the leaders did their best to abolish them by the severe 
methods. 
In the early days of the Republic of China, it was habitual for the residents of 
Wanxi to plant and smoke opium. In some places, when a guest came, the house 
owner would use the homemade opium paste to treat him. Peng Yuting hated such 
habit and determined to stop it at all cost397. In 1930, Peng ordered to destroy all the 
opium dens in Zhenping. Then, the self-government investigated every ward, village, 
and town to find out the opium-smokers. These smokers must come to the ward office 
in person, where they filled in the form and paid the fine. In the fall, the 
self-government passed The Law of Forbidding Opium, it stipulated:  
Anyone who runs opium den, sells opium pipe, roasted opium, and other 
opium-related things, will be promptly executed as soon as the case is 
verified; any household that has one member who smokes opium must pay 
two silver dollars a month, and the fine doubles monthly; anyone who 
declares he has given up smoking must turn over all opium pipes and 
relative stuffs to the government. If he is found smoke opium again, he will 
be executed promptly. Anyone that covers up the smoker or evades the fine 
will be executed, etc. 
Moreover, from the September of 1932, nobody was allowed to plant opium in 
Zhenping. In Neixiang, Bie issued the order of forbidding opium in 1931 398 . 
According to the order:  
All the opium smokers must be registered and turn over their opium pipe 
to the government; if there is any person smoke again, not only the smoker 
but also the head of jia, bao, and joint-bao he lives in will be severely 
punished; if the smoker is an official of the self-government, the 
punishment will be doubled.  
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Bie set up a compulsory center of quitting opium, where all smokers were put 
together and forced to put on special clothes and labor in the construction site399. 
The local residents called them “the team of opium pipe”. In Xichuan, Chen Shunde 
followed Bie’s way and promised that the opium and its smoker would disappear by 
1936400. 
Gambling was a bad habit that lasted thousands years in the countryside of 
China. From 1932, gambling was forbidden everywhere in Zhenping. Peng Yuting 
racked his brains to persuade the peasants from gambling. Peng once got a report 
that some people were gambling while they were watching a local drama. Peng put 
on casual clothes and went to the village. When the gamblers recognized Peng, they 
were frightened. Peng did not punish them, but stepped on the stage and gave a 
speech on the harm of excessive gambling to the personal life and society. Finally, 
Peng warned them that if they gambled again, they would face the severe 
punishment. In the slack season, Peng organized the peasants to participate in the 
drills of mintuan or construction work. Since 1933, one typical scene of the 
countryside—idling farmers sitting together and gambling—was seldom seen in 
Zhenping. 
In Neixiang, Bie contended that “gambling is the fountainhead of the 
banditry.” Consequently, he ordered the head of ward, joint-bao, bao, and jia must 
examine the household one by one to confiscate all the gambling tools, and then 
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burned them in public. After that, any people who gambled inside or outside his 
home would be fined and sentenced the hard labor in the construction site, and at the 
same, the head of bao and jia he lived in would be punished. Bie encouraged the 
residents to report anyone who was gambling to mintuan. When the report was 
verified, half of the money confiscated would be awarded to the reporter. 
After the census, Peng found that the number of the females was seventy 
thousands less than males401. The reason was that, affected by the thought of “man is 
superior to woman”, many peasants drowned the female infant. In 1932, Peng 
Yuting published a statement, in which he told the peasants how the disproportion of 
the male and female population would undermine the nation in the long run. The 
self-government demanded that all heads of village and town keep a close watch on 
the household that had a female infant. Any household that drowned the female 
infant would be severely punished by the government. 
Besides the work of forbidding opium, gambling and the drowning of female 
infants, the self-governments of Wanxi tried to abolish some bad habits in the daily 
life of the peasants. For example in Neixiang, smoking cigarette was also forbidden. 
In the county, anyone, who sold or smoked cigarette, would be fined. In every 
joint-bao, there was a special checkpoint, whose duty was to check and confiscate 
the cigarette that the passenger had. In the Rural Normal School of Wanxi, there 
were many teachers, who were the chain-smokers. Although Bie Tingfang respected 
them very much, they must strictly abide by the order of forbidding cigarette. They 
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had no choice but smoking the water pipe instead. In Xichuan, although the life was 
poor, the residents were very wasteful in the wedding ceremony and funeral. Chen 
Shunde set up a special society to promote the industrial and thrifty way of life. The 
society had branch in every ward and bao. 
Dropping lawsuit 
In Henan, the people of Nanyang were called “fight-cock”. The term referred 
that they had the bellicose trait and were easily involved in lawsuits. Since the 
establishment of the Republic of China, although the modern legal system was 
adopted by the nationalist government, it did not exerted great influence on the 
countryside. In the rural area, it was the traditional pettifogger but not the modern 
lawyer who dealt with the lawsuits. To make profits, pettifoggers would collude with 
the wealthy and powerful families in the countryside, the village and county 
policemen, and the judges of county courts to cheat and racketeer the ordinary 
peasants. To make things worse, they deliberately provoked the conflicts between the 
rural residents from which they could make profits. In his speech, Peng Yuting 
pointed out that:  
Every year, there were at least five thousands lawsuits in our county. The 
cost of one lawsuit was at least two hundreds chuan (string) coppers. The 
total cost of these lawsuits would be more than one million! Around you, 
there are how many ordinary people that are robbed of family fortunes by 
these bottomless-pit-like lawsuits?402 
In 1930, Peng set up the General Society of Dropping Lawsuits, which had the 
branch in every ward and village or town. If the peasants had the dispute over land, 
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house, personal fortune, and something else, they should report it to the society, and 
the society would handle it by the relative law. The mediator of the society was chosen 
from the moral and righteous people in the countryside. To supervise their work, the 
self-government issued some regulations, in which anything that could jeopardize the 
legal justice, such as drinking, attending feast, and meeting plaintiff or defender alone, 
was strictly forbidden. Neixiang had the similar organization, which was called the 
“Committee of Mediation”, and it was put under the direct control of the headquarters 
of mintuan403. The result of the work was encouraging in Zhenping. In 1931, there 
were three hundreds and forty-five lawsuits in the county. In 1933, the number sharply 
decreased to seventy cases. The next year, the number dropped to 31404. 
Dropping lawsuit could be regarded as a unique work in the self-government of 
Wanxi and it had two principles. On one hand, it stressed on the function of the 
traditional Confucian ethics in dealing with the rural lawsuit. In the publications of the 
General Society of Dropping Lawsuit of Zhenping, the self-government hoped that 
people could be more “zhong (honest)”, “shu (altruistic)”, “ren (patient)”, and “rang 
(tolerant)”. On the other hand, it took the present civil law as the basis. Peng 
understood well that, law could not be replaced by traditional moral teaching, because 
the former was clearer and more accurate. Thus, The Civil Law of the Republic of 
China became the supreme rule in the work of dropping lawsuit405. 
Compared with other rural reconstruction experiments, Wanxi did not stress 
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only one aspect of the rural reconstruction, but deal with all aspects of the rural 
development. These local leaders hoped that, through their efforts, the society of 
Wanxi could be upgraded all-round. To some extent, the work Wanxi did was not just 
a rural reconstruction, but also a systematic local state building. The reason why 
Wanxi could promote such a comprehensive reconstruction, which could not be done 
by other experiments, was because it had the full autonomy. In fact, almost all rural 
reconstruction experiments wanted the full autonomy to perform their reform. 
However, to most of them, the political right that given by the central or provincial 
authorities was not satisfying. To the central government, in the RRM, any (unofficial) 
experiment that touched the sensitive topic of power was suspicious and dangerous. 
The full autonomy Wanxi enjoyed was grabbed from the hands of the Guomindang’s 
provincial government by the military—mintuan—and political—a semi-independent 
local self-government—method. Such the way guaranteed that, in a given time, the 
local elites could promote their rural reconstruction program without the interference 
from the superior government. That was the most significant reason why the local 
self-government of Wanxi could achieve something in the rural reconstruction. 
The model had its limits. Because the autonomy was based on the local armed 
force, the local politics was, at least partly, militarized. Thus, the leaders of Wanxi 
particularly emphasized on the social control. For example in Neixiang, mintuan had 
incorporated the civil administrative organ. The head of the sub-team of mintuan was 
“trinity”: he was a military officer, the primary school teacher, and the assistant head 
of bao. Similarly, the 2nd head of the joint-team of mintuan was the director of the 
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People’s School and the assistant head of joint-bao 406 . The militarized social 
administration was a good tool of controlling and mobilizing the mass. However, 
under the tight control, the people turned out inactive. Bie Tingfang admitted that the 
local self-government achieved only in stabilizing the society but the initiative of the 
people remained blunted.407 In other words, although the performance of Wanxi was 
better than those of the intellectual-led experiments, it did not solve once and for all 
the problem of inactivity of the peasants in the Rural Reconstruction Movement. 
To strengthen the social administration, the method Wanxi employed was too 
oversimplified and crude. In Zhenping, if there were one member joined the banditry, 
the total household would be executed. To forbid opium, Peng Yuting 
indiscriminately executed the smokers. Although these severe methods had the 
deterrent force, they greatly worsen the feelings of the ordinary peasants. In the period 
of the local self-government, the society of Wanxi became more closed. The system of 
bao-jia and “five permits” jeopardized the mobility of the rural residents. The policy 
of forbidding the sale of foreign goods and products that made in places outside 
Wanxi was a very backward local economic seclusionism and made the economy of 
the region less competitive. One of the prime goals of RRM was to break the 
closeness of the countryside. Unfortunately, what Wanxi did ran in the opposite 
direction. 
The dual nature of the leader of Wanxi damaged the legitimacy of the local 
self-government. It was conspicuous in Bie Tingfang’s activities. In the period of 
                                                 
406 Luo Zhuoru and Bie Tingfang 罗桌如、别廷芳, Neixiang xian jianshe gongzuo baogao 内乡县建
设工作报告 (The Report of the Construction Work of Neixiang County), p. 237. 
407 Ibid, p. 236. 
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forbidding cigarette, although the ordinary residents would be severely punished if 
they violate the ban, the senior officers of mintuan and the powerful local elite could 
be freed from any punishment. To make things worse, Bie secretly encouraged the 
people to plant opium and sell them to areas outside Wanxi, in which he extracted a 
huge amount of tax. The number was estimated more than 4,000,000 silver dollars408. 
Xixiakou, where the headquarters of mintuan was located in, was a famous opium 
trade center. Bie even provided the armed escort for the opium smuggler. Besides 
smuggling opium, Bie involved himself in trafficking arms409. These illegal activities 
seriously undermined the clean and righteous image of the local self-government of 
Wanxi. 
From the point of local state building, Wanxi was half-and-half in contributions 
and blunders. In the chaotic time, by its own way, Wanxi did good work on 
suppressing banditry, developing the local economy, and popularizing the primary 
education. In other words, the local self-government of Wanxi accomplished the work 
of developing local society, which could not be done by the central and provincial 
government in the region. Notwithstanding these merits, the local self-government 
was limited by its local vision, and some of its policies impeded the regional 
modernization. In the field of central-local relation, the way of Wanxi—it was marked 
by the semi-independent and militarized local self-government—was dangerous for 
the state and could not be legalized by the central authorities. If the state approved of 
                                                 
408 Nanyang diqu zhi 南阳地区志 (The General Record of Nanyang) (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin 
chubanshe河南人民出版社, 1993), p. 878. 
409 Xu Youli 徐有礼, Sanshi niandai Wanxi xiangcun jianshe moshi yanjiu 三十年代宛西乡村建设
模式研究 (A Study on the Rrual Reconstruction Mode of Wanxi in the 1930s), p. 185. 
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the model of Wanxi, the locality would grab more and more power and the central 
government would be further weakened. However, in the Republican period, what 
China need the most was a powerful and centralized national government. 
It seemed that there was no way of settling the problem. If modernization was 
indeed the prime goal of the modern state building of China, it should be divided into 
two parts. One was the national-level modernization, which should be done by the 
central government. The other was the regional-level modernization that should be 
promoted by the locality. The two kinds of modernization interacted. To promote the 
regional modernization, the central government must give the locality more political 
rights. Only by such the way, the energy of the locality could be released. Therefore, 
to do that, there must be a reconfiguration of the central-local power. In the process, 
the danger to the power of the locality could be over-emphasized. To avoid the danger, 
the central government turned out more conservative in the central-local relation. In 
the eyes of the locality, the conservativeness of the central authorities was 
unreasonable. How to handle the matter? The central government in the Republican 




This thesis examines the history of the local self-government of Wanxi from 
1930 to 1940. As it argues in previous chapters, the local self-government of Wanxi 
was neither generated by a grand social idea nor led by some 
internationally-esteemed scholars or historical figures. Rather, it was the region’s 
spontaneous response to the social problems caused by rampant banditry and abject 
poverty. Local elites, who were dissatisfied with the official administration’s 
indifference and inability such as Peng Yuting, Bie Tingfang, and Chen Shunde, 
regarded it as a “self-salvation movement”. The first step of “self-salvation” was to 
eliminate the bandit gangs as soon as possible, as they were the most ferocious 
enemies of Wanxi. Their method was to create a powerful new-style 
militia—mintuan. Under Peng and Bie’s guidance, this new local armed force was 
put under strict military and political training. In this process, Peng paid great 
attention to instill the idea of local self-government into the young soldiers. He 
hoped that every mintuan member understands that joining the mintuan did not 
mean that they became private soldiers of the local power-holder but rather as active 
participants in promoting the local self-government. Hence, Peng convinced them 
that the stabilization and development of Wanxi would ultimately be helpful to the 
nation’s rehabilitation. 
Mintuan was a double-edges sword and exerted great influence on the local 
self-government of Wanxi. It was both a military and an administrative organ. On 
one hand, its efficacy of eliminating banditry was prompt. It was the mintuan that 
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terminate the rampancy of banditry, which lasted for decades in this region. Teams 
and sub-teams of mintuan penetrated every village of Wanxi and played the decisive 
role in suppressing banditry and maintaining social order. On the other hand, 
mintuan was a great tool of mobilizing rural residents. The head of mintuan at each 
level was not only a military officer but also a civil administrator. Besides his 
military duties, he was in charge of many civil affairs. In this period, one of the 
reasons why the local self-government of Wanxi achieved rigid social control could 
possibly be attributed to the mintuan’s dual function. 
Nevertheless, the negative influence of mintuan was very obvious. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the local politics of Wanxi was “militarized”. The 
commencement of promoting the local self-government was organizing and training 
this local armed force, which rendered the local leaders of Wanxi fond of performing 
social administration by military methods. Although Peng Yuting attempted to 
establish an institution of grass-root civil administration, which was characterized by 
direct election, his early death stopped him from preventing the militarization of the 
local politics. The other two leaders of Wanxi, Bie Tingfang and Chen Shunde, 
firmly believed that only severe punishments could be employed to control local 
residents. After Peng’s death, Bie became the dominant figure of the local 
self-government. Unaccountable stories of his excessive execution showed that local 
people of Wanxi were very much fearful of Bie’s “iron-blood” policy. 
The existence of mintuan rendered the leaders of Wanxi capable of remolding 
local administration in spite of Guomindang’s county governments in this region. 
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The failure of the provincial government’s effort in resuming the state power could 
be partially attributed to this powerful local armed force. The provincial government 
had to give up the idea of military attack but employ political means to check Wanxi. 
Guomindang’s county-level administration in this region was totally replaced by 
elite-controlled self-government organs. Consequently, Peng could launch the 
general election of village and ward head in Zhenping County, and Bie was able to 
push his militarized social control in Neixiang County. 
When it came to the issue of social administration, the leaders of Wanxi had 
very different ideas. Peng expected a lasting and efficient social administration that 
would have a cornerstone of civil institution. He proposed that the people of Wanxi 
could firstly perform election supervised by the self-government committee; next, 
they could carry out full-fledged self-government. He called this process “from 
gentry-governance to self-governance”. However, Bie and Peng did not think that 
such idea would be feasible in this region. After Peng’s assassination in 1933, Bie’s 
idea of “rule by severe punishment” won the day. From a long-term point of view, 
rigid social control preferred by Bie and Chen would eventually damage the 
openness of Wanxi and impede the social mobility of rural residents. 
After the fulfillment of creating mintuan and tight social control, the local 
self-government began to improve the rural society of Wanxi. Its rural reconstruction 
work embraced land resurvey, reduction of land-tax, developing of local industry, 
extending primary education, and so forth. Rural residents welcomed the local 
self-government’s new land tax, which was based on a fair land survey. However, 
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Peng and Bie did not change the structure of land ownership. What they did was just 
to limit local power-holder’s behavior of evading tax. To ordinary households, their 
standard of living was not very much increased, although the tax burden was 
reduced. In political reforms, the local self-government of Wanxi did not break the 
traditional mode of elite governance and ordinary peasants were not given more 
political rights. 
Overall, Wanxi had developed into a semi-independent political system, which 
aggressively extracted local military, political, and fiscal resources. To a large extent, 
local residents supported this political system and approbated the elites’ effort of 
improving the countryside. Notwithstanding this, we cannot simply claim that the 
local self-government of Wanxi had full legitimacy. As a competitive local political 
system, which had its own armed forces and independent self-government organ, it 
could not avoid being suspected by the ruling party’s provincial agent. The 
self-government’s way of decreasing this tension was to openly declare that the idea 
of promoting local self-government in Wanxi was in conformity with Sun 
Zhongshan’s sanminzhuyi, the guiding ideology of Guomindang. Peng even 
proposed a “reshaped sanminzhuyi” to justify the local self-government. His 
painstakingly-reformulated regionalism sounded very attractive, but failed in 
persuading the provincial government to change its hostile attitude towards Wanxi. 
When Bie Tingfang, the most powerful leader of Wanxi, passed away, this region 
was reincorporated into the political domain of Guomindang’s Henan. 
Therefore, how can we interpret the history of Wanxi in the paradigm of 
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state-society relationship? Here, I cannot agree more with Li Huaiyin’s argument410. 
Li points out that earlier scholarship employed the “paradigm of binary opposition” 
in dealing with the relationship between state and society. This therefore resulted in 
two contrasting scenarios: “an autocratic state was penetrating all the way down to” 
the countryside; in the meanwhile, the autonomous local society was “operating 
against government control”. If we put Wanxi into such context, we either denounce 
Wanxi as a “separatist regime” and its leaders as “local bullies and evil gentry” or 
commended Wanxi’s “radical” policy out of sympathy. As Li suggests, such 
paradigm could not explain the complexity of state-society relationship in modern 
China; and, the “either-or” formula could not reveal the “mutual dependence” 
between state and society. Accordingly, he suggests that we find “an alternative 
conceptual framework”. 
When we think about the history of Wanxi, we do not need to be limited by the 
paradigm of “the dichotomous opposition between state and society”. It is 
unnecessary for us to contend whether the local self-government of Wanxi was 
“anti-governmental” or local elites such as Peng Yuting and Bie Tingfang were 
“separatists”. That is to say, it would be more beneficial to concern ourselves with a 
more important issue: whether these local elite’s work of rural reconstruction would 
ultimately benefit the country’s modernization? Objectively speaking, their work 
was worthy of praise. They implemented what could not be done by state in the 
countryside. Even though the top-echelon officials in the provincial and central 
                                                 
410 Huaiyin Li, Village Governance in North China, 1875-1936 (Standford: Standford University, 
2005), pp.6-9. 
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government resented Peng and Bie’s seizure of power from the Guomindang, they 
had to admit that Wanxi did a good job in improving the rural society. This situation 
mirrored an awkward reality: the result of the central government’s effort in 
rehabilitating the countryside was very poor. Moreover, it implied that to find the 
solution to rural problems, the state had to rely on local initiatives. In other words, 
the central government should “transfer’ some political power to the local society. 
This thesis does not very much appreciate Wanxi’s means of promoting local 
self-government. Although Peng defended himself in his speeches, public execution 
of the officially-appointed county magistrates and the making of Guomindang’s 
county government into a mere figurehead could generate nothing but deeper 
suspicion and hostility. The political “freedom” Wanxi enjoyed was transient and 
could not be perpetual. Ultimately, the provincial government resumed its rule in 
this region. When the rule was resumed, the rural rehabilitation work fell in a 
standstill. Hence, the history of Wanxi might imply that in the configuration of the 
power between state and society, there should be a “compromise”, by which both the 
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